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Abstract 
 
This thesis makes an innovative argument for global justice by exploring neglected 
areas of Rawlsian theory, and using New Zealand as a case study. An enquiry into the 
Rawlsian view of domestic justice is included because it acts as a basis for Rawlsian global 
justice.  
In giving its view of global justice, the thesis argues for a global difference principle 
focused on persons. This argument includes an exploration of a neglected aspect of the 
principle; how it is constrained by the duty of assistance and the just savings principle. The 
thesis will also show that the global difference principle makes demands on developed 
nations because they can help realize the principle by improving conditions in developing 
nations by using Official Development Assistance (ODA). It is also likely that developed 
nations can improve conditions in the developing world by using the international factor of 
trade. However, rather than just focusing on this factor, the thesis reasons it is best to use this 
factor in tandem with ODA. The thesis also shows that developed nations should provide 
ODA by demonstrating how the numerous pledges made by developed nations over the years 
regarding ODA amount to promises, and that promises have moral significance.  
Before moving on to discuss New Zealand’s ODA programme, the thesis examines 
one of Rawls’s international principles of justice, the freedom and independence of peoples 
principle, and how it applies to New Zealand. In making an argument for the principle, the 
thesis shows how the principle can fit into a global justice framework, and adds to the 
literature by showing how the principle should treat small polities. The thesis also assesses 
how New Zealand’s history of colonialism has and has not respected the principle. This 
history also affects New Zealand’s ODA programme, so much so that one can be justified in 
describing this programme as being a relic of this history. This programme will be the subject 
of the final topic-based chapter. Previous assessments of the programme have been done with 
no, or a limited, normative framework. By this point a detailed Rawlsian normative 
framework, along with a picture of ODA’s efficacy, is in place, and is used to analyse the 
programme. This analysis includes the policy recommendations of monetarily enlarging the 
programme, focusing the programme on the globally least advantaged, and giving more of 
the programme’s funds to multilateral agencies
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Thomas Nagel starts his essay “The Problem of Global Justice” by saying “We do not 
live in a just world … may be the least controversial claim one could make in political 
theory.”1 However, Nagel then argues that due to “the perplexing and undeveloped state”2 of 
political theory on global justice, it is difficult to say what a just world is. In an attempt to 
draw a picture of one, Nagel contrasts two views.  First there is the cosmopolitan view that 
the “demands of justice derive from an equal concern or a duty of fairness that we owe in 
principle to all our fellow human beings”.3 Then there is what he calls the political view, 
exemplified in John Rawls’s The Law of Peoples (henceforth LoP), that states justice is 
primarily a relationship between “fellow citizens of a sovereign state”.4 This is because, 
according to this view, the institutions of state put, “fellow citizens of a sovereign state into a 
relation that they do not share with the rest of humanity” and that it is this relationship that 
must, “be evaluated by the special standards of fairness and equality that fill out the content 
of justice.”5 On one reading of this statist view, there is no such thing as global justice 
because there is no world state, or in other words, there is no global justice under global 
anarchy.
6
  
As we will see in this thesis, much of the debate over global justice is like how Nagel 
portrays it, with cosmopolitans on one side of the debate, and the statists, led by Rawls, on 
the other.
7
 There is a deep irony in this situation. In A Theory of Justice (henceforth ToJ), 
                                                 
1
 Thomas Nagel, ‘The Problem of Global Justice’, in Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 33, No. 2, (March 
2005), p. 113, DOI: 10.1111/j.1088-4963.2005.00027.x. 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 Ibid, p. 119. 
4
 Ibid, p. 120. 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Whether global justice might ultimately require a global or world state is a question I do not address in this 
thesis. Rawls is against a world state. He claims: 
 
[A] world government—by which I mean a unified political regime with the legal powers normally 
exercised by central governments—would either be a global despotism or else would rule over a fragile 
empire torn by frequent civil strife as various regions and peoples tried to gain their political freedom 
and autonomy. 
 
John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, with “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” (LoP), (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2002 [1999]), § 4.1, p. 36. However, Rawls does not base this claim 
on much evidence, and the success of the large federal state of the United States brings this claim into question.  
7
 Not all commentators see the debate over global justice divided in this way. Lea L. Ypi argues 
cosmopolitanism is compatible with a form of statism, which while not placing as much emphasis on fellow 
citizenship, still sees the state as the primary agency of achieving just goals. She argues, “political communities 
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published 28 years prior to LoP, Rawls presented a liberal egalitarian view of justice applied 
to one state.
8
 While ToJ did contain hints Rawls would take a different view of global 
justice
9
, many political philosophers, like Charles Beitz, thought a Rawlsian view of global 
justice should be cosmopolitan.
10
 Many in this group, like Allen Buchanan, were dismayed 
with the statist view given in LoP
11
, but there were other political philosophers, like Nagel, 
who were pleased.
12
 
In this thesis, I will argue LoP presents some defensible principles of justice, but 
Rawls should have presented a view on global justice more in keeping with the spirit of ToJ, 
which would mean having a global difference principle focused on persons. To show some of 
the implications of this view, and to make an original contribution to the literature, the thesis 
will look at how we can apply this view to a particular country, New Zealand.  
                                                                                                                                                        
[like states] provide the unique associative sphere in which cosmopolitanism obtains political agency, [and] may 
be legitimately enforced and cohesively maintained.” Since this thesis argues that we can start to realize a 
cosmopolitan goal, a global difference principle focused on persons, partly via Official Development Assistance 
(ODA), which is part of the state system, to a certain extent the thesis coheres with Ypi’s analysis. ‘Statist 
Cosmopolitanism’, The Journal of Political Philosophy, Vol. 16, No. 1, (March 2008), p. 48, DOI: 
10.1111/j.1467-9760.2008.00308.x. 
8
 I am not the first to note the irony in the difference between the views Rawls presents in A Theory of Justice 
(ToJ) and LoP. Catherine Audard notes, “It is ironic that the best-known theoretician of distributive justice 
should not regard distributive justice as appropriate to international relations.” ‘Peace or Justice: Some Remarks 
on Rawls’s Law of Peoples’, in Revue Internationale de Philosophie [International Journal of Philosophy], Vol. 
3, (2006), pp. 301-326, paragraph 10, also available at URL: 
http://www.cairn.info/article.php?ID_ARTICLE=RIP_237_0301, (accessed 9 December 2014).  
9
 The only place in ToJ where Rawls spends time on global justice is in a small section where he discusses the 
“just political principles regulating the conduct of states”, and this is to answer the question of when an 
individual is justified in refusing military service. In giving his answer, Rawls writes that he, “can give only an 
indication of the principles”, but thinks there would be, “no surprises”, and the principles would be, “familiar 
ones”.  Here Rawls has in mind the far from cosmopolitan principles traditionally found in international law. 
When discussing these principles, Rawls refers in a footnote to J. L. Brierly’s The Law of Nations, and states in 
regards to these familiar principles, this book, “contains all that we need here”. A Theory of Justice (ToJ), 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2005 [1971]), (revised edition 1999), § 58, pp. 377-378 
original edition/331-332 revised edition. However, Brierly goes further than Rawls suggests. While Brierly 
describes the state of international law at the time of writing, at certain points he expresses the hope states will 
strengthen their moral obligations to one another. For example, he writes:  
 
[I]n the society of states the need is not for greater liberty for the individual states, but for a 
strengthening of the social bond between them, not for the clamant assertion of their rights, but for a 
more insistent reminder of their obligations towards one another. 
 
The Law of Nations, (sixth edition), (Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 50-51.  
10
 Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 
pp. 126-176. Beitz was aware that in ToJ Rawls only supported limited principles of international justice.  Ibid. 
While still critical of this limited set, Beitz notes that Rawls includes a human rights principle and the duty of 
assistance, two principles not mentioned in ToJ. Beitz thinks, “These additions constitute substantial changes 
from A Theory of Justice and result in a considerably more progressive view.” ‘Rawls’s Law of Peoples’, in 
Ethics, Vol.110, No.4, (July 2000), p. 672, Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/233369. 
11
 Allen Buchanan, ‘Rawls’s Law of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian World’, in Ethics, Vol. 110, No. 
4 (July 2000), pp. 697-721, Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/233370. 
12
 Nagel thinks that what he calls Rawls’s political conception of global justice “is probably correct.” ‘The 
Problem of Global Justice’, p. 126. 
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Along with making original contributions, the thesis will also have exegetical value, 
clarifying some issues in Rawlsian theory. Exegesis is worthwhile in itself, but the main 
value of exegesis in this case is in providing a clearer theory, which will give a clearer view 
of global justice.   
A thesis on global justice needs to take a different stance from the one taken in LoP 
because LoP, in a sense, is not about global justice. The phrase “global justice” only appears 
once, and this is only so Rawls can dismiss the idea the phrase expresses.
13
 This reflects his 
position that the world stage is where questions of international justice arise between peoples 
(which Rawls sometimes presents as idealised versions of states).
14
   
I will use the phrase “global justice” repeatedly in this thesis because I will argue that 
while entities approximating peoples populate the world stage, this does not mean there 
should not be principles of justice that apply globally and focus on persons.  
Besides the introductory and concluding chapters, I divide the thesis into three parts. 
The first part of the thesis begins with chapter two and ends with chapter five. This part 
introduces Rawls’s distinction between ideal and nonideal theory but focuses more on ideal 
theory. In doing so, the first part of the thesis presents a Rawlsian cosmopolitan view of 
global justice that includes a global difference principle focused on persons.  
The second and third parts of the thesis focus more on nonideal theory. The second 
part proceeds from chapter six to chapter nine, and looks at how we might realize a global 
difference principle and other principles of global justice by using Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) and trade. While this part of the thesis will have more of an empirical 
focus, it will explore a number of issues in Rawlsian theory, most notably the Rawlsian view 
of promising.  
The third part of the thesis includes two chapters, chapters ten and eleven. In these 
chapters, we will take what we have learned in the first two parts of the thesis to give a moral 
analysis of two aspects of New Zealand’s foreign relations, its history of colonialism and its 
ODA programme. 
                                                 
13
 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, with “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 2002 [1999]), § 11.1, p. 82. As we will see in detail later, Rawls does discuss global 
distributive justice, but this is once again so he can dismiss the idea. 
14
 At one point Rawls describes the hypothetical Islamic society discussed in LoP, Kazanistan, as “an idealized 
Islamic people”. Ibid, § 9.3, p. 75. 
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Now that I have introduced the general structure of the thesis, I will move on to give 
an outline of each chapter.  
The first part of the thesis starts with the second chapter. This chapter starts by giving 
some reasons why I chose Rawls’s theory, but the argument for selecting Rawls’s theory will 
continue throughout the thesis. Part of this argument will occur later in this chapter when I 
consider Rawls’s argument for his domestic principles of justice. Before this, it will be 
necessary to lay some groundwork for Rawls’s argument. This will start with a description 
and discussion of Rawls’s distinction between ideal and nonideal theory. The chapter will 
then move on to an examination of part of Rawls’s ideal theory, which is his domestic model. 
This examination is necessary because a Rawlsian view of global justice needs this model as 
a basis. The second chapter will also include an investigation of what Rawls calls “the two 
moral powers”, which are the “sense of justice” and the “conception of the good”. The 
chapter will argue that the potential of virtually all persons to develop these powers is the 
main justification for treating persons equally. The chapter will then consider Rawls’s 
domestic principles of justice and his argument for why we should select them ahead of 
perfectionist and intuitionist principles. However, because the thesis focuses on Rawls’s 
difference principle, there will be a focus on, and endorsement of, Rawls’s argument that we 
should select this principle ahead of a utilitarian principle. To further buttress the argument in 
favour of the difference principle, I will go beyond the work of Rawls and consider the 
stricter forms of egalitarianism advocated by Kai Nelsen and G. A. Cohen. I will conclude 
that Nielsen’s argument and Cohen’s argument fail. 
Having investigated Rawls’s domestic model and the principles derived from it; in the 
third chapter, we will do the same for Rawls’s international model. In doing this we will first 
look at Rawls’s taxonomy of polities because Rawls bases his argument for having 
international principles of justice focused on peoples on the idea peoples are a type of polity 
that have a certain moral nature. He further contends that there are two types of peoples, 
liberal and decent. Along with peoples, Rawls identifies burdened societies, outlaw states, 
and benevolent absolutisms. Only the representatives of peoples select the principles of 
international justice, even though the principles apply to all polities.  
I will note that the representatives in the international original positions select from 
interpretations of principles rather than selecting from a range of principles. Besides the work 
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of Alyssa R. Bernstein, commentators have not discussed this issue, so this discussion, which 
builds on Bernstein’s work, will add to the literature.  
Having seen what Rawls’s thinks the domestic and international principles of justice 
are, in the fourth chapter I will argue that one of the clauses found in the domestic principles, 
the difference principle, should, pace Rawls, operate at the global level. This is because the 
main arguments for a domestic difference principle also apply at the global level.  
After this, the chapter will move on to respond to a number of Rawls inspired 
arguments against the global difference principle. This response will start by addressing the 
argument that a global difference principle would be unacceptable to non-liberal societies due 
to their views on the nature of persons. One reason I will give for rejecting this argument is 
that there is evidence that social and economic rights, which are similar to a global difference 
principle, are acceptable to actual hierarchical societies.  
The chapter will then consider the related argument, made by Rawls and developed by 
Philip Pettit, which claims the appropriate representatives in the international original 
positions are the representatives of peoples, and then claims that these representatives would 
not select a global difference principle focused on persons. I will question the first claim, and 
then argue that even if the first claim is true, the second claim does not follow. 
The chapter will then study an argument that is present but not fully developed in the 
current literature, namely the argument that international reasonable pluralism makes a global 
difference principle morally unacceptable. In response, the chapter argues international 
reasonable pluralism is not as extensive as Rawls argues it is, and that this fact weakens his 
argument.  
The chapter will then analyse the argument that a difference principle should target 
whom Rawls calls “the least advantaged”, and that this is not possible in the case of the globe 
because there is no globally least advantaged group. In response, I will argue that if we 
follow Rawls’s definition we can identify a globally least advantaged group. I will also note 
international institutions do something similar when they try to identify the world’s poor. 
 We will then assess Samuel Freeman’s argument that we should reject a global 
difference principle because it will clash with domestic difference principles. We will argue 
that we do not have to do this by showing how different difference principles can redistribute 
different resources.    
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Finally, the chapter will assess Nagel’s argument that Rawls’s principles apply to 
basic structures, and implies there is no global basic structure, and therefore there can be no 
global difference principle. To rebut this argument, the fourth chapter will argue Rawls 
convincingly identifies something analogous to such a structure, namely the basic structure of 
what he calls “the Society of Peoples”. 
The focus on the difference principle and arguments against it will continue into the 
fifth chapter where we will study Rawls’s claim that one of his international principles of 
justice, the duty of assistance, covers some of the same ground as the global difference 
principle, but is preferable due to features it does not share with the global difference 
principle. In response, the chapter will find that the duty of assistance is not different to the 
global difference principle in the way that Rawls says it is. In doing this, the chapter will 
show that the scenarios Rawls gives to highlight the differences between the two principles, 
fail. The discussion of the scenarios will add to the literature by clarifying the neglected 
Rawlsian notion of deserved inequalities, a notion that acts as a constraint on the global 
difference principle. The discussion will also show how the duty of assistance and the just 
savings principle also act in this fashion, another aspect of Rawls’s theory which is not 
commented on much in the literature.  
In investigating the global difference principle and the duty of assistance, the chapter 
shall find they are complementary, with the global difference principle being mainly a 
distributive principle, and the duty of assistance being mainly a principle that focuses on the 
realization and preservation of institutions. The chapter will then add to the literature by 
demonstrating how we can have both principles by noting the similarities between the duty of 
assistance and Rawls’s just savings principle, a principle that, like the duty of assistance, 
focuses on the realization and preservation of institutions, and constrains the domestic and 
global difference principles.  
Having finished with the first part of the thesis, that by focusing mainly on issues of 
ideal theory had developed a Rawlsian cosmopolitan theory, we will move on to the second 
part of the thesis that focuses more on an issue in nonideal theory, namely realizing principles 
of global justice. It is natural when looking at this issue in nonideal theory to study empirical 
issues, and this will be done in the sixth chapter when we will look at two of Rawls’s 
empirical claims, that if established would count against the possibility of realizing certain 
principles of global justice. First is the claim Rawls and some economists make, namely that 
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whether a nation is wealthy or poor is mainly due to what occurs within that nation. Rawls’s 
former student, and sometimes critic, Thomas Pogge, has labelled this claim “explanatory 
nationalism.”15 If true, it would undermine the idea that the global difference principle is a 
realizable principle of justice. This is because this principle requires that international factors 
have a role in reducing poverty in poor nations. The chapter will conclude that national 
factors do explain some of the differences in economic performance of different nations, but 
argue that international and global factors, like how governments sell natural resources on the 
international market, also have an effect. The chapter will also argue that when trying to give 
a moral assessment of the economic performance of nations, there is the further question of 
whether we can hold the persons who make up these nations responsible for the national 
factors that help to explain their nation’s economic performance. In a philosophical context, 
David Miller has already made this point. However, this chapter will add to the literature by 
arguing that this responsibility is less likely to occur in non-liberal societies than Miller 
suggests.  
The second empirical claim made by Rawls the chapter will consider is similar to the 
first; viz. the claim that what Rawls calls the “well-orderliness” of a nation is mainly due to 
factors that occur within that society. We will see that if this claim were true, it would 
undermine Rawls’s idea that the duty of assistance is a realizable principle of justice. The 
chapter will also conclude that Rawls’s claim regarding well-orderliness is often false 
because international factors, including the aforementioned selling of natural resources, can 
have an effect on well-orderliness. 
In the seventh chapter, we will see how the international factor, Official Development 
Assistance (ODA), also known as international aid
16
, can in the near future be a step towards 
realizing a global difference principle. In assessing this policy, and later on when assessing 
the policy of trade, there will be a focus on the near future due to the difficulties in assessing 
the long-term consequences of policies. In assessing the policy of ODA, the chapter will 
consider economist William Easterly’s claim that ODA has generally been a failure in 
reducing poverty. This would also mean ODA has been a failure in helping to realize a global 
difference principle because reducing global poverty would be a step towards realizing a 
                                                 
15
 Thomas Pogge, ‘Do Rawls’s Two Theories of Justice Fit Together?’, in Rex Martin and David A. Reidy eds., 
Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia?, (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), pp. 217-
221. For another discussion by Pogge of the idea see his World Poverty and Human Rights, (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2008), § 5.3, pp. 145-151. 
16
 In reaction to institutional changes, observers started to refer to international aid as “ODA” in the 1960s. In 
keeping with the literature on this topic, I will use the two terms “aid” and “ODA” interchangeably. 
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global difference principle. Easterly argues that this failure is due to a number of obstacles, 
including the obstacle of not knowing where to allocate resources to help poor people, and 
the obstacle of donor interest. The chapter will show that these obstacles are not always 
present, and that when they are present, we can sometimes overcome them.  
The chapter will then argue that we can know ODA has been effective in realizing a 
global difference principle by using randomized controlled trials similar to the ones used to 
test the effectiveness of drugs in curing disease.   
However, knowing ODA can be effective in realizing a global difference principle 
will not be enough to show we should pursue ODA. This is because of the possibility other 
policies will be more effective and therefore we should pursue them instead of ODA. The 
policy most often suggested by economists and others in development circles as an 
alternative to ODA, which would help to reduce poverty and help to realize a global 
difference principle, is trade. Therefore, the eighth chapter will study both trade in both its 
free and fair forms. 
Another reason for looking at the policy of trade via global justice theory is that, as 
Fernando R. Tesόn and Jonathan Klick note, those writing on global justice rarely discuss 
trade.  While Tesόn and Klick do make some use of Rawls’s ideas, I will argue there are a 
number of problems with their Rawlsian influenced argument in favour of free trade, 
including their claim that free trade’s non-coercive nature makes it morally preferable to 
other policies including ODA. The chapter will also argue that while there are reasons to 
believe free trade will help the world’s poor, and therefore we should use free trade as a step 
towards realizing a global difference principle, it is not the sole solution to world poverty, 
which is how some of its advocates portray it. Indeed, we will see that in some instances 
ODA can help to promote trade. The chapter will also note that Tesόn and Klick neglect to 
mention free trade can sometimes require coercion.  
The chapter will close by briefly considering fair trade. It will note that fair trade is 
more of a social movement than a school of thought, and will suggest that trade can be made 
fair if it improves the condition of the globally least advantaged. 
Looking at whether trade and ODA can be a step towards realizing a global difference 
principle, raises the question whether other factors matter in the assessment of these policies. 
In this regard, the eighth chapter takes into account the coercive nature of these policies.  In 
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the ninth chapter, I will argue that another factor that we should take into account when 
giving a moral assessment of ODA is promises. 
The chapter will add to the literature by having a description of the numerous pledges 
by developed nations to give 0.7% of their Gross National Product (GNP) in ODA, and then 
arguing that we can use Rawls’s analysis of promises to show these pledges about ODA 
amount to promises. Then the chapter will also argue that the promise breaking, that the 
breaking of these pledges represents, cannot be morally justified. This discussion of promises 
is the final part of the second part of the thesis. 
The third part of the thesis looks at the nonideal theory question of how global justice 
applies to two aspects of New Zealand’s foreign policy. This starts in the tenth chapter that 
will consider Rawls’s freedom and independence of peoples’ principle and how it applies to 
New Zealand’s history of colonialism. Because the principle refers to peoples, such a 
consideration might appear wrongheaded in a thesis that makes an argument for 
cosmopolitanism. However, this is not the case, in part because when making an argument 
for the principle, Rawls mainly depends on the claim that it is good for persons to have an 
attachment to their particular free and independent people. We also find this cosmopolitan 
argument in international law for the similar principle of self-determination.  
A reason for investigating the freedom and independence of peoples' principle in 
relation to New Zealand is that New Zealand has arguably violated this principle via its 
history of colonising the Pacific Island nations of the Cook Islands, Niue, Samoa, and 
Tokelau. However, making an exact judgment about New Zealand on this issue is difficult, in 
part because of the varying constitutional relationships New Zealand currently has with these 
nations. Rawls envisioned us respecting the freedom and independence of peoples by having 
polities with full statehood, but the cases of the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau show that 
arrangements short of full statehood can respect this freedom and independence. In 
discussing this issue, the chapter will also look at how small polities can fit into Rawlsian 
theory, a topic commentators have largely ignored.  
The chapter will conclude that currently New Zealand generally respects the freedom 
and independence of the Cook Islands, Niue, Samoa, and Tokelau, but that historically, due 
to its colonialism, this was often not the case. 
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A reason for investigating New Zealand’s history of colonialism in this thesis, besides 
it being able to be analysed via a Rawlsian framework and that we can use this framework to 
come to a number of interesting conclusions, is that this history has influenced New 
Zealand’s ODA programme. Indeed, New Zealand’s long-standing and significant bilateral 
ODA programmes with the Cook Islands, Niue, Samoa, and Tokelau are a relic of New 
Zealand’s history of colonialism. The eleventh chapter will investigate this and other aspects 
of New Zealand’s programme to see what role the programme had in the past, currently, and 
what role it could have in the near future, in realizing a global difference principle. The 
chapter will also touch on how the programme can help to realize the duty of assistance, and 
how it may have affected the freedom and independence of peoples. A number of researchers 
have already assessed this programme, but these researchers generally present their 
assessments without a normative framework, or with a very limited one.
17
 By this stage of the 
thesis, there will be a detailed normative framework in place. There will also be a general 
picture of ODA and its effectiveness.  
There is, however, reason for thinking New Zealand’s ODA programme might differ 
from this general picture. This is because the programme is distinctive in a number of ways. 
Notably, while geographical closeness, perhaps surprisingly, does not have much of an 
influence over most countries’ ODA allocation, it does affect New Zealand’s, with countries 
in the Pacific much more likely to be selected to receive ODA, and also more likely to 
receive more ODA than other ODA recipients. I will argue that some justification can be 
given to this Pacific focus due to a shared history, prior commitments, and some of the 
globally least advantage being in the Pacific. But I will further argue that the focus cannot be 
fully justified because the focus of New Zealand’s ODA programme should be more on 
improving the condition of the globally least advantaged no matter where they live. 
Another feature of New Zealand’s ODA programme, that the chapter will investigate, 
is the programme’s size in monetary terms. The programme is relatively small in this sense 
due in part to the small size of New Zealand’s economy.18 However, this small size also 
                                                 
17
 For an example see, Jonathan Grossman and Annette Lees [aka the Ministerial Review Team], ‘Towards 
Excellence in Aid Delivery: A Review of New Zealand’s Official Development Assistance Programme’, (March 
2001), URL: http://nzadds.files.wordpress.com/2011/01/ministerial-review-nzoda-2001.pdf, (accessed 9 
December 2014).   
18
 In 2012, New Zealand’s ODA programme was 21st out of 28 in monetary terms among the country members 
of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD’s) Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) (the European Union is also a member). This is what one might expect since New Zealand is 
24
th
 out of 28 in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms among DAC country 
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reflects the small percentage of New Zealand’s GNP that goes towards ODA19, with New 
Zealand only coming close in the 1970s to its repeatedly pledged goal of giving 0.7%.
20
 I will 
argue that this smallness means the programme is not fulfilling its role in helping to realize a 
global difference principle, and that because of this (and that New Zealand has made 
numerous pledges to give 0.7%) New Zealand should increase the amount of ODA it gives to 
at least 0.7%. One might think that advocating this, along with advocating a shift away from 
ODA to the Pacific to ODA to the globally least advantaged, is unrealistic and not pragmatic 
because such a move would lack public support, but I will gather evidence that will show this 
is not the case.  
The eleventh chapter will also compare what New Zealand’s ODA programme 
contributes to bilateral and multilateral programmes and agencies, and argue that the amount 
given to multilateral programmes and agencies should be increased because these 
programmes and agencies are less likely to reflect strategic interests. 
The eleventh chapter ends the third part of the thesis and the topic-based chapters. 
Then there will be the concluding chapter that will sum up the conclusions of previous 
chapters, and end with some thoughts on the overall picture of the prospects for global justice 
the thesis gives.
                                                                                                                                                        
members in 2012. OECD, ‘Gross Domestic Product in US dollars at current prices and current PPPs’, DOI: 
10.1787/2074384x-table3.   
For a definition of the PPP concept see OECD, ‘Glossary of Statistical Terms: (PPPS)-OECD’, (last updated on 
11 June 2013), URL: http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=2205, (accessed 9 December 2014).   
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Query Wizard for International 
Development Statistics, (QWIDS), URL: http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/, (accessed 9 December 2014).  
While QWIDS uses Gross National Income (GNI), this should not matter when discussing GNP because 
according to the OECD’s Glossary of Statistical terms, “gross national income is identical to gross national 
product (GNP) as previously used in national accounts generally”. ‘Gross National Income’, (5 March 2003) 
URL: http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1176, (accessed 9 December 2014). OECD, ‘DAC members’, 
URL:  http://www.oecd.org/dac/dacmembers.htm, (accessed 9 December 2014).     
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 In 2012, New Zealand placed 17
th
 out of 28 in the DAC in percentage of GNP given in ODA. QWIDS. 
20
 Ibid. 
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Chapter 2: Rawls’s Theory and Domestic Model 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I start by describing what led me to Rawls’s theory and give a brief 
theoretical justification for this move, but will delay a fuller argument for selecting Rawls’s 
theory and his principles until later in the chapter. I do this because before making this 
argument, it is necessary to describe some of Rawls’s theory. This will start with a 
description of Rawls’s distinction between ideal and nonideal theory. Along with clarifying 
Rawls’s theory, this will help to clarify the structure of the thesis, which one can view as 
having its first part mainly dedicated to ideal theory, and its second and third parts mainly 
dedicated to nonideal theory. The chapter will then move on to Rawls’s domestic model of 
justice and the two principles he derives from it. Looking at this model is necessary in this 
thesis because the principles of domestic justice influence what the principles of global 
justice are. It is also the only place where Rawls argues for the difference principle, a 
principle this thesis will argue should operate at the global level.  
Rawls argues we can see what the domestic principles of justice are by imagining 
persons selecting principles of justice behind a “veil of ignorance” in the “original position”. 
Rawls believes that this process will help our “considered judgments” reach “reflective 
equilibrium”. He also thinks the principles of justice apply to a society’s “basic structure”. In 
this chapter, I will explain the meaning and reasons for using these terms.    
One of the reasons Rawls gives for why those in the domestic original position would 
select the principles he says they would, including the difference principle, is that persons 
have what he calls “the two moral powers”. In beginning to look at this argument, we will 
start to see how it naturally extends to the global arena. 
The chapter will then assess Rawls’s argument for why the representatives in the 
original position would select his principles rather than intuitionist, perfectionist, and 
utilitarian principles, with there being a focus on his argument for the selection of the 
difference principle ahead of a utilitarian principle. Like many of Rawls’s arguments, this 
argument involves ideas often considered by economists, like decision making under 
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uncertainty, so naturally the argument, like much of the rest of ToJ
21
, has attracted the critical 
attention of economists.
22
 This chapter will consider the criticism made by R. A. Musgrave 
that in order for the representatives in the original position to select the difference principle 
their risk aversion has to be very high, and see how Rawls responds to criticism of this type.
23
 
The chapter will close by considering the arguments made by Kai Nielsen and G. A. 
Cohen that we should reject the difference principle, as Rawls generally presents it, in favour 
of a more egalitarian principle. The chapter will conclude that these arguments fail. 
The Focus on Rawls 
 
The choice to focus on Rawls’s theory raises the difficult question of why focus on 
this theory rather than another one. I hope that as the thesis progresses a number of the merits 
of Rawls’s theory will be apparent to the reader. Indeed, in this chapter, after laying some 
Rawlsian groundwork, I will argue that Rawls’s argument in favour of his theory has merit. 
However, before doing this I will briefly mention what drew me to Rawls’s theory and how I 
can give this move some theoretical justification.  
The main reason why I selected to look at Rawls’s theory is that it offered a rational 
elaboration of one of my intuitions about New Zealand’s ODA programme, namely that New 
Zealand should target the programme at the globe’s worst off persons. As the thesis notes in 
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 As R. A. Musgrave notes: 
  
The magnificent edifice erected in Rawls's A Theory of Justice has been of great interest to economists, 
partly because a major wing of the structure is assigned to economic issues, but mostly because an 
economic way of thinking enters into much of its grand design. 
 
‘Maximin, Uncertainty, and the Leisure Trade-Off’, in The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 88, No. 4 
(November 1974), p. 625, Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1881826. 
22
 Some of this attention has been positive with Kenneth J. Arrow writing, “as an economist accustomed to 
much elementary misunderstanding of the nature of an economy on the part of philosophers and social scientists, 
I must express my gratitude for the sophistication and knowledge which Rawls displays here [in ToJ.]” ‘Some 
Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls’s Theory of Justice’, in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LXX, No. 9, (10 
May 1973), p. 245, Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2025006.  
23
 While Rawls wants to deny this criticism, he does not deny that risk plays a role in the selection of his two 
principles. In § 26 of ToJ, ‘The Reasoning for the Two Principles’, Rawls writes, “the two principles are those a 
person would choose for the design of a society in which his enemy is to assign him his place.” Rawls then 
writes: 
 
[T]hat the two principles of justice would be chosen if the parties were forced to protect themselves 
against such a contingency explains the sense in which this conception is the maximin [rule of choice 
under great uncertainty] solution [to the problem of social justice]. And this analogy suggests that if the 
original position has been described so that it is rational for the parties to adopt the conservative 
attitude expressed by this rule, a conclusive argument can indeed be constructed for these principles.  
 
Ibid, p. 153/133. I added this footnote in response to a point made by my examiner David Reidy. 
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chapter 11, many of my fellow New Zealanders appear to share this intuition. Still, some will 
be uncomfortable with this appeal to intuition. In an article where he gives a brief critique of 
some of Rawls’s ideas, Peter Singer argues against the view, “that the role of moral 
philosophers is to take our common moral intuitions as data, and seek to develop the theory 
that best fits those intuitions.”24 However, while Singer rightly argues we can eliminate 
certain intuitions that we cannot give a rational basis, in the end he has to admit that an 
ethical theory, “must rest on a fundamental intuition about what is good.”25 In my case, I 
have a fundamental intuition that it is good to help the worst off.  
As we will see, Rawls thinks we can come to giving priority to the worst off via a 
narrow conception of rationality that avoids controversial ethical elements. Some might think 
that my ethical intuition about the worst is an example of such an element, and that it would 
be better to simply depend upon on Rawls’s theory and make no appeal to intuition. I would 
agree with Singer that such an attempt to build an ethical theory purely on rationality would 
not work
26
, and would further say we need to recognise the motivating factor intuitions 
provide. What Rawls’s theory does is to provide some rational support for my intuition, and 
suggests one can describe the intuition as a, “rational intuition.”27  
One might think that this is not a Rawlsian approach. After all, we have just seen that 
in coming to his theory Rawls appeals to a narrow form of rationality. There is also the 
apparent problem that, as we will shortly see, Rawls criticises what he calls “intuitionism.” 
Rawls is also a great admirer of Kant, who attempted to base morality purely on rationality. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that Rawls denies that intuitions play an important role in 
ethical thinking. Indeed, when criticising “intuitionism” Rawls writes, “any ethical view is 
bound to rely on intuition to some degree at many points.”28 Therefore, placing importance 
on intuition is in keeping with Rawls’s theory.  
Having explained what led me to Rawls’s theory, and having given some justification 
for this move, I will now start with a description of Rawls’s theory that will lead into Rawls’s 
argument for his theory and its concomitant principles. This description will start with a 
description of two different types of Rawlsian theory.  
                                                 
24
 Peter Singer, ‘Ethics and Intuitions’, in The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 9, (2005) p. 332, DOI 10.1007/s10892-
005-3508-y. 
25
 Ibid, p. 349. 
26
 Ibid, p. 351. 
27
 I take this term from Singer. Ibid, p. 351. 
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 Rawls, ToJ, § 7, p. 40/35. 
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Ideal Theory and Nonideal Theory 
 
In the second section of ToJ, Rawls introduces the distinction between ideal and 
nonideal theory, even though he does not use the phrase “nonideal theory.” Rawls writes:   
The other limitation on our discussion [in ToJ] is that for the most part I examine the 
principles of justice that would regulate a well-ordered society. Everyone is presumed to act 
justly and to do his [and her] part in upholding just institutions. … Thus I consider primarily 
what I call strict compliance [ideal theory] as opposed to partial compliance theory [nonideal 
theory]. The latter studies the principles that govern how we are to deal with injustice. It 
comprises such topics as the theory of punishment, the doctrine of just war, and the 
justification of the various ways of opposing unjust regimes, ranging from civil disobedience 
and conscientious objection to militant resistance and revolution. Also included here are 
questions of compensatory justice and of weighing one form of institutional injustice against 
another. Obviously the problems of partial compliance theory are the pressing and urgent 
matters. These are the things that we are faced with in everyday life. The reason for beginning 
with ideal theory is that it provides, I believe, the only basis for the systematic grasp of these 
more pressing problems. The discussion of civil disobedience, for example, depends upon it. 
At least, I shall assume that a deeper understanding can be gained in no other way, and that 
the nature and aims of a perfectly just society is the fundamental part of the theory of 
justice.
29
 
 
Having introduced the distinction, Rawls generally leaves it to one side for the rest of 
ToJ. This may help to explain something recently noted by A. John Simmons, viz. that while 
the use of Rawls’s distinction between ideal and nonideal theory has become commonplace, 
“relatively little serious critical attention has actually been focused on the distinction itself”.30 
Still, the lack of comment is surprising given that Rawls appears to present the distinction in 
a way that is open to a number of objections. As Simmons notes, the assumption of strict 
compliance with principles of justice appears to be highly unrealistic. Some persons in every 
society throughout history have acted in ways nearly everyone would agree were unjust. The 
assumption also appears to leave the door open to utilitarianism as a principle of justice, 
something Rawls argues against in ToJ. This is because one of the strongest arguments 
against utilitarianism is that persons would not always follow its principles because persons 
have a partly self-interested nature. It appears the utilitarian can respond that this objection is 
not open to the Rawlsian when she is discussing ideal theory because ideal theory simply 
assumes strict compliance with principles of justice. However, this, and the previous point, 
misconstrues Rawls’s view of strict compliance. Simmons point out: 
                                                 
29
 Ibid, § 2, pp. 8-9/7-8. 
30
 A. John Simmons, ‘Ideal and Nonideal Theory’, in Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 38, Issue 1, (Winter 
2010), p. 5, DOI: 10.1111/j.1088-4963.2009.01172.x.  
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[T]he strict compliance assumption is designed only to allow us to imagine the results of 
getting “up and running” the institutions embodying different conceptions of justice, which 
requires imagining that those subject to those institutions support and comply with them, at 
least initially. But it may turn out that some conceptions—such as utilitarianism—will 
predictably involve “strains of commitment” that “exceed the capacity of human nature”, such 
that long-term support and compliance are unlikely or impossible. The strict compliance 
assumption, then, “still permits the consideration of men’s capacity to act on the various 
conceptions of justice”.31 
 
Still, one might criticise Rawls’s use of ideal and non-ideal theory on the basis that he 
wrongly places primacy on ideal theory. After all, even he says that issues of nonideal theory 
are “the pressing and urgent matters” and that they are the problems “we are faced with in 
everyday life.” Does this not give credence to Charles W. Mills, who writes, “the institutional 
prescriptions [Rawls] advocates are of little use when applied to real societies”?32 One may 
further ask, is not this even truer when we consider the global difference principle? In 
answering this question, we can argue that we should view the principles of ideal theory as 
principles we work towards via, inter alia, principles provided to us by nonideal theory. This 
helps us to understand the importance of ideal theory, and how nonideal theory, while of 
great practical importance, is of secondary theoretical importance. For example, while the 
doctrine of just war is of practical value in a world where war is commonplace, the ultimate 
justification for this doctrine, I would argue, is that it aims towards a world without war. Of 
course, whether such a world is possible is a matter for debate, as is the possibility of a world 
that is moving towards a global difference principle. I hope this thesis adds to this latter 
debate. 
 Another related criticism of Rawls made by Liam B. Murphy, who writes, “Rawls 
himself has not devoted much time to nonideal theory.”33 However, Murphy made this 
criticism soon after the publication of LoP, and this criticism does not appear to reflect an 
awareness of LoP’s content. Rawls divides LoP into three parts, with the first two parts being 
on ideal theory, and the third part being on nonideal theory. Therefore, at least when it comes 
to international relations, Rawls cannot be criticised for neglecting nonideal theory. 
Nevertheless, as this thesis progresses we will see there are some problems with how Rawls 
uses the ideal and nonideal theory distinction in LoP, in particular when he criticises the 
global difference principle, and when he discusses decent peoples.  However, I hope these 
comments suggest that the distinction is not simply wrongheaded as some of Rawls’s critics, 
                                                 
31
 Ibid, p. 9. 
32
 Charles W. Mills, ‘”Ideal Theory” as Ideology’, in Hypatia, Vol. 20, No. 3, (Summer 2005), pp. 168-169, 
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3811121.  
33
 Liam B. Murphy, Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 8. 
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like Mills, suggest, and that the principles he identifies as part of ideal theory may be of use 
to real societies. When looking at the principles put forward by Rawls in ideal theory, along 
with the ideal/nonideal theory distinction, we should also keep in mind the model he uses to 
derive these principles, a model to which we now turn. 
Rawls’s Model 
 
Rawls starts his domestic model of justice by imagining an “original position”34, a 
position where free and rational
35
 persons are in a position of equality similar to “the state of 
nature” in other social contract theories. As David Gauthier notes, “the language of the social 
contract theory is the language of ideal explanation; the men [and women] in the state of 
nature are not ourselves.”36 The same is true of Rawls’s original position, which is not an 
actual state of affairs.  Instead, Rawls wants the original position to “represent equality 
between human beings as moral persons”.37  
                                                 
34
 In § 31 of ToJ, in the context of wider discussion of equal liberty, Rawls provides what he calls “an 
elaboration of the original position.” This is the four-stage sequence. The first stage of this sequence is finished 
when, “parties have adopted the principles of justice in the original position”. They then move on to the second 
stage where they, “decide upon the justice of political forms and choose a constitution”. The third stage is when, 
“The justice of laws and policies is to be assessed,” and the fourth and final stage, “is that of the application of 
rules to particular cases by judges and administrators, and the following of rules by citizens generally.” ToJ, § 
31, p. 196/172, ibid, ibid, 198/174, 199/175. 
I question whether this four-stage sequence is appropriate to assess questions of global justice. Do we really 
need some sort of global constitution, which would be very difficult to set up, before trying to realize certain 
principles of global justice? Rawls four-stage sequence may also not be appropriate to assess countries like New 
Zealand, where the constitution is not as central as it is in the United States. Rawls was aware of the cultural 
particularity of the four-stage sequence, writing, “The idea of a four-stage sequence is suggested by the United 
States Constitution and its history.” Ibid, p. 196 n. 1/172 n. 1.  
I thank my examiner Stephen Winter for reminding me of the role the four-stage sequence plays in Rawls’s 
thinking. 
35
 What does Rawls mean by “free and rational”? When it comes to the issue of freedom, Rawls, in ToJ, mainly 
discusses the concept of autonomy in a highly Kantian manner. When it comes to the related issue of free will, 
Rawls’s discussion is brief, and he does not place it in the context of the familiar, for philosophers, 
compatibilism/incompatibilism debate. Rawls, ToJ, § 40, pp. 251-257/221-227. In his later political philosophy, 
Rawls found a justification for this placement. In answering the question: “In what sense are citizens free?” 
Rawls writes, “The relevant meaning of free persons is to be drawn from the political culture of such a 
[democratic] society and may have little or no connection, for example, with freedom of the will as discussed in 
the philosophy of mind.” Rawls, Erin Kelly ed., Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 21. This reflects a turn in Rawls’s later philosophy from being concerned 
with what is actually the case, to being concerned with what individuals think is the case. However, at another 
point in Justice as Fairness, he writes, “It [the conception of the person] must of course be compatible with (one 
or more) … philosophical or psychological conceptions [of the person].” Ibid, p. 19. 
Rawls, in ToJ, goes into more detail when discussing his interpretation of rationality. I will discuss this 
interpretation presently, and at later points in this thesis. 
36
 David Gauthier, ‘The Social Contract as Ideology’, in Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Winter 
1977), p. 138, Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2264939.  
37
 Rawls, ToJ, § 4, p. 19/17. Rawls notes that the veil of ignorance is not an entirely original idea, writing: 
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Rawls places those in the original position behind a “veil of ignorance.” The veil is 
there in order to prevent persons making decisions based on inappropriate reasons, which in 
this case are knowledge of morally arbitrary factors. This means persons behind the veil of 
ignorance do not know their social position, and natural endowments like intelligence and 
strength; the representatives are not, however, entirely ignorant.  They do know that the other 
persons behind the veil are also, like themselves, reasonable, rational, and are motivated to 
promote their interests.  
Since Rawls talks about free and rational persons being in the original position, one 
might think that we are to imagine virtually all persons within a society being in this position; 
however, Rawls, in order to simplify his model, generally speaks of representatives being in 
the original position. When it comes to who these representatives are, Rawls writes: 
[T]hat for the most part [when it comes to questions of domestic justice] each person holds 
two relevant positions: that of equal citizenship and that defined by his [or her] place in the 
distribution of income and wealth. The relevant representative men [and women], therefore, 
are the representative citizen and those who stand for the various levels of wellbeing.
38
  
 
So, initially at least, the representatives are simply described as citizens who are 
members of social groups defined by their level of income and wealth which correlate with 
levels of wellbeing.  
The task that faces the representatives is to select principles of justice to apply to 
society’s “basic structure”. Rawls sums up the structure as, “the way in which the major 
social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of 
advantages from social cooperation.”39 Rawls argues that it is appropriate to have principles 
of justice apply to the basic structure because its effects, “are so profound and present from 
                                                                                                                                                        
The veil of ignorance is so natural a condition that something like it must have occurred to many. The 
closest explicit statement of it known to me is found in J. C. Harsanyi, ‘Cardinal Utility in Welfare 
Economics and in the Theory of Risk-Taking,’ in Journal of Political Economy, vol. 61 (1953).  
 
Ibid, original edition, § 24, p. 137, n. 11. John C. Harsanyi, ‘Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the 
Theory of Risk-Taking’, in Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 61, No. 5, (October 1953), pp. 434-435, Stable 
URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1827289. In the revised edition of ToJ, Rawls suggests that we can find the 
idea of the veil of ignorance implicitly in Kant’s discussion of universal law in The Critique of Practical Reason. 
This is because, “when Kant tells us to test our maxim by considering what would be the case were it a universal 
law of nature, he must suppose that we do not know our place within this imagined system of nature.” Ibid, 
revised edition, § 24, p. 118, n. 11. Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Practical Reason, (Thomas Kingsmill 
Abbott trans.), (fifth edition), (London: Longmans, Green, and Co. 1898 [1788]), p. 133, also available at URL: 
http://files.libertyfund.org/files/360/0212_Bk.pdf, (accessed 9 December 2014).  
38
 Rawls, ToJ, § 16, p. 96/82.  
39
 Ibid, § 2, p. 7/6. 
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the start [of persons’ lives].”40  When it comes to the selection of these principles, Rawls 
expects that the representatives to make the same decision the persons they are representing 
would make, because they have the same levels of wellbeing as these persons, and, like them, 
are reasonable and rational.  
In explicating what he means by rational, Rawls writes that the, “concept of 
rationality must  be interpreted as far as possible in the narrow sense, standard in economic 
theory, of taking the most effective means to given ends.” Rawls does this because, “one 
must try to avoid introducing into it [the concept of rationality] any controversial ethical 
elements.”41 One must do this in part because it helps to widen the appeal of one’s theory of 
justice. However, this lack of ethical elements might lead one to conclude that Rawls was 
trying to base his theory on a narrow form of rational self-interest, and that any resulting 
picture of justice would be a veiled form of egoism. A related concern is that one could not 
arrive at Rawls’s egalitarian principles just via narrow self-interest, or as Leonard Choptiany 
colourfully put it in a review of Rawls’s early view of justice, “One can neither draw blood 
from a stone nor extract moral principles from the decisions of rational egoists.”42 Perhaps in 
response to these concerns, in his later philosophy Rawls was keen to stress the importance 
and nature of reasonableness. In LoP, he notes, “The term “reasonable” is often used in A 
Theory of Justice, but not, I think, ever specified.” Fortunately, as Rawls notes, “This is done 
in Political Liberalism [Rawls’s second major work on domestic justice, henceforth PL]”.43 
In PL Rawls defines reasonableness as the willingness to offer fair terms of cooperation, and 
recognition of the burdens of judgment.
44
 This definition raises the further definitional 
questions of what are “fair terms of cooperation” and “the burdens of judgment”. Rawls 
would define “fair terms of cooperation” as those that would be recognised in the original 
position, but, for now, we can define it as terms a party to an agreement would find 
acceptable if they happened to be in the position of the other parties to the agreement. I will 
address the meaning of “the burdens of judgment” in the fourth chapter in a discussion of the 
related concept of reasonable pluralism.   
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Rawls, in ToJ, also states that while those in the original position come close to 
resembling homo economicus in their motivation, this, “must not be confused with the 
motivation of persons in everyday life who [in a Rawlsian society] accept the principles that 
would be chosen [in the original position] and who have the corresponding sense of 
justice.”45 Those in the original position are also not purely economic beings, in that they 
know that the persons they are representing are, “creatures having a conception of their good 
and capable of a sense of justice”46 or in other words, have the two moral powers.  
The possession of these powers justifies treating humans as morally equally persons, 
and justifies the set-up of the original position that reflects this equality. Rawls also thinks 
that in order to respect this equality at the domestic level we need to have a difference 
principle. This thesis will argue that to respect this equality also requires a global difference 
principle. These factors give us reason to investigate the moral powers. 
The Two Moral Powers 
 
Let us first consider the capacity for a sense of justice, which in ToJ Rawls describes 
as, “a skill in judging things to be just and unjust, and in supporting these judgments by 
reasons.”47 He argues this skill is “extraordinarily complex” because we are ready to make 
judgments of justness on a potentially infinite number of cases.
48
 Despite this complexity, the 
sense of justice is similar among those who possess it, so we can expect others to agree with 
our judgments.
49
 According to Rawls, we also have a shared desire to act on these 
judgments.
50
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 Rawls, ToJ, § 25, p. 148/127.  
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 Ibid, § 4, p. 19/17. 
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 Ibid, § 9, p. 46/41. 
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 Ibid.  
49
 In the society described in ToJ, “Everyone has a similar sense of justice and in this respect a well-ordered 
society is homogeneous. Political argument appeals to this moral consensus.” Ibid, § 41, p. 263/232.  Aware 
such a consensus might be viewed as unrealistic, Rawls notes:  
 
For the most part the philosophical tradition … has assumed that there exists some appropriate 
perspective from which unanimity on moral questions may be hoped for, at least among rational 
persons with relevantly similar and sufficient information. Or if unanimity is impossible, disparities 
between judgments are greatly reduced once this standpoint is adopted. 
 
Ibid, p. 263/233. Rawls, of course, offers up the original position as a version of this standpoint. 
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These judgments, which Rawls calls “considered judgments”, are, “rendered under 
conditions favorable
51
 to the exercise of the sense of justice”.52 Rawls explains what he 
means by favourable conditions when he writes, “once we regard the sense of justice as a 
mental capacity, as involving the exercise of thought, the relevant judgments are those given 
under conditions favorable for deliberation and judgment in general.”53 Therefore, in this 
portrayal the sense of justice involves thought and is not something purely intuitive.  
Rawls argues that the form of deliberation that takes place when we use our sense of 
justice needs further guidance because, “In describing our sense of justice an allowance must 
be made for the likelihood that considered judgments are no doubt subject to certain 
irregularities and distortions”.54 Naturally, we would like these to be removed, and Rawls 
thinks that this can be accomplished by a theory of justice which acts as both an account and 
guide for our sense of justice.  
The theory can act as a guide because someone may find the principles of the theory 
so convincing, “he [or she] may well revise his [or her] judgments to conform to its 
principles”.55 There is also the possibility she may do the reverse and modify the principles of 
her theory in order for it to accord with her considered judgments. She will do this if she 
believes that in this case her considered judgments are regular and clear, and has more 
confidence in them than she does have in her theory. Eventually, Rawls hopes, this process 
will reach an end with the deliberator satisfied with both her considered judgments delivered 
mainly by her sense of justice, and her theory of justice delivered mainly by her other forms 
of moral reasoning. In ToJ Rawls refers to this state of affairs as a person being in “reflective 
equilibrium”.56  
Rawls defines the other moral power, the capacity for a conception of the good, as, 
“the capacity to form and revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of one’s rational 
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advantage or good.”57 As this definition suggests, Rawls sees rational advantage and 
goodness as equivalent. Indeed, Rawls views goodness as rationality.
58
 Unlike the theory of 
justice delivered by the sense of justice, the conception of goodness delivered by the capacity 
for a conception of goodness varies from individual to individual. This means there is not 
agreement on what for an individual constitutes rational advantage or goodness.
59
 
We can, Rawls argues, consider those who possess a capacity for a conception of the 
good and a sense of justice to be morally equal.
60
  Furthermore, as William A. Galston notes, 
Rawls emphasises that the two moral powers, “are … within the capacity of every normal 
person to develop and to exercise, at least in favorable circumstances.”61 If both these 
propositions are true, this means virtually everyone is morally equal. Some might object to 
this on the basis that even if virtually everyone has these moral powers, these powers could 
vary in quality. Rawls argues that this is not the case when it comes to the capacity for a 
conception of the good, because the variation in judgments made by those with this moral 
power is not due to a variance in the capacity for a conception of the good, but rather is due 
to the plurality of goods. Different individuals will focus on different goods. Some 
individuals deny what other individuals focus on actually are goods, but Rawls argues that we 
should respect the judgment of differing individuals on what are goods because the 
conception of the good is the individual’s view of what is good for her, and the individual is 
in the best position to come to this judgment.
62
 However, one should not think this means the 
conception of the good is necessarily individualistic. The individual may realize her 
conception of the good by belonging to various groups. 
While there are numerous conceptions of the good, Rawls, in ToJ, maintains there is 
only a single conception of justice. This is because the sense of justice leads individuals to 
one conception of how we should organize the basic structure of society. Certain individuals’ 
sense of justice will be greater than others and this means they will be better at making 
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judgments in the real world of what is just and unjust, and supporting these considered 
judgments with reasons, but under ideal conditions individuals should come to agreement on 
the one conception of justice.   
Rawls argues that the variance in the sense of justice does not alter the equal moral 
worth of persons because the potential to develop this moral power and the capacity for a 
conception of the good is what gives persons this status.
63
 In support of this claim, Rawls 
writes:    
[I believe] regarding the potentiality [to develop the two moral powers] as sufficient [for 
participation in the original position and for moral equality] accords with the hypothetical 
nature of the original position, and with the idea that as far as possible the choice of principles 
should not be influenced by arbitrary contingencies. Therefore it is reasonable to say that 
those who could take part in the initial agreement, were it not for fortuitous circumstances, are 
assured equal justice.
64
 
 
However, how plausible is it that virtually all persons have the potential to participate 
in the original position, given a varying realized sense of justice enables some persons to be 
better judges of what is just and unjust in the real world? Could not this mean that the 
potential to develop a sense of justice also varies; with some persons not having enough 
potential to participate hypothetically in the original position? We can respond to this concern 
by saying we should not let the considerable variance in the realized sense of justice make us 
think the variance in potential is also considerable. This is because much of the variance in 
the realized sense of justice would be down to environmental conditions. Working out the 
influence of environmental conditions would be difficult. However, what if one could show 
that certain individuals under the best conditions would be unable to develop a refined sense 
of justice and make good judgments in difficult cases of what is just or unjust in the real 
world? This would not be a problem because there are some features of the original position 
that would make making good judgments less intellectually demanding, and thereby make it 
possible for these individuals to participate.  
We can see this when we keep in mind that in the original position the amount of 
information the representatives have to process is limited in order to assist them to come to an 
impartial judgment. In the real world, there are no such limits, which makes coming to 
impartial judgments much more difficult. 
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Now that we know the representatives and the moral powers they possess, along with the 
situation they find themselves in in the original position, we are ready to look at the 
principles Rawls says they would select.  
Rawls’s Principles of Domestic Justice 
 
Rawls thinks the representatives would select two principles. In ToJ, the second and 
final statement of these principles is:
65
    
Rawls’s Two Principles of Domestic Justice 
First Principle 
 
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic 
 liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. 
 
                                                 
65
 The first statement of the two principles in ToJ is:  
 
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties 
compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others. Second: social and economic inequalities are 
to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) 
attached to positions and offices open to all. 
 
Ibid, § 11, p. 60/53. Rawls views the second statement of the principles as building on the first.  
In both the original and revised editions of ToJ, Rawls writes, “this conception of justice [the two principles of 
justice] is the unique solution to the problem set by the original position.” Ibid, § 20, p. 119/103. Given the 
revised edition of ToJ was published in 1999, the same year as LoP, one might think that Rawls’s views had not 
changed in the period between the original publication of ToJ and the publication of LoP. However, the 
revisions in the 1999 edition of ToJ are mainly ones made by Rawls in 1975 for the German edition. Ibid, 
Preface for the Revised Edition, p. xi. This means a good deal of time had elapsed between most of the revisions 
to ToJ and the publication of LoP. During this time, Rawls had concluded that the representatives in the original 
position could select anyone of a family of liberal conceptions of justice. Members of this family would have 
three characteristic principles in common. Of these characteristics, in LoP, Rawls states: 
 
[T]he first enumerates basic rights and liberties of the kind familiar from a constitutional regime; the 
second assigns these rights, liberties and opportunities a special priority, especially with respect to the 
claims of the general good and perfectionism values; and the third assures for all citizens the requisite 
primary goods to enable them to make intelligent and effective use of their freedoms.  
 
Rawls, LoP, § 1.1, p. 14. Rawls gives these three characteristics in virtually the same form in PL (which 
Columbia University Press published in 1993). The later Rawls argues that persons can interpret these three 
characteristics in a number of ways, which gives rise to a number of different types of liberalism. Furthermore, 
Rawls claims, “Of these liberalisms, justice as fairness is the most egalitarian.” Ibid, n. 5. In the same vein in PL 
he says, “the two principles express an egalitarian form of liberalism”. PL, Lecture I, ‘Fundamental Ideas’, p. 6. 
While he has come believe that his two principles may not be selected, in PL he also writes, “Justice as 
fairness—its two principles of justice, which of course includes the difference principle—I believe to be the 
most reasonable [liberal political] conception because it best satisfies these conditions [or characteristics].” 
However, he also believes other liberal conceptions are also reasonable. As an example, he gives a conception, 
“that substitutes for the difference principle, a principle to improve social well-being subject to a constraint 
guaranteeing everyone a sufficient level of adequate all-purpose means.” Ibid, Introduction to the Paperback 
Edition, pp. xlvi-xlvii.  
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Second Principle 
  
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: 
(a) To the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings 
principle, and 
(b) Attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity.
66
  
 
Following a number of commentators, including Amartya Sen
67
, I will call the first 
principle “the liberty principle”, while I will call the second principle “the principle 
governing social and economic inequality”.68 This chapter will have an initial investigation of 
both these principles, but I will delay discussion of some aspects of these principles until later 
chapters. 
I will start our initial investigation by noting that if the two principles clash, we curtail 
the principle governing social and economic inequality and honour the liberty principle due 
to the priority of liberty.
69
 We will also sometimes have to curtail certain liberties because the 
liberty principle is about preserving a system of basic liberties that sometimes requires this 
curtailment. Rawls gives the example of free speech being curtailed in order for people 
having the right to a fair trial, which means freedom of speech is being curtailed in the 
interests of the freedom of the person.
70
   
It is part of the second principle, the idea, “social and economic inequalities are to be 
arranged to the benefit of the least advantaged”, which is most commonly identified as the 
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difference principle, and it is this principle that will be discussed most in this thesis. Let us 
start this discussion by analysing the meaning of the terms used in the statement of the 
principle, starting with who the least advantaged are.  
Rawls defines the least advantaged “as those who are least favoured by each of the 
three main kinds of contingencies.” This means this group is composed of, “persons whose 
family and class origins are more disadvantaged than others, whose natural endowments (as 
realized) permit them to fare less well, and whose fortune and luck in the course of life turn 
out to be less happy”.71 
 While one might object that this definition does not mention liberty, and liberty 
should be included because of its importance, it is likely the least advantaged will also 
experience low levels of liberty. This is because, even in a society where the basic liberties 
are enshrined in law, a liberal society, citizens need, “primary goods to enable them to make 
intelligent and effective use of their freedoms.”72 
The factors that define the least advantaged, as the word “contingencies” suggests, are 
beyond a person’s control. Some new contingencies emerge during the course of one’s life, 
for example, certain types of luck and fortune, but others like what family or class one is born 
into, and one’s natural endowments, are present before birth. These latter contingencies 
determine what Rawls calls one’s starting place in society.73  
Rawls argued that justice should be mainly concerned with how the basic structure 
treats these starting places, rather than altering these starting places, or on compensating 
persons for poor choices that they make during the course of their life. This is because Rawls 
tended to take starting places as given. He generally did not consider how we could change 
family and class structures
74
, and did not suggest science-fiction scenarios where scientists 
altered natural endowments. The focus on starting places also explains why Rawls talks about 
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improving, “the expectations of the least advantaged members of society”75, rather than 
simply improving the conditions in which they live. 
One of the ways a basic structure treats starting places is via the distribution of social 
primary goods.  These goods are things society produces which are generally useful to one no 
matter what one’s rational plan of life is.  Initially the main social primary good Rawls 
identifies are, “rights, liberties, and opportunities, and income and wealth.” However, he also 
indicates the importance of self-respect.
76
 One way the distribution of these goods takes place 
is by individuals who fill certain offices and positions having more social primary goods than 
others do. This may seem to disrespect the equal moral worth of persons, but Rawls thinks 
that the difference principle is one way his theory respects this equality while having this 
inequality in goods. Nevertheless, before considering how the difference principle does this, 
we can also note the role of another part of the principle governing social and economic 
inequality, the equal opportunity principle.  
Rawls defines equality of opportunity in a standard manner, writing, “The thought 
here is that positions are to be not only open in a formal sense, but that all should have a fair 
chance to attain them.”77 This means: 
[A]ssuming that there is a distribution of natural assets, those who are at the same level of 
talent and ability, and have the same willingness to use them, should have the same prospects 
of success regardless of their initial place [also known as their starting place] in the social 
system.
78
 
 
If we realize this principle, this means everyone had a fair chance of filling positions 
associated with greater social and economic rewards, and this means those who fail to fill 
these positions have less room for complaint. 
The least advantaged also have less room for complaint if we institute a difference 
principle, which means the basic structure arranges the inequalities associated with these 
positions to their benefit. Before considering how the basic structure might accomplish this, 
we can ask what exactly Rawls means by the edict that we must arrange inequalities to the 
benefit of the least advantaged. At times Rawls means we can arrange these inequalities in 
                                                 
75
 Rawls, ToJ, § 13, p. 75/65. 
76
 Ibid, § 11, p. 62/54. However, as we will see later in this chapter, individuals can maintain self-respect in a 
number of social structures. 
77
 Ibid, § 12, p. 73/63. 
78
 Ibid. 
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such a way that they result in the least advantaged having more of things of social and 
economic value, including liberty, than they would have under an equal distribution.
79
  
 Rawls’s focus on the least advantaged may give the impression that he is only 
concerned whether they are benefiting from the difference principle, and it is true that the 
difference principle is a form of prioritarianism, which Derek Parfit defines as the view, 
“Benefiting people matters more the worse off these people are.”80 However, Rawls writes 
that he has, “taken for granted that if the principle is satisfied, everyone is benefited.”81 This 
of course raises the question of what Rawls means by “everyone is benefited.” If we continue 
with our previous definitions, then “everyone is benefited by the difference principle” means 
“everyone has more liberty, and things of economic and social value under the difference 
principle than they would under an equal distribution.” Rawls thinks that this is true because 
he assumes that by arranging social and economic inequalities in a certain way we can 
increase the production of social primary goods. This assumption is necessary because if the 
amount of social primary goods remained constant, any inequality would see at least one 
individual having less primary social goods than she would have enjoyed under an equal 
distribution.  
Rawls sees social and economic inequality leading to the greater production of social 
primary goods via offering persons the incentive of a greater amount of these goods if they 
gain certain skills; he gives the example of being an entrepreneur.
82
 In the absence of these 
incentives, Rawls posits, there would be fewer entrepreneurs, the economic process would be 
less efficient, and therefore there would be less social primary goods.  
This scenario only explicitly mentions entrepreneurs benefiting. Aware of this, Rawls 
raises the additional possibility that the benefits from this economic process will, “spread 
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throughout the system to the least advantaged.”83 One might think this happens purely 
through market processes, and Rawls does think these processes have some role in this.
84
 
When Rawls writes, “the greater expectations allowed to entrepreneurs encourages them to 
do things which raise the prospect of [the] laboring-class”85 (a group he suggests under 
certain circumstances could be the least advantaged in society) he probably has in mind 
making investments and the like.  
However, Rawls believes that if we only have market processes, the, “distribution 
which results in any period of time is determined by the initial distribution of assets”, and 
Rawls further believes, “social circumstances and such chance contingencies as accident and 
good fortune”86 influence this initial distribution of assets. This means he thinks that the least 
advantaged, who do poorly when it comes to this initial distribution, cannot expect to have 
their expectations maximized via a market process. In order to maximize these expectations, 
and thereby realize the difference principle, requires some government action.  
What government action is required to do this, and to realize Rawls’s other domestic 
principles of justice, is a difficult question, but there are critics who say government should 
not even start to attempt to realize these principles because there are other superior domestic 
principles of justice. So let us now look at Rawls’s argument for why we should have his two 
principles of justice. 
The Argument for the Selection of Rawls’s Principles 
 
 Rawls says ideally those in the original position would select from all possible 
principles and theories of justice, but he argues this is too intellectually demanding. The best 
they can do is to compare Rawls’s theory and two principles of justice with familiar theories 
of justice from the history of moral and political philosophy.
87
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Two of the theories Rawls considers are intuitionism and perfectionism. We will 
briefly look at his arguments against theories, starting with intuitionism. According to Rawls, 
intuitionist theories:  
[H]ave two features: first, they consist of a plurality of first principles which may conflict to 
give contrary directives in particular types of cases; and second, they include no explicit 
method, no priority rules, for weighing these principles against one another: we are simply to 
strike a balance by intuition, by what seems to us most nearly right.
88
 
 
Rawls writes, “A refutation of intuitionism consists in presenting the sort of constructive 
criteria that are said not to exist.”89 This means the presentation of Rawls’s theory, with its 
constructive criteria, acts as an argument against intuitionist theories even though it does not 
directly address these theories. However, Rawls does provide a direct argument against the 
theory by arguing that the persons in the original position would not select it. In doing so, 
Rawls writes: 
[B]eing rational, the persons in the original position recognize that they should consider the 
priority of these principles. For if they wish to establish agreed standards for adjudicating 
their claims on one another, they will need principles for assigning weights. They cannot 
assume that their intuitive judgments of priority will in general be the same; given their 
different positions in society they surely will not. Thus I suppose that in the original position 
the parties try to reach some agreement as to how the principles of justice are to be 
balanced.
90
 
 
We in the real world can also recognise the problematical nature of intuitionism 
recognised by those in the original position. We often have clashing intuitions. This similarity 
is not surprising since, as Rawls emphasises in LoP, the original positions, “models what we 
regard—you and I, here and now—as fair and reasonable conditions for the parties.”91 
However, as was noted before, Rawls’s rejection of intuitionism does not mean he rejects the 
need for intuitions in moral reasoning. 
Rawls’s criticism of perfectionism focuses on the form of perfectionism that sees 
itself as, “the sole principle of a teleological theory directing society to arrange institutions 
and to define the duties and obligations of individuals so as to maximise the achievement of 
                                                                                                                                                        
have enough [italics original].” ‘Equality as a Moral Ideal’, in Ethics, Vol. 98, No. 1, (October 1987), p. 21, 
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I thank my examiner Stephen Winter for noting the need for me to mention sufficientarianism. 
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human excellence in art, science, and culture.”92 There are a number of problems with this 
form of perfectionism. If there are only certain individuals that can achieve excellence in art, 
science, and culture, and this achievement requires the sacrifice of a number of less talented 
individuals, then the road appears clear to justify a great deal of human suffering in the name 
of perfection. Indeed, Rawls notes that Nietzsche appears to have taken this road.
93
 
However, as one might expect, Rawls’s main argument against perfectionism is that 
those in the original position would not select it. He writes: 
The parties [in the original position] do not share a conception of the good by reference to 
which the fruition of their powers or even the satisfaction of their desires can be evaluated. 
They do not have an agreed criterion of perfection that can be used as a principle for choosing 
between institutions. To acknowledge any such standard would be, in effect, to accept a 
principle that might lead to a lesser religious or other liberty, if not to a loss of freedom 
altogether to advance many of one’s spiritual ends.94 
 
This does not mean that in a Rawlsian society that there will be no recognition of excellence 
in art, science and culture. However, rather than the institutions of state being dedicated to 
these excellences, Rawls says, “the human perfections are to be pursued within the limits of 
the principle of free association.”95 
While Rawls does spend some time arguing against intuitionism and perfectionism, 
because of utilitarianism’s prominence in moral and political philosophy, not to mention 
economics, he is mainly concerned with showing the superiority of his two principles to 
utilitarian principles.
96
 
A number of commentators on Rawls, including philosophically minded economist 
John C. Harsanyi, have had an even more narrow focus, looking at whether the difference 
principle is superior to a utilitarian principle.
97
 Since in this thesis I will be mainly arguing 
for a global difference principle, I will also have this focus. 
Some of these commentators, including another philosophically minded economist R. 
A. Musgrave, agree that the representatives would have selected the difference principle, but 
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they argue that the representatives only do so because Rawls gives those in the original 
position an inappropriately high amount of risk-aversion.
98
 We can start to see how these 
commentators might think this works by noting an unmodified maximizing utilitarian 
principle, which, in one of its forms, focuses solely on maximizing total welfare, could have 
certain groups doing poorly. The worst-off of these groups could be doing very poorly.  
However, this group is likely to be small because high total welfare will generally see 
most individuals who make up social groups doing well. Those in the original position, due to 
the veil of ignorance, do not know which group is their group. Therefore, it might be thought 
that those in the original position would be willing to endorse the utilitarian principle, 
because they would reason that their chances of ending up in a group that is doing well is 
large, while the chances of them ending up in the worst off group is small.  
If, however, those in the original position were highly averse to the risk of doing 
poorly, this may alter their decision. They might be attracted to a principle that looked to 
maximize the welfare of the worst off group, which is, in one of its guises, the difference 
principle.  
In response to this, Rawls argues that those in the original position are not highly risk-
averse.
99
 It is understandable that he does this. High-risk aversion does not accord with 
human nature, so its postulation appears arbitrary, or perhaps designed in order to make the 
representatives in the original position select the principles Rawls wants them to. Instead, 
Rawls argues that grave risks face those in the original position, which means even with 
normal levels of risk aversion they are going to adopt a conservative attitude, which will lead 
them to selecting the difference principle.
100
 Part of the gravity of risk is that those in the 
original position cannot be sure of the probability that they will be among the least 
advantaged or another group that is doing poorly. This is in part because they do not even 
know their temporal location. Therefore, Rawls thinks that the reasoning concerning 
probabilities described previously is inappropriate.
101
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Still, some would argue that even if we cannot reason this way in the original position, 
we could still see how counter-intuitive and overly egalitarian the difference principle is by 
imagining how it would judge certain scenarios, and that this would give us a reason not to 
select the principle. Those making this argument could say we should imagine three scenarios. 
Under scenario one everyone has 5 units of positive expectations; under scenario two the 
least advantaged (who make up 20% of the population) have 6 units of positive expectations 
while everyone else has 20, and under scenario three the least advantaged (who still make up 
20% of the population) have 7 units of positive expectations while everyone else has 8. The 
difference principle, at least prima facie, says we should prefer scenario three because under 
this scenario everyone is better off than they would have been under an equal distribution,  
and the expectations of the least advantaged have been maximized. This is counter-intuitive 
because it appears to give too much weight to the interests of the least advantaged. 
Rawls, aware of these types of objections, gives an extreme version of the objection 
when he writes, “it seems extraordinary that the justice of increasing the expectations of the 
better placed by a billion dollars, say, should turn on whether the prospects of the least 
favored increase or decrease by a penny.”102 Rawls’s response to his own objection is to say, 
“The possibilities which the objection envisages cannot arise in real cases; the feasible set is 
so restricted that they are excluded.” This is partly because, “the two principles [of justice] 
are tied together as one conception of justice which applies to the basic structure of society as 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
Other things equal, the persons in the original position will adopt the more stable scheme of principles. 
However attractive a conception of justice might be on other grounds, it is seriously defective if the 
principles of moral psychology are such that it fails to engender in human beings the requisite desire to 
act upon it. 
 
Ibid, § 69, p. 455/398. However, this statement comes late in ToJ, where Rawls also states, “This argument from 
stability is for the most part in addition to the reasons so far adduced”, which brings into question how central it 
is to Rawls’s argument. Ibid. 
When it comes to what he calls the condition of publicity Rawls writes:  
  
When the basic structure of society is publicly known to satisfy its principles for an extended period of 
time, those subject to these arrangements tend to develop a desire to act in accordance with these 
principles and to do their part in institutions which exemplify them. A conception of justice is stable 
when the public recognition of its realization by the social system tends to bring about the 
corresponding sense of justice. Now whether this happens depends, of course, on the laws of moral 
psychology and the availability of human motives. 
 
Ibid, § 29, p. 177/154. While I do not look deeply into the question of publicity, the evidence I provide that 
shows public support for focusing ODA on the least advantaged, suggests that a global difference principle may 
meet the condition of publicity.  
102
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R a w l s ’ s  T h e o r y  a n d  D o m e s t i c  M o d e l  P a g e  | 47 
a whole.”103 Rawls thinks that this means increasing the expectations of the better placed by a 
billion dollars would either be impossible in this world, or would  also result in the least 
favoured doing better than they would have done if the better placed had not gained a billion 
dollars.  
Rawls notes some philosophers would concede this point. However, since they think, 
“Moral conceptions should hold for all possible worlds”104, would still think the difference 
principle is objectionable because it does not endorse the possible world where the 
expectations of the better placed increase by a billion dollars while the expectations of the 
least favoured decrease by a penny. Rawls’s response is to say that those in the original 
position are not set with the task of coming up with an “ethics of creation” which applies to 
all possible worlds, rather they are expected to come up with principles of justice which are 
constrained by certain general facts.
105
 Still, one might think that these constraints do not rule 
out the less extreme examples previously discussed. Rawls initial response to this objection is 
to argue that certain plausible economic assumptions rule these scenarios out.
106
 However, if 
these assumptions turn out to be false, Rawls “bites the bullet” and says we should endorse 
scenarios like scenario three because, “those who are better off should not have a veto over 
the benefits available for the least favored. We are still to maximize the expectations of those 
most disadvantaged.”107 This conclusion may be counterintuitive to some but Rawls believes 
that honouring the equal moral worth of persons entails this conclusion. He also thinks that 
utilitarianism endorses scenarios that are even more counterintuitive.  
Rawls points out that in a world where slaves were less miserable, which meant 
slavery increased human happiness, the utilitarian, who believes in maximizing happiness, 
would have to endorse slavery.
108
 Rawls notes that this utilitarian will often say in reply that 
facts of human nature rule this possibility out, but Rawls thinks that this type of reply 
displays one of the inferiorities of utilitarianism when compared to his two principles of 
justice. This is because the liberty principle, unlike the utilitarian principle, incorporates the 
idea that the denial of liberty involved in slavery is inherently wrong.
109
 Having considered 
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arguments that, inter alia, claim that the difference principle is overly egalitarian, we will 
now consider the argument that claims that the difference principle is not egalitarian enough. 
Why should one not argue for a stricter form of 
egalitarianism? 
 
Kai Nielsen argues that the difference principle is too inegalitarian because its 
toleration of inequality wounds an individual’s self-respect.110 In doing so, he writes: 
We cannot in Rawls’ system in situations of moderate scarcity (relative abundance) trade off 
a lesser self-respect for more goodies. But the disparities in power, authority and autonomy 
that obtain even in welfare state capitalism, to say nothing of its cruder forms, and are not 
only allowed but justified by the difference principle, undermine for the worst off and for 
many others as well, their self-respect.
111
 
 
The reason why Nielsen says that in Rawls’s system we cannot trade off a lesser self-
respect for more goodies (by which he means income and wealth and what income and 
wealth can buy) is because of the importance Rawls places on self-respect. I already noted in 
this chapter the importance Rawls places on self-respect, but let us now consider this position 
in more detail along with the concept of self-respect. Nielsen claims, “Self-respect for Rawls 
is the most important primary good”.112 However, Rawls is less certain than this quote 
suggests. At one point in ToJ Rawls writes, “perhaps the most important primary good is that 
of self-respect”, while at another point he writes, “self-respect is the main primary good.”113 
Still, given the importance Rawls places on self-respect, and Nielsen’s claim that the 
inequalities allowed by the difference principle wounds someone’s self-respect as Rawls 
defines it, it is imperative to know what Rawls thinks self-respect is. In giving this definition, 
Rawls writes:  
We may define self-respect … as having two aspects. First of all … it includes a person’s 
sense of his [or her] own value, his [or her] secure conviction that his [or her] conception of 
his [or her] good, his [or her] plan of life, is worth carrying out. And second, self-respect 
implies a confidence in one’s ability, so far as it is within one’s power, to fulfill one’s 
intentions.
114
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How may the difference principle damage this type of self-respect? The most likely 
way would appear to be by damaging a least advantaged individual’s sense of her own value. 
This could occur by a least advantaged individual comparing their allotment of social primary 
goods to those allotted to an entrepreneur, and thinking these allotments reflect personal 
value. The least advantaged person then concludes their own value must be low, which 
causes them to have little or no self-respect.  
One possible problem with this scenario is it presupposes persons make judgements 
on personal value via interpersonal comparisons of the possession of social primary goods. It 
may be that in order to be convinced of their value and self-worth individuals only require a 
certain amount of social primary goods. Raising this possibility is, as is Rawls’s writing on 
this subject in ToJ, highly speculative. What is the actual evidence on this topic? Searching 
for this evidence might seem futile because it might appear difficult to measure an 
individual’s sense of her own value and self-respect, and thereby have an idea of how 
different social arrangements with different levels of egalitarianism might affect these 
personal factors. It would appear to be much easier to measure income and wealth, or as 
Nielsen would put it “goodies.” Nevertheless, researchers David P. Schmitt and Jüri Allik 
have attempted to measure the related personal factor of self-esteem, and done this in 
numerous countries. Schmitt and Allik, inter alia, would ask subjects if they agreed with the 
statements:  
““I see myself as someone who is outgoing, sociable” … “I see myself as someone who is 
helpful and unselfish with others” … “I see myself as someone who is a reliable worker” … 
“I see myself as someone who worries a lot” … “I see myself as someone who is curious 
about many different things”.115 
  
The results might surprise some. Responses were generally positive, indicating high 
self-esteem and probably high self-respect across a variety of countries with varying levels of 
egalitarianism.
116
 This suggests that the strictly egalitarian society Nielsen envisions may not 
have higher levels of self-respect than a society governed by a difference principle. Since this 
was Nielsen’s main argument in favour of his principle, I think we can now move on to 
consider a more moderate egalitarian objection to the difference principle.
117
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This is the objection of G. A. Cohen, who argues that how Rawls generally presents the 
difference principle is problematic from an egalitarian point of view.
118
 Cohen writes:  
I believe that the idea that an inequality is justified if, through the familiar incentive 
mechanism, it benefits the badly off is more problematic than Rawlsians suppose; that (at 
least) when the incentive consideration is isolated from all reference to desert or entitlement, 
it generates an argument for inequality that requires a model of society in breach of an 
elementary condition of community. The difference principle can be used to justify paying 
incentives that induce inequalities only when the attitude of talented people runs counter to 
the spirit of the difference principle itself: they would not need special incentives if they were 
themselves unambivalently committed to the principle. Accordingly, they must be thought of 
as outside the community upholding the principle when it is used to justify incentive 
payments to them.
119
  
 
The talented person might say they are still acting in accordance with the difference 
principle. Cohen would have some sympathy with this claim, but would say the talented 
person is only acting in accordance with what he calls the lax difference principle, which he 
differentiates from the strict difference principle. The lax difference principle, according to 
Cohen, accepts inequalities that are the result of talented persons demanding more pay than 
others receive in order that they, the talented persons, make the choice to work hard and make 
the best use of their superior talents, and thereby indirectly help the worse off. The strict 
difference principle, according to Cohen, says the more talented should not expect more pay 
simply because they choose to make the best use of their talents. The fact they have more 
talent, and therefore can produce more goods and services than others, is the result of luck, 
and cannot justify a claim for greater rewards. 
                                                                                                                                                        
peoples and of each people maintaining its self-respect, not lapsing into contempt for the other, on one side, and 
bitterness and resentment, on the other”. LoP, § 17.2, p. 122.  
This quote suggests that the self-respect of peoples has a lot to do with how other peoples view them. 
Researchers have not done much work on national self-respect, never mind the particular type of self-respect 
Rawls had in mind. However, researchers have done work on the related notion of national pride, but this work 
has mainly focused on developed countries. Some of this work suggests that historical origins influence national 
pride more than the view of other peoples. For example, Tom W. Smith and Seokho Kim found, “off-shoots of 
Europe led by the USA and Venezuela” had the highest levels of national pride. ‘National Pride in Comparative 
Perspective: 1995/96 and 2003/04’ in International Journal of Public Opinion Research, Vol. 18, No. 1, (2006), 
p. 133, DOI: 10.1093/ijpor/edk007.  
I thank my examiner David Reidy for reminding of the important role the concept of self-respect plays in 
Rawls’s work. 
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 Cohen argues that in ToJ Rawls sometimes portrays talented individuals as always 
obeying the strict difference principle and at other times portrays talented individuals as 
always obeying the lax difference principle. This leads Cohen to claim that Rawls portrays 
talented individuals inconsistently, and to argue that to be consistent, not just with how he 
portrays the behaviour of talented individuals, but also with his wider theory, Rawls should 
portray talented individuals, along with less talented members of society, as obeying the strict 
difference principle. What should we make of this critique? 
One issue with Cohen’s critique is that it does not mention the distinction between 
ideal and nonideal theory, or partial compliance and strict compliance.
120
 He only mentions 
full compliance. This leads him to mischaracterise Rawls’s position on how persons comply 
with the principle.  
Cohen argues that talented individuals, who are self-interested market maximizers, 
can comply with the lax difference principle.
121
 However, if we take compliance with the 
principles of justice to be acting from the motivation to honour the principles, then these 
individuals never comply with the principles of justice; they only act from self-interest. One 
might try to defend Cohen’s portrayal of talented individuals in Rawls’s theory as being 
correct by pointing out that Rawls claims that the principles are the ones self-interested 
individuals would select in the original position. However, Rawls carefully distinguishes 
between the behaviour of these representatives and the behaviour of individuals in a Rawlsian 
society. 
Another issue with Cohen’s critique is the issue of whether he endorses the difference 
principle. At one point, he says, “For my part, I accept the difference principle in its generous 
interpretation”.122 By “generous interpretation”, he means an interpretation, “which … allows 
inequalities that do not help but also do not hurt the worse off.”123 I would argue that in 
allowing these inequalities, this generous difference principle does not respect the moral 
equality of persons. The only way one can have social and economic inequality while 
respecting this equality is if this inequality maximises the benefits to the least advantaged.  
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Along with saying that he accepts the generous difference principle, Cohen says one 
can see this interpretation in Rawls’s writings. On this latter point, one might think that 
Cohen is mistaken because the final statement of the difference principle only states social 
and economic inequalities are to be, “To the greatest benefit of the least advantaged”, and 
does not add the clause that failing that, these inequalities are not to make the least 
advantaged worse off. However, as Derek Parfit points out, Rawls implies his acceptance of 
these inequalities when he gives what he calls the lexical version of the difference 
principle.
124
 Rawls writes that this principle states: 
[I]n a basic structure with n relevant representatives, first maximize the welfare of the worst 
off representative man [or woman]; second, for equal welfare of the worst-off representative, 
maximize the welfare of the second worst-off representative man [or woman], and so on until 
the last case which is, for equal welfare of all the preceding n–1 representatives, maximize the 
welfare of the best-off representative man [or woman].
125
   
 
However, Rawls displays uneasiness with this principle, immediately going on to state:  
I think, however, that in actual cases this principle is unlikely to be relevant, for when the 
greater potential benefits to the more advantaged are significant, there will surely be some 
way to improve the situation of the less advantaged as well. The general laws governing the 
institutions of the basic structure insure that cases requiring the lexical principle will not arise. 
Thus I shall always use the difference principle in the simpler form [.]
126
 
 
I think this displays recognition on Rawls’s part that inequalities that have no effect on the 
least advantaged are unacceptable from an egalitarian standpoint. 
Cohen, perhaps also uncomfortable with these inequalities, would amend his view. 
However, he did not reject the generous interpretation of the difference principle. Instead, he 
wrote: 
I would now say … That distributive justice is (some kind of equality), but that … the 
difference principle, often trumps justice. Accordingly, I would … say that although, with 
certain qualifications, I indeed accept the difference principle, I do not accept it as a principle 
of justice, but rather as a policy of intelligent policy [italics original].”127  
 
Here Cohen appears to be saying that in a nonideal world the difference principle is 
acceptable, but that in an ideal world there would be “some kind of equality.”128 However, the 
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difference principle, in its more miserly interpretation, is “some kind of equality.”  
Admittedly, it is still a bit paradoxical to say that there can be equality in economic and social 
inequality, but one should always remember that this inequality is there to ensure that the 
least advantaged have the maximum possible benefits.  
Conclusion 
 
 This chapter had the dual role of describing and arguing for Rawls’s theory and its 
concomitant principles of domestic justice. In doing so, the chapter introduced Rawls’s 
distinction between ideal and nonideal theory, his domestic model, the two moral powers, and 
the two principles of domestic justice. In a thesis on global justice, it was necessary to focus 
on Rawls’s domestic model and principles of justice because the Rawlsian view of global 
justice needs these elements as a basis. As was noted in the introductory chapter, many were 
dismayed when Rawls gave his international model and the principles of justice he derived 
from it, in part because they believed that the model and principles did not follow from 
Rawls’s domestic model and principles. I will largely agree with this critique, but before 
considering this critique in detail, let us introduce ourselves to Rawls’s international model. 
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Chapter 3: Rawls’s International Model 
 
Introduction 
 
Rawls believes his international model will lead to the selection of eight international 
principles of justice. Before looking at what these principles are and how the representatives 
in the international original positions select them, we will briefly introduce important entities 
in his model, viz. his polities. Among these polities are liberal peoples and decent peoples, 
with the other three types of polities Rawls identifies being burdened societies, outlaw states, 
and benevolent absolutisms. We will see that while these latter three polities have no role in 
selecting the principles of international justice, Rawls believes the principles still apply to 
them. 
 The process the representatives of liberal and decent peoples go through in Rawls’s 
international model in arriving at these principles is different from that which occurs in the 
domestic model. Rather than selecting from a range of principles, the representatives of 
liberal and decent peoples select from interpretations of principles already present in 
international law. Commentators have given a good deal of attention to the lack of alternative 
principles. In this chapter, we will consider Christopher Heath Wellman’s defence of this lack, 
and conclude that this defence does not work.  We will also consider the less commented on 
interpretative nature of this process by considering Alyssa R. Bernstein’s and Rawls’s 
comments on this process. 
Introducing Rawls’s Polities 
 
 Rawls, to a certain extent, separates discussion of his polities into different parts of 
LoP. In the first part of LoP, he discusses what he calls the first part of ideal theory, and is 
mainly concerned with describing liberal peoples. In the second part of LoP, he discusses 
what he calls the second part of ideal theory and is mainly concerned with discussing decent 
peoples. In the third part of LoP, he moves on to nonideal theory and is mainly concerned 
with discussing outlaw states and burdened societies, and very briefly discussing benevolent 
absolutisms. 
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Rawls describes liberal and decent peoples as being well-ordered and living together 
in the “Society of Peoples”, but they are fundamentally different partly because they view 
persons differently. Liberal peoples view persons as, “citizens first” who, “have equal basic 
rights as equal citizens.”129 In contrast, decent peoples view persons, “as responsible and 
cooperating members of their respective groups” but not as equal.130 This means, “some 
persons will take part in representing” the interests of the members of their group, but they do 
so as members of these groups, “and not as individuals.”131 Due to not viewing persons as 
equal, decent peoples do not have the electoral principle of one person, one vote; and do not 
engage in original position reasoning on questions of domestic justice, which means their 
view of domestic justice differs from that of liberal peoples, and does not depend on a theory 
of justice comparable to Rawls’s. Rawls suggests that a philosophical doctrine could act as a 
basis for a decent peoples’ view of domestic justice, but the only example of a decent people 
he gives is of a hypothetical Islamic society with a religion-based view of domestic justice. 
The differences between liberal and decent peoples helps to explain why Rawls says 
they are dealt with by different parts of ideal theory, with the first part dealing with liberal 
peoples and the second part dealing with decent peoples. Of the second part Rawls writes, 
“The second step of ideal theory is more difficult: it challenges us to specify a second kind of 
society—a decent, though not a liberal society—to be recognized as a bona fide member of a 
politically reasonable Society of Peoples”.132 In describing both liberal and decent peoples 
Rawls, inter alia, says they are reasonable, free and responsible. However, as the thesis 
progresses, we will see problems face Rawls when he describes decent peoples in this fashion. 
To be more specific, in chapter four in a discussion of international reasonable pluralism, I 
will bring into question the freeness and reasonableness of the opinions of decent peoples, 
while in chapter six I will bring into question the freeness and responsibility of decent 
peoples. 
Burdened societies are not like liberal or decent peoples because they, “lack the 
political and cultural traditions, the human capital and know-how, and, often, the material and 
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technological resources needed to be well-ordered”.133 Outlaw states appear to choose to be 
not well-ordered, by generally refusing, “to comply with a reasonable Law of Peoples”134, 
sometimes by being aggressive and expansionist, and by not recognising the human rights of 
their members.
135
 Benevolent absolutisms also appear to choose not to be well-ordered, and 
while, unlike outlaw states, they have regard for their members’ human rights, benevolent 
absolutisms deny their members any meaningful role in political decision-making.
136
 
These latter three types of polities will not have representatives who draw up the 
international social contract with its international principles of justice, because they refuse or 
cannot view other polities as equal. However, the long-term goal of this contract and its 
principles is for all polities to become either liberal or decent peoples. It is these international 
principles we now turn to. 
Rawls’s Principles of International Justice 
 
Initially the representatives of liberal peoples will select the principles of international 
justice in a second original position, then the representatives of decent peoples will select 
them in a third original position.
137
 The representatives do know what type of people they are 
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representing, but do not know, “the size of the territory, or the population, or the relative 
strength of the people whose fundamental interests they represent ... [or] the extent of their 
natural resources, or the level of their economic development, or other such information.”138 
As in the domestic case of the original position, the veil is there to ensure those in these 
original positions come to an impartial judgment. 
Rawls claims, “that their [decent peoples] representatives in an appropriate original 
position would adopt the same eight principles [of international justice] … as those … 
adopted by the representatives of liberal societies.”139 Given their differing views on the 
nature of the person and domestic justice, on the face of it, this agreement is surprising, but 
let us withhold judgment and investigate the principles further. 
The name Rawls gives his set of international principles of justice is “The Law of 
Peoples”, which is of course the same name he gave to his book on international justice, 
published in 1999.
140
  To provide elaboration on the meaning of the name, Rawls writes, “By 
the “Law of Peoples” I mean a particular political conception of right and justice that applies 
to the norms of international law and practice.”141 Rawls also writes that the, “basic charter of 
the Law of Peoples” comes, “from the history and usages of international law and 
practice”.142 One might think this is problematic because the Law of Peoples cannot both 
apply to and come from international law and practice, but what Rawls is doing is justifying 
principles that we can identify in international law and practice but which states do not 
always follow, even though they could.  This approach ties in with the later Rawls’s desire 
for his political philosophy to be realistically utopian.   
 To clarify what he means by “realistically utopian” Rawls writes, “Political 
philosophy is realistically utopian when it extends what are ordinarily thought of as the limits 
                                                                                                                                                        
Community, or the commonwealth of the republics in the former Soviet Union. It is natural to envisage 
future world society as in good part composed of such federations together with certain institutions, 
such as the United Nations, capable of speaking for all the societies of the world. 
 
Ibid, § 8.4, p. 70. This suggests that the separation of liberal and decent peoples into two international original 
positions is a reflection of the real world where liberal and decent peoples do not tend to join to form 
cooperative organizations with a basic structure; but, if they did, having them together in one international 
original position would be appropriate. 
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of practical political possibility.”143 Furthermore, “The idea of this society [governed by the 
Law of Peoples] is realistically utopian in that it depicts an achievable social world that 
combines political right and justice for all liberal and decent peoples in a Society of 
Peoples.”144  
These comments from Rawls show how his international model has a balance 
between what one could describe as pragmatic and moral considerations. Indeed, a number of 
commentators have made this observation.
145
 There is of course the question of whether 
Rawls correctly balances these considerations. In following chapters, I will argue that Rawls 
errs when he argues that pragmatic considerations rule out a global difference principle.
146
 
However, before getting to this point, let us specify the international principles of justice 
Rawls endorses. 
Rawls’s Eight Principles of International Justice 
1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be 
respected by other peoples. 
2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. 
3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them. 
4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention. 
5. Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons other 
than self-defense. 
6. Peoples are to honor human rights. 
7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war. 
8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that 
prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime.
147
  
 
Rawls admits this list of principles is incomplete, but it is the only canonical statement of 
principles of international justice in LoP.  
The first principle, “Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and 
independence are to be respected by other peoples”, is partly about the need to tolerate the 
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different ways liberal and decent peoples order their societies.
148
 I will discuss the principle 
more fully in the tenth chapter, which considers New Zealand and how it has and has not 
respected this principle. 
Rawls does not give a detailed discussion of the second and third principles, regarding 
treaties and agreements, and his explicit discussion of the fourth principle, the principle of 
non-intervention, is limited to how the human rights principle can override it.
149
 
Most of Rawls’s discussion of the fifth principle—the principle of self-defence— 
comes in a section on well-ordered peoples’ right to war.150 This, however, does not mean 
Rawls thinks only well-ordered peoples have a right to war. Rawls argues benevolent 
absolutisms and burdened societies have the right to war in self-defence because they honour 
human rights, albeit a very narrow set. This is the only time he mentions benevolent 
absolutisms outside brief outlines of his taxonomy of polities.
151
  
When it comes to the right to war, liberal and decent peoples have the further 
justification of defending their just or decent institutions, and the freedom, in the case of 
decent peoples the very limited freedom, of their members. One might think that Rawls 
thinks that the right of self-defence covers all rights to war since peoples have, “no right to 
instigate wars for reasons other than self-defense”, but Rawls believes that peoples can 
defend their allies, and can intervene militarily if an outlaw state gravely violates human 
rights of its own inhabitants.
152
 This latter case is a case of the human rights principle 
overriding the non-intervention principle.
153
  
In the next chapter, we will consider how similar reasons might lead to the selection 
of the human rights principle and a global difference principle, but for now, we will note that 
Rawls’s discussion of the human rights principle is mainly limited to issues of war.154 This is 
because he sees two of the main roles of these limited set of rights as restricting, “the 
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justifying reasons for war and its conduct” and specifying, “limits to a regime’s internal 
autonomy.”155  
Therefore, the sixth principle, the human rights principle, ties into the seventh 
principle, the principle there should be certain restrictions on the conduct of war.
156
 
According to Rawls, the need to honour human rights does not mean, however, that the 
targeting of civilians in war cannot be justified. Indeed, he thinks this can be justified in a 
“supreme emergency”.157  
Rawls claims that the sixth and seventh principles “are superfluous in a society of 
well-ordered peoples”.158 Presumably, Rawls means that by their nature liberal and decent 
peoples honour human rights, which means if they were to conduct a war, they would do so 
in a just manner. Rawls indicates other principles are also superfluous in a society of well-
ordered peoples, but does not say which. Perhaps this does not matter because all the 
principles are in a sense superfluous in a society of well-ordered peoples because Rawls 
defines such a society as one that follows these principles.
159
  
The eighth and final principle is the duty of assistance. This duty is the moral 
requirement that liberal and decent peoples help burdened societies to become either liberal 
or decent peoples.
160
 A detailed discussion of this principle will occur in the fifth chapter.  
In the next chapter, I shall argue we should add a global difference principle to this 
list of principles. In doing so, I will not be the first to make this or similar suggestions. Darrel 
Moellendorf argues that Rawls should have added principle “(9) Peoples are to honor 
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principles of egalitarian distributive justice” to the Law of Peoples.161 Moellendorf suggests 
that the main reason why Rawls does not include this or any other egalitarian distributive 
principles is that he wants to make the list of principles acceptable to decent peoples.
162
 This 
is clearly part of the explanation, but further explanation is required.  
This further explanation comes from the choice Rawls gives the representatives in the 
international original positions. Rawls writes that in these positions: 
The parties are not given a menu of alternative principles and ideals from which to select, as 
they are in Political Liberalism, or in A Theory of Justice. Rather, the representatives of well-
ordered peoples simply reflect on the advantages of these principles of equality among 
peoples and see no reason to depart from them or to propose alternatives.
163
 
 
Considering that the representatives do not even propose alternatives, can we describe 
the process as selecting? Alyssa R. Bernstein gives reason for thinking we might be able to 
do this by noting that Rawls says the representatives select from interpretations of the eight 
principles. Furthermore, she argues this gives them a range of choice because we can 
interpret the principles in a number of ways, and can see them as relating to one another in a 
number of ways.
164
 The latter claim is certainly true. This is in part because Rawls does not 
offer us a clear and strict priority rule as he does in the domestic case. The earlier claim 
regarding interpretation may seem questionable, but Rawls points to his discussion of what he 
calls the two traditional powers of sovereignty, in order for us to see how one can describe 
this interpretive process as selection. These two powers traditionally covered the right of a 
state to go to war for rational prudential reasons (which included increasing a state’s power 
and wealth), and the right for a state to do as it wishes with its citizens. Rawls advocates 
reformulating these principles in the light of the Law of Peoples, so we end up with states that 
have the sovereign power to wars of self-defence, and the sovereign power to constrain their 
citizens with laws as long as these laws respect human rights.
165
 Still, this is a more 
constrained process than what occurs in the domestic realm. What justification can one give 
for this constraint?  
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Christopher Heath Wellman attempts to give a justification when he argues that when 
it comes to these principles, “the key comparative question is not whether moral analysis 
recommends a competing set of principles as more ideal, it is whether historical evidence 
indicates that another set could more fully and effectively eliminate the political oppression 
and such [that leads to such evils as poverty] [italics original].”166 Wellman believes that 
Rawls thinks that the historical evidence suggests his eight principles are the most effective, 
and goes on to argue that Rawls uses the international original positions only to confirm there 
is nothing morally objectionable in imposing the eight principles internationally.
167
  
However, Rawls’s view is not as focused on effectiveness as Wellman argues. Rawls 
spends most of LoP describing an ideal world where there are only liberal and decent peoples 
and where the international community has fully realized his eight principles. Moreover, as 
we have just seen, Rawls also wants to leave some room for moral analysis by suggesting that 
those in the international original positions still go through a selective process.  However, 
Wellman is correct to argue that one of Rawls’s main justifications for his eight principles is 
his claim that they are the most effective in producing a world free from such evils as poverty.  
This claim made by Rawls is bold and in need of further justification. The following 
chapters will address Rawls’s further justification, and other claims he makes in support of 
his eight principles, and the empirical questions these claims raise. 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter briefly looked at Rawls’s international model of justice. This model has 
two international original positions, a taxonomy that identifies five polities, and 
representatives that select eight principles of international justice. One of the most discussed 
differences between this set of principles and Rawls’s domestic principles of justice is that 
this set of principles does not have a difference principle. The international principle that 
comes closest to the domestic difference principle is the duty of assistance, but as we will see 
in the fifth chapter, the duty of assistance is an analogue to the just savings principle rather 
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than the difference principle. However, before we move to Rawls’s argument that the duty of 
assistance has a number of features that make it preferable to the global difference principle, 
let us consider some other arguments against the global difference principle and some 
arguments for it.
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Chapter 4: The Global Difference Principle and its 
Critics 
 
Introduction 
 
 This chapter will argue that a Rawlsian view of global justice should include a global 
difference principle focused on persons. The chapter will also respond to a number of Rawls 
inspired arguments against the principle including those made by Philip Pettit, Samuel 
Freeman, and Nagel. These authors could point out that in opposing the difference principle 
they were following Rawls, who offered a number of arguments against the principle. The 
chapter will also respond to these arguments.   
The chapter will start with an argument for the global difference principle similar to 
the one made by Charles Beitz, viz. that the global difference principle focused on persons is 
justified by virtually all persons possessing the potential to develop the two moral powers.
168
  
 As Rawls points out, placing this importance on the two moral powers also leads to 
what I will call a “global liberty principle.” Rawls argues that decent peoples will oppose 
both this and the global difference principle. While I will only briefly discuss the global 
liberty principle, I will argue that it is similar to civil and political rights, while the global 
difference principle is similar to economic and social rights. I will point out that a number of 
countries have supported both of these types of rights by voting for certain UN resolutions. 
This will suggest that opposition to these principles is not as widespread as Rawls suggests, 
and that Rawls’s idealised decent peoples may not oppose these principles. However, I will 
note that liberal societies have been more in favour of civil and political rights, while non-
liberal societies have been more in favour of economic and social rights.  
The chapter will then move on to consider what I will call the “The Question of 
Representatives Argument” made by Rawls and developed by Pettit. This argument starts by 
claiming that the representatives of peoples are the appropriate parties to be in the 
international original positions, and then claims these representatives would not select a 
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global difference principle focused on persons. I will question the first claim, and then argue 
that even if the first claim is true, the second claim does not follow.  
In the next section of the chapter, I will further argue that Rawls seemed to appreciate 
the representatives in the international original positions could select a cosmopolitan 
principle like the global difference principle. In making this argument, I will note that he 
argued that the representatives would select the human rights principle, which I will argue is 
a cosmopolitan principle. 
While the time the chapter spends on the question of representatives and human rights 
will be relatively brief, the chapter will spend more time on what I will call Rawls’s 
“International Reasonable Pluralism Argument”. In making this argument, Rawls first argues 
that there is international reasonable pluralism because there are liberal and decent peoples 
who are both reasonable (even though liberal peoples are more reasonable) but who have 
different views on the value of persons. He then argues that this is analogous to the situation 
in a liberal domestic society where there is what he calls a “reasonable pluralism of 
comprehensive doctrines”169 held by persons. Rawls argues that in this domestic society it 
would be wrong to impose a reasonable liberal comprehensive doctrine on persons who hold 
reasonable non-liberal comprehensive doctrines. Analogously, he argues that having a global 
difference principle is wrong because this amounts to imposing a reasonable liberal 
comprehensive doctrine on peoples who hold reasonable non-liberal comprehensive doctrines. 
The chapter will argue that this analogy fails for a number of reasons including that 
international reasonable pluralism is not as extensive as Rawls suggests. 
Having pointed out a number of problems with the international reasonable pluralist 
argument, the chapter will move on to consider the claim that there is no social group that 
equates to the globally least advantaged group, and therefore a global difference principle 
focused on persons would have no target. On the contrary, I will argue that if we accept 
Rawls’s definition of the least advantaged, and look to the world, then we will be able to 
identify a global group that have enough similarities to be considered the globally least 
advantaged group.  
However, if Rawls’s definition picks out a globally least advantaged group and a least 
advantaged group in a domestic society, this leads us to having two difference principles, 
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which say we should arrange social and economic inequalities to the benefit of two different 
groups. As Freeman points out, this might lead to demands to fulfil mutually incompatible 
actions. The chapter will argue that we can avoid this by having an additional justification for 
the domestic and global difference principles, which will help us to identify different 
resources we could redistribute to the two different groups. 
Lastly, we will come to what I will call “the argument from basic structures.” This 
argument comes from Nagel who argues that Rawls’s two principles of domestic justice 
apply to basic structures, and implies there is no global basic structure in part because of the 
lack of coercion involved in the relations between societies. This lack of a global basic 
structure, Nagel argues, means there can be no global difference principle. In rebutting this 
argument, I will point out that Rawls suggests there is something analogous to a global basic 
structure, namely the basic structure of the Society of Peoples. I will also reference the 
argument made by Laura Valentini that there is a significant amount of coercion in 
international relations, which suggests that the existence of a global basic structure cannot be 
denied on the basis of a lack of global coercion. I will then argue that even if there is not a 
global basic structure, we should construct one. 
The Global Difference Principle and its place in Rawlsian 
theory 
 
Rawls was aware that there were those who argued that a Rawlsian approach that 
extended beyond justice for one society would lead to cosmopolitan principles including a 
global difference principle focused on persons. Nevertheless, when Rawls first discusses 
cosmopolitanism in LoP, which is the only time in LoP he uses the phrase “global justice”, he 
only mentions what one could call “a global liberty principle.” In doing so, Rawls writes: 
Some think that any liberal Law of Peoples … should begin by first taking up the question of 
liberal cosmopolitan or global justice for all persons. They argue that in such a view all 
persons are considered to be reasonable and rational and to possess what I have called "the 
two moral powers"—a capacity for a sense of justice and a capacity for a conception of the 
good [.] … From this starting point they go on to imagine a global original position with its 
veil of ignorance behind which all parties are situated symmetrically. Following the kind of 
reasoning familiar in the original position for the domestic case, the parties would then adopt 
a first principle that all persons have equal basic rights and liberties. Proceeding this way 
would straightaway ground human rights in a political (moral) conception of liberal 
cosmopolitan justice.
170
 
                                                 
170
 Ibid, § 11.1, p. 82. 
T h e  G l o b a l  D i f f e r e n c e  P r i n c i p l e  a n d  i t s  C r i t i c s  P a g e  | 68 
 
It is telling that here Rawls says, “in such a [liberal cosmopolitan] view all persons are 
considered … to possess… what I have called “the two moral powers””; rather than just 
saying persons have the two moral powers. This suggests one can justifiably take the liberal 
view or the decent view of persons. Which means one can justifiably think that persons 
possess the moral powers and are therefore of equal moral worth and therefore we should 
have a global liberty principle, or one can justifiably think that persons do not possess these 
powers, or anything else which makes them of equal moral worth, and therefore we should 
not have a global liberty principle.
171
 I would instead argue that the liberal view is correct.
172
 
One of the reasons I do this is because, if we give up on the idea that persons actually 
possess the potential to develop the two moral powers, then we give up on the idea that 
Rawlsian theory could have a firm base; this giving up makes Rawlsian theory nothing more 
than a form of liberal prejudice. Rawls might still insist that, somehow, the liberal view is 
more reasonable, but this is unconvincing when he does not base this reasonableness on facts. 
Instead, if we take seriously the argument made in ToJ (that virtually all persons, no matter 
what society they happen to belong to, actually have the potential to develop these powers)
173
 
we are led to global principles of justice.  
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As Rawls notes, we are not alone in taking this path. Beitz came to view his 
cosmopolitanism as justified by persons possessing the two moral powers.
174
 However, Beitz 
acknowledges that such a cosmopolitan view, “would be pointless if there were no feasible 
scheme of institutions to which principles of [global] justice could apply.”175 While Beitz 
thinks there is such a scheme, Rawls thinks there is not. 
 In supporting his position, Rawls argues that if liberal democratic societies promote 
cosmopolitan principles and any necessary associated institutions, they will face opposition 
from non-liberal societies. According to Rawls, this opposition is reasonable, and this makes 
it difficult and morally unacceptable to have a cosmopolitan scheme of institutions. However, 
if we look to actual political practice we arguably see a different picture at least when it 
comes to the global difference principle.  
Of course, societies have not promoted or rejected an actual global liberty principle or 
an actual global difference principle, but they have considered similar entities. In regards to a 
global liberty principle, I am talking of civil and political rights. Notable in this regard is the 
UN’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which includes such declarations 
as:  
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[I]f there were no international basic structure—if, for example there were no appreciable international 
capital flows, little trade, no international economic institutions, and only rudimentary forms of 
international law—then we would not find principles of international distributive justice of any 
practical interest. It could be said in this counterfactual world that the world economy is something 
most people can realistically avoid, and in any case that there is no structure of institutions or pattern of 
practice to which regulative principle could be applied. 
What the facts about interdependence and the global structure demonstrate is that this cannot be said 
about the actual world as we have it today. 
 
Beitz writes in a footnote, “I believe the remarks in the text are consistent with the formulation in my 
‘Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment’, p. 595.” Political Theory and International Relations: With a 
new afterword by the author, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 204. However, in this work Beitz 
goes further. Writing of a world where there is no international cooperation, Beitz writes: 
 
Unless international cooperation according to the principle of justice can be shown to be infeasible, 
limiting the scope of the principle to national societies on the grounds that international cooperation 
does not exist today (or, as Brian Barry argues, because present-day international cooperation lacks the 
requisite mutuality) would arbitrarily favour the status quo. 
 
‘Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment’, p. 595. I would emphasise Beitz’s latter point. 
While not appealing to the two moral powers directly, David Richards makes a similar argument in 
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Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall 
include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his [or her] choice, and freedom, 
either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his [or 
her] religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.
176
 
 
Theorists often contrast these rights with economic and social rights, which I would 
argue are similar to a global difference principle. A notable UN resolution concerning 
economic and social rights is the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, which includes such declarations as, “The States Parties to the present Covenant 
recognise the right of everyone to … the continuous improvement of living conditions.”177 
The critic, who argues that the global difference principle is not similar to social and 
economic rights, may point out that the global difference principle does not make this 
demand for the continuous improvement of the living conditions of everyone. However, we 
can reply by noting that improving the living conditions of everyone would see an increase in 
the expectations of the least advantaged, which means a move towards realizing this right 
would be a step towards realizing a global difference principle.  
Both covenants gained widespread support in the UN.
178
 As Gillian Brock notes: 
If we take this [widespread support] seriously, it can no longer be maintained that there is 
significant controversy in the global public culture concerning the recognition the 
international community gives to individual basic entitlements, including recognition of 
individuals' equality and entitlements to basic freedoms.
179
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This suggests that the opposition to the global liberty principle and the global difference 
principle may not be as widespread as Rawls suggests. However, the leaders of liberal 
democratic societies have tended to emphasise the importance of the global implementation 
of civil and political rights and down play the importance of social and economic rights, 
while the leaders of non-liberal societies have tended to do the reverse.
180
 This suggests that 
Rawls’s picture of liberal societies forcing a global difference principle on reluctant non-
liberal societies may be misleading, but may be more accurate when it comes to the global 
liberty principle. 
When Rawls, in LoP, argues against the global difference principle, he does not 
explicitly mention global original position reasoning even though such reasoning would lead 
to this principle. One can find a partial explanation for this omission by where Rawls places 
the discussion, in the third part of LoP that deals with nonideal theory. Rawls did the same 
thing in the earlier essay version of LoP where he also criticised the global difference 
principle. However, there are problems with this placement.  As Pogge notes:  
Rawls considers such a principle [the global difference principle] only in regard to one part of 
nonideal theory: coping with unfavourable conditions, although it has generally, if not always, 
been proposed as an analogue to the domestic difference principle, which is used primarily to 
design the ideal basic structure.
181
 
 
A response Rawls could give would be to concede that the placement of criticism of the 
global difference principle within a discussion of nonideal theory was a mistake, but that one 
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[T]he first principle covering the equal basic rights and liberties may easily be preceded by a lexically 
prior principle requiring that citizens’ basic needs be met, at least insofar as their being met is 
necessary for citizens to understand and to be able fruitfully to exercise those rights and liberties. 
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can make a similar criticism of the principle within ideal theory. Indeed, Rawls implies such 
an argument in LoP, when he suggests that when we consider questions of global justice we 
should look to the ideal theory question of who the representatives selecting principles of 
global justice should be. Those making this argument claim that when we do this we will see 
why a global difference principle is not appropriate. Let us take a closer but brief look at this 
argument. 
The Question of Representatives 
 
This argument points out that when Rawls, for the sake of argument, talks of parties 
in a global original position coming to a global liberty principle focused on persons; he 
implies that these parties are persons who are representing global social groups. This 
contrasts with how he describes the two international original positions. In these two cases, 
we have the representatives of peoples. These representatives are concerned with the interests 
of the people they represent and not in the interests of global social groups. This, Rawls 
argues, means they will not select any global principle focused on persons, a category that, 
along with a global liberty principle, includes a global difference principle. Rawls further 
asserts this is appropriate.  
In developing this anti-cosmopolitan position, Pettit argues Rawlsian 
cosmopolitanism that uses global original position reasoning, like the form of Rawlsian 
cosmopolitanism presented in this thesis, “fails to take sufficient account of the nature of 
peoples. It fails to reflect an understanding of just what sort of thing a people is.”182 Pettit 
believes this failure is partly a failure to recognise peoples (which certain states are well-
ordered enough to be referred to as
183
) are agents in the same way persons are, they just 
happen to operate on the international stage while persons operate on the domestic stage.  
Pettit argues that, like persons, peoples have certain goals, make judgments about how to 
change, revise, order, and pursue their goals, and do all this in a rational manner.
184
 However, 
even if we concede this point to Pettit, there is still the question of whether we can describe 
peoples as moral agents.
185
 Do they have moral qualities? If they do, are the qualities 
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something over and above the qualities of the persons who make up these peoples
186
, for this 
is necessary to give moral justification for the placing of the representatives of peoples in the 
original position.
187
 At one point in LoP Rawls hints at such an argument by writing, “some 
forms of culture and ways of life are good in themselves”188, but he does not pursue this 
point. Perhaps this is because it is hard to see how culture and ways of life could be good in 
themselves. 
However, even if one could do this, and therefore be morally justified in placing the 
representatives of peoples in the international original positions, it is still possible the 
representatives would select a global difference principle focused on persons. We have 
already seen that in actual political practice there is support for social and economic rights 
that are similar to a global difference principle. Another reason for thinking that the 
representatives of peoples might select a cosmopolitan principle similar to the global 
difference principle is Rawls has already argued for the representatives selecting a 
cosmopolitan principle, viz. the human rights principle.  
Human Rights and the Global Difference Principle 
 
According to Rawls, the human rights principle in the Law of Peoples covers a 
relatively narrow set of rights among which are: 
[T]he right to life (to the means of subsistence and security); to liberty (to freedom from 
slavery, serfdom, and forced occupation, and to a sufficient measure of liberty of conscience 
to ensure freedom of religion and thought); to property (personal property); and to formal 
equality as expressed by the rules of natural justice (that is, that similar cases be treated 
similarly).
189
 
 
As one would expect out of a cosmopolitan principle, the human rights principle focuses on 
persons and is universal in scope. One might think that this scope is inappropriate because the 
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 As Rawls asks: 
  
Why does the Law of Peoples use an original position at the second level that is fair to peoples and not 
to individual persons? What is it about peoples that gives them the status of the (moral) actors in the 
Law of Peoples? 
 
Rawls, LoP, § 1.3, n. 9. Rawls argues it is the reasonableness of both types of peoples, liberal and decent. 
However, in this thesis I will bring into question the reasonableness of decent peoples. Rawls’s argument can be 
found in § 11 of LoP.  
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Law of Peoples should only govern relations between peoples and not the other types of 
polities identified by Rawls, but Rawls thinks: 
The list of human rights honoured by both liberal and decent hierarchical regimes should be 
understood as universal rights in the following sense: they are intrinsic to the Law of Peoples 
and have a political (moral) effect whether or not they are supported locally. That is, their 
political (moral) force extends to all societies, and they are binding on all peoples and 
societies, including outlaw states.
190
  
 
Rawls’s argument in favour of human rights, including their universality, contrasts with most 
arguments for human rights, like Jack Donnelly’s argument, which depend on some account 
of human nature.
191
 Human rights theorists also generally view no person having more human 
rights than another does. Given this, and Rawls’s previous work, one might have expected 
Rawls would have justified human rights on the basis that virtually all humans have the 
potential to develop the two moral powers. However, in this case, Rawls rules out using a, 
“moral conception of the nature of the human person”, which is what he now takes the two 
moral powers to be, with Rawls appearing to think that facts do not dictate this “moral 
conception.” This means, according to Rawls, other cultures can and do reasonably reject the 
idea of persons possessing the two moral powers.
192
  
Instead, Rawls simply says human rights are, “a proper subset of the rights possessed 
by citizens in a liberal constitutional regime, or the rights of the members of a decent 
consultation hierarchical society.”193 Rawls tries to justify the enforcement of human rights 
by liberal and decent peoples on regimes that are neither liberal nor decent, by saying that 
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such enforcement, “is a consequence of liberalism and decency.”194 This sounds more like a 
statement about the nature of certain regimes than a moral justification.
195
  
Rawls also appeals to the self-interest of peoples to justify the universal enforcement 
of human rights. In doing so, he suggests states that abuse human rights (outlaw states) are a 
threat to peoples, but this does not cover the possibility of a non-aggressive outlaw state, a 
possibility Rawls does not rule out. Indeed, as mentioned in the previous chapter, Rawls says 
if these non-aggressive outlaw states gravely violated the human rights of their inhabitants, 
liberal and decent regimes would be morally justified in intervening militarily.
196
 
A defender of Rawls could concede that the universal scope of the human rights 
principle means it is a cosmopolitan principle, and that the representatives of peoples in their 
international original positions would select this principle, but point out that realizing the 
human rights principle is in some respects a more modest goal than realizing a global 
difference principle. The defender of Rawls would point out that human rights, as defined by 
Rawls, when it comes to questions of distributive justice only require peoples to ensure, “the 
right to life (to the means of subsistence and security)”, which will generally require less 
redistribution than a global difference principle. The defender of Rawls maintains that this 
shows, while the representatives adopt a human rights principle, they will not adopt a global 
difference principle. In response, we can note that a global difference principle may not be 
demanding as it first appears because, as is argued in the next chapter, it is constrained by the 
duty of assistance and the just savings principle. We can also argue that even if the global 
difference principle is demanding, this does not mean it is not a defensible principle of 
justice. 
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 However, even if one of our arguments works, it does not mean we have defeated the 
critic. She can appeal to other Rawlsian ideas and other facts to show how the global 
difference principle is morally unacceptable and/or impossible to realize. The first of these 
arguments we will look at, and consider at some length, is what I will call “the International 
Reasonable Pluralism Argument”.197 
International Reasonable Pluralism 
 
Rawls’s first description in LoP of reasonable pluralism involves persons in a liberal 
society. In this case, Rawls describes reasonable pluralism as, “a plurality of conflicting 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines, both religious and nonreligious (or secular).”198 As 
Rawls further explains in PL, comprehensive doctrines cover, “the major religious, 
philosophical, and moral aspects of human life in a more or less consistent and coherent 
manner.”199  
We have reasonable pluralism because persons face the burdens of judgment. These 
burdens are a reflection of the fact:  
To some extent (how great we cannot tell) the way we assess evidence and weigh moral and 
political values is shaped by our total experience [.] Thus, in a modern society with its 
numerous offices and positions, its various divisions of labor, its many social groups and their 
ethnic variety, citizens’ total experiences are disparate enough for their judgments to 
diverge … on many if not most cases of any significant complexity.200  
 
Furthermore, since a plurality of comprehensive doctrines is the normal result of a liberal 
culture and liberal institutions, we cannot expect this reasonable pluralism to end as long as 
this culture and institutions are present. In addition, since the doctrines are reasonable, Rawls 
argues that it would be wrong to suppress them in the name of creating a just society. 
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For Rawls, the major difference between ToJ and PL was ToJ failed to recognise the 
fact of a reasonable pluralism of comprehensive doctrines in a liberal society.
201
 Instead, 
according to Rawls, in ToJ he presents his theory of justice, which Rawls often describes as 
“justice as fairness”, as a comprehensive doctrine affirmed by all citizens in a liberal culture 
with liberal institutions. Since the later Rawls also believed that a variety of comprehensive 
doctrines is the normal result of a liberal culture and liberal institutions, he thought his theory 
of justice in ToJ contained a contradiction.
202
 However, this assessment by the late Rawls of 
the early Rawls is incorrect because the early Rawls does not present justice as fairness as a 
comprehensive doctrine. It is true that the early Rawls raises the possibility one could extend 
his theory beyond “justice as fairness” which covers justicial relationships, to “rightness as 
fairness” which covers all human relationships, and this may sound like making his theory a 
comprehensive doctrine.
203
 However, Rawls goes on to write: 
But even this wider theory fails to embrace all moral relationships, since it would seem to 
include only our relations with other persons and to leave out of account how we are to 
conduct ourselves toward animals and the rest of nature.
204
  
 
One of the reasons why the theory would seem to apply only to humans is because it would 
seem to cover only entities with the potential to develop the two moral powers.  
Rawls correctly thinks that how we treat animals and the rest of nature are moral 
questions of “first importance”.205 This means Rawls’s theory, as he presents it in ToJ, even 
when he extends it to rightness as fairness, does not cover all major moral questions never 
mind all major philosophical and religious questions, as the later Rawls says comprehensive 
doctrines do. Therefore, even though in the society portrayed in ToJ there is widespread 
agreement on justice as fairness, there could still be a wide range of comprehensive doctrines, 
which means there could be the reasonable pluralism the later Rawls thinks is the normal 
result of a liberal culture and its associated institutions. 
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Along with being mistaken about the possibility of reasonable pluralism in the society 
described in ToJ, Rawls is also mistaken about the extent of international reasonable 
pluralism.  
We can start to see Rawls’s mistake in his discussion of the parallel between 
reasonable pluralism in a domestic setting, and, “the diversity among reasonable peoples with 
their different cultures and traditions of thought both religious and non-religious”.206 In this 
discussion, Rawls does not mention the burdens of judgment, which helps to explain the 
absence in the literature of a discussion of these burdens in an international context. Rawls 
should think that there are international burdens of judgment, because without them there 
could be no international analogue to reasonable pluralism. This is because Rawls argues 
domestic and international reasonable pluralism are analogous, and the burdens of judgment 
in a domestic setting are the sources of disagreement between reasonable persons that lead to 
reasonable pluralism.  
In an international context, the burdens of judgment would apply to peoples. When 
talking of these burdens, one could talk of the different experiences of peoples whose 
position in the international system is different, whose members typically do different types 
of labour when compared to the members of other peoples, and whose ethnic composition 
differs to that of other peoples. Given these differences, this line of argument suggests that 
when it comes to the complex case of what international and global institutions there should 
be, we should not be surprised that different peoples come to different conclusions, and that 
the difference between these conclusions put limits on what international and global 
institutions there could be.  
However, the complexity of the question is not the only cause that leads different 
peoples to different conclusions about what sort of international and global institutions there 
should be. Peoples also come to these conclusions due to their differences in opinion over the 
nature of the person. Decent peoples do not think persons are equal. This position rules out 
institutions that help to realize a global difference principle because the principle expresses 
the view that persons are equal. We have already seen it is questionable whether actual non-
liberal societies would be as opposed to the global difference principle as this argument 
suggests, but for the sake of argument let us concede this point.    
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  Then we can argue that the analogies Rawls makes between the difference in opinion 
between liberal and decent peoples, and the difference in opinion between persons in a liberal 
domestic society, do not work. In doing so, we can point out that it is more likely that a 
person’s opinion will be reasonable if a person forms that opinion freely, and then argue that 
the same is true of a people’s opinion. In order to work out if a people formed an opinion 
freely we would start by noting that the opinion of a people would be a reflection of the 
opinions of its individual members. While in a liberal society persons would generally freely 
form their opinions thanks in part to the presence of liberal institutions, this would not be true 
in a decent society. A defender of Rawls might object that Rawls imagines his decent 
consultation hierarchies would have, “a sufficient measure of liberty of conscience to ensure 
freedom of religion and thought”.207 However, Rawls also says, “these freedoms are not as 
extensive or as equal for all members of the decent society as they are in liberal societies.”208  
This brings into question whether one can say all of the members of decent peoples freely 
form their opinions, which brings into question the likelihood of the peoples’ opinion being 
reasonable. We bring the freedom of the process of opinion formation in non-liberal societies 
into further question when we look at actual non-liberal societies, where we find the view of 
the state is often more a reflection of the dominance of certain social groups than a reflection 
of the different experiences of different peoples.  
For a notable example, when a non-liberal society exhibits a view that persons are not 
of equal moral worth, it is more accurate to say that this equality is unacceptable to the 
hierarchies that run these societies, than to say that this view of persons reflects the freely 
formed opinions of the persons who make up this society. This brings into question if the 
difference in opinion between liberal and non-liberal societies on the nature of the person can 
be characterised as an example of international reasonable pluralism; and this makes the 
views expressed by non-liberal societies on the nature of the person more open to moral 
questioning.
209
    
Even if we conceded that most of the members of hierarchical societies are opposed to 
the idea persons are morally equal, and therefore opposed to the global difference principle, 
and that these opinions were formed freely, it can still be questioned whether these opinions 
are reasonable, and are therefore an example of international reasonable pluralism. In an 
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attempt to defend persons with this inegalitarian view, a believer in international reasonable 
pluralism, Wilfried Hinsch, writes, tentatively: 
On the basis of their shared comprehensive doctrines, perhaps, the members of nonliberal 
societies may hold different views as regards the nature of domestic social cooperation. In 
particular, they may see it for religious or other reasons as, at least in some respect, a form of 
cooperation among unequals. Thus, they may accord a less-than-equal status to women in the 
sphere of political decision making, as is the case in many Islamic countries.
210
 
 
Are we to say these views are reasonable? I would say no because of, inter alia, the previous 
arguments made in favour of the moral equality of persons. If Hinsch says something slightly 
more modest like, the views are reasonable in their society, or these views while not fully 
reasonable are still reasonable; is this enough to say a principle, which runs counter to these 
“reasonable” views, is morally unacceptable? I would again say no.  
However, one can make a different argument against the global difference principle. 
One making this argument suggests that while the global difference principle may be morally 
acceptable, it is a practical impossibility because it targets a non-existent group. 
Targeting 
 
 Someone making the argument points out that in applying a global difference 
principle we try to identify and target the globally worst-off representative group of 
persons.
211
 In doing so, we would look for individuals who, among other things, were 
particularly poor. We would find such persons in various countries some of which might not 
be particularly poor. These persons would have many differences including different roles in 
their various societies. Therefore, the person making this argument would argue that these 
persons could not be viewed, let alone function, as a social group, and since a difference 
principle should target a social group, this shows a global difference principle cannot work.  
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In response, we can draw parallels between the global and domestic case. We have 
seen in the domestic case that Rawls defines the least advantaged group as faring poorly in 
terms of family and class, natural endowments (as realized), fortune and luck, and social 
primary goods.  Rawls suggests that for ease of identification, rather than using a criterion 
that includes all the listed characteristics, we could use the criterion of “all persons with less 
than half of the median [income]”.212 This criterion could work because it, “would appear to 
cover those most disfavored by the various contingencies”.213 The persons identified by this 
criteria, due to their diversity, may not act as a group, or even see themselves as a group, but 
a state will often treat a collection of persons similar to them as a group. For example, the 
poor and unemployed, even though they are a diverse group, are sometimes eligible for an 
unemployment benefit.  We cannot say the same for how global society treats the globally 
least advantaged. Still, there are attempts to identify a group similar to the least advantaged in 
ways similar to the one suggested by Rawls to identify the domestically least advantaged. 
However, in the global case international institutions tend to use absolute rather than relative 
measures. For example, there is the much talked about 1 dollar a day measure used by the 
World Bank (WB).
214
 Interestingly and coincidentally from a Rawlsian point of view, a 
relatively recent study suggests that the world median income was close to double this dollar 
a day level.
215
  
In a parallel to the domestic case, we can expect the globally least advantaged to be 
among those living at or below this dollar a day level because those living below this level 
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will have generally fared poorly in terms of family and class, natural endowments (as 
realized), fortune and luck, and social primary goods. This means, despite their diversity, 
within a Rawlsian framework there is justification in viewing them as a group.  
Still, even with yet another anti-global difference principle argument dealt with, the 
opponent of the global difference principle can raise a different concern. She can point out 
that by identifying both a domestic least advantaged group and a globally least advantaged 
group we have created a problem for ourselves, the problem of different difference principles.  
Different Difference Principles 
 
 Freeman says we cannot have a global difference principle and a domestic difference 
principle because, “we can seek to maximize the position of the globally least advantaged, or 
the domestically least advantaged, but not both, for we can maximize only one thing.”216 We 
can expand on Freeman’s point by noting that if we have a principle that targets the globe’s 
least advantaged group of persons, it will say social and economic inequalities should be 
arranged to the benefit of this group, which we can call group A. The domestic difference 
principle in a wealthy country shall say that social and economic inequalities should be 
redistributed to the least advantaged in this society, which we can call group B. Group A and 
group B may share no members. Therefore, it appears as though we have two principles that 
demand mutually incompatible actions.
217
  
The early Beitz launched an attempt to avoid this problem by arguing, “due to the rise 
of global economic interdependence … principles of distributive justice must apply in the 
first instance to the world as a whole, and derivatively to nation-states.” Beitz goes on to 
claim, “The appropriate global principle [for distributive justice] is Rawls’s difference 
principle, perhaps modified by some provision for intranational redistribution in relatively 
wealthy states once a threshold level of international redistributive obligations has been 
met.”218 Beitz does not go into detail about what this threshold would be, or explain who the 
“relatively wealthy states” are, but he does consider the possibility that a domestic difference 
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principle could be justified due to, “the greater intensity of social cooperation inside as 
compared to across national boundaries”.219 This was before he concluded that the moral 
powers rather than social cooperation justified the difference principle. I agreed with the later 
Beitz position on moral powers. Does this mean the later Beitz and I are unable to justify a 
domestic difference principle in wealthy states, because the only way left open to us would be 
to make the erroneous argument that those in wealthy states have greater moral powers than 
those in poorer states? 
If the answer to this question were yes, this would not be a problem if it were the case 
that we should only have a global difference principle and no domestic difference principle. 
However, a serious problem for this position is the widespread belief that those involved in 
producing goods that occurs within a national society, have a right to a share in these goods 
greater than the share those who are not involved in this production do. This means 
suggesting only having a global difference principle is unrealistic.  
Here I suggest the solution of having both difference principles, domestic and global, 
mainly justified by the two moral powers, but also finding justification and finding funding 
from the level of domestic and global cooperation, respectively. However, this solution is not 
without potential problems. If we were in a situation, where there was a low level of or no 
global cooperation, and a high level of domestic cooperation, the difficult question of how to 
distribute the benefits of this domestic cooperation between the globally least advantaged and 
the domestically least advantaged would confront us. However, as Beitz noted when he was 
still arguing any difference principle required a scheme of cooperation, there has been a rise 
in “global economic interdependence”, a rise that continues to this day.  
Even with this interdependence, there is still the problem of trying to work out what 
part of the social product is due to national factors, and what part is due to global factors, and 
then redistributing according to what the harmonised difference principles would dictate.  
There is also the issue that in both cases there would be a need to make sure this did not 
interfere with economic efficiency. Still, these problems do not appear to be insurmountable. 
However, even if different difference principles can be harmonised, the critic of the 
difference principle can raise yet further objections. They can argue that a difference 
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principle requires a basic structure, but that in the global case there is no such structure, and 
therefore can be no global difference principle. 
A Global Basic Structure 
 
We can see this type of anti-global difference principle argument in Nagel’s wider 
argument against cosmopolitanism. In particular where he endorses what he takes to be 
Rawls’s view that the, “two principles of justice are [not] designed to regulate the 
international relations of societies to one another, but only the basic structure of separate 
nation-states”.220 In making this argument, Nagel implies that the principles do not apply to 
the relations between societies because these relations do not include a basic structure. 
One way of responding to this argument is to start by noting that Rawls believes that 
there is something analogous to a global basic structure. Indeed, he sees this structure as 
being vital to the Law of Peoples, writing, “we may view that law [the Law of Peoples] as 
governing the basic structure of the relations between peoples.”221 In order to see if Rawls is 
correct in believing there is such a structure, let us examine what he has in mind. 
When writing about this structure Rawls uses the term “the basic structure of the 
Society of Peoples”.222 It is not entirely clear what institutions would make up this basic 
structure, but at one point in LoP Rawls argues: 
In addition to agreeing to the principles that define the basic equality of all peoples [which are 
the Law of Peoples], the parties [in the international original positions] will formulate 
guidelines for setting up cooperative organizations and agree to standards of fairness for trade 
as well as certain provisions for mutual assistance.
223
  
 
The institutions Rawls asks us to imagine are, “one framed to ensure fair trade among 
peoples; another to allow a people to borrow from a cooperative banking system; and the 
third similar to that of the United Nations”.224 In a footnote to this discussion, he asks us to, 
“Think of the first two organizations as in some ways analogous to GATT [General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the precursor to the World Trade Organization (WTO)] and 
the World Bank.”225  Rawls adds in another footnote that without these institutions there will 
                                                 
220
 Nagel, ‘The Problem of Global Justice’, p. 123. 
221
 Rawls, LoP, § 3.2, p. 33. 
222
 Ibid, § 16.1, p. 113. 
223
 Ibid, § 4.5, p. 42. Rawls sees these conditions as helping to ensure, “Basic fairness among peoples”. Ibid. 
224
 Ibid. 
225
 Ibid, n. 51. 
T h e  G l o b a l  D i f f e r e n c e  P r i n c i p l e  a n d  i t s  C r i t i c s  P a g e  | 85 
 
not be, “fair background conditions” and that without these conditions, “market transactions 
will not remain fair, and unjustified inequalities among peoples will gradually develop.”  This 
means that these conditions and their associated institutions, “have a role analogous to that of 
the basic structure in domestic society.”226  
The critic of the global difference principle could argue that institutions similar to the 
United Nations (UN), the WTO, and the WB could not be part of a global basic structure. The 
critic could base their argument on the claim that the effects of the actual institutions are not 
“profound and present from the start” of persons’ or peoples’ lives, and that having these 
effects is part of what it means to be a basic structure. However, given growing global 
economic interdependence, this is a difficult position to maintain. Nagel, aware of this 
problem, takes a slight different approach by arguing: 
The societal rules determining [a sovereign state’s] basic structure are coercively imposed: it 
is not a voluntary association. I submit that it is this complex fact—that we are both putative 
joint authors of the coercively imposed system, and subject to its norms, i.e., expected to 
accept their authority even when the collective decision diverges from our personal 
preferences—that creates the special presumption against arbitrary inequalities in our 
treatment by the system.
227
 
 
Since countries can choose not to be part of international institutions like the WTO, Nagel 
would argue that we could not describe the institution as coercive, and therefore could not 
describe it as part of a global basic structure. However, as Laura Valentini argues, Nagel 
takes a too narrow view of coercion. While it is true that countries can choose not to join the 
WTO, the dominance of WTO standards means that this choice can result in the country 
experiencing, “virtually no trade.”228  For some countries, this would mean economic 
collapse. This brings into question whether we can describe countries as free to choose to join 
the WTO, and therefore describe the WTO as a voluntary association. This lack of 
voluntariness makes it more plausible to view the WTO as coercive and as part of a global 
basic structure. 
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 While not arguing from a Rawlsian viewpoint, Valentini gives us further reason to 
take a broader view of the global basic structure by arguing agricultural subsidies in the: 
United States and the European Union foreseeably and avoidably place nontrivial constraints 
on the freedom of farmers in developing countries who are forced to undervalue their 
products, relative to their own costs of production, to compete on the market. Because the 
result for these farmers is often poverty and destitution, the subsidies certainly qualify as 
coercive.
229
 
  
While these subsidies take place in states or confederations of states, rather than in global 
institutions, if they have the profound global effects which Valentini argues they do, we can 
view them as part of a global structure that is sometimes coercive. I will discuss these 
subsidies further in the eighth chapter, where we will see some argue that these subsidies do 
not have these profound effects. However, even if one could show that these policies and the 
aforementioned institutions do not have these profound effects, and therefore there is 
currently no global basic structure, it is not be fatal to the argument for a global difference 
principle. This is because of the different role basic structures play in the domestic and 
international original positions. 
We have seen Rawls talks of those in the international original position agreeing to 
the setting up of cooperative organizations and institutions; this suggests building up a global 
basic structure. This contrasts with the domestic situation where those in the original position 
alter an already existent basic structure. The idea of setting up a global basic structure is 
congruent with the idea that the two moral powers justify global principles of justice. This is 
because these powers are present even if there is no global basic structure.  
This consideration of the global basic structure brings us to the end of the body this 
chapter. 
Conclusion 
 
We started this chapter by seeing how when we extend Rawlsian theory to the world 
it should include cosmopolitan principles. Even Rawls appeared to appreciate this point when 
he argued that his international principles of justice should include a human rights principle. 
Rawls also appreciated that many commentators would see a global difference principle as a 
natural extension of his theory, but he and others came up with a number of arguments for 
why these commentators were mistaken. We explored a number of these arguments, but 
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found them unconvincing. However, in the next chapter we will examine a different and more 
positive argument against the global difference principle.  
The argument comes from Rawls. This is the argument that the duty of assistance 
plays a role similar to the global difference principle, but is superior. 
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Chapter 5: The Global Difference Principle and the 
Duty of Assistance 
 
Introduction 
 
 As we saw in the third chapter, the duty of assistance is the duty of liberal and decent 
peoples, “to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having 
a just or decent political and social regime.”230 Rawls bases much of his argument against the 
global difference principle on the alleged superiority of this duty. As might have been 
expected, some commentators, like Shmuel Nili
231, have found Rawls’s argument convincing, 
while others, like Pogge
232
, have not. However, this difference in opinion, and how Rawls 
frames the debate, should not lead us to think, like Nili
233
, that the Rawlsian must choose 
between a duty of assistance and the global difference principle. Instead, in this brief chapter 
I will argue, in agreement with Hinsch
234
, that we can have both principles, and indicate how 
they can work together.  
In examining Rawls’s argument a number of issues will be analysed some of them 
exegetical in nature. The chapter will start by arguing that Rawls’s preference for the duty of 
assistance in the international arena did not just reflect a non-egalitarian view of international 
inequality, but also reflected a change in his view of domestic inequality, even though he did 
not acknowledge this change.
235
   
 After this exegetical exercise, we will consider Rawls’s argument that the global 
difference principle would have unacceptable consequences while the duty of assistance 
would not. In trying to show this, Rawls describes two scenarios. These scenarios depend on 
the notion of deserved inequalities, a notion Rawls does not directly discuss in LoP or ToJ. 
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However, this notion is important because, like the duty of assistance and the just savings 
principle, it acts as a constraint on the global difference principle.  
I will argue that Rawls’s scenarios do not work because in the scenarios the global 
difference principle and the duty of assistance have the same consequences, viz. no 
redistribution of wealth; but the chapter will not argue this means the principle and the duty 
are identical. 
 The differences between the duty and principle will be highlighted by showing how 
the duty of assistance constrains the global difference principle at the global level of social 
organization in a manner similar to how the just savings principle constrains the difference 
principle at the domestic level of social organization.  
This demonstration will take place in a discussion of the just savings principle, a 
principle that commentators in the literature have largely neglected. In this discussion it will 
also be pointed out that the just savings principle also constrains the global difference 
principle.  
Rawls’s Changing View of Inequality 
 
Rawls, in the original and revised editions of ToJ, states, “Injustice … is simply 
inequalities that are not to the benefit of all.”236 In contrast, in LoP, Rawls mentions two 
views on the topic of justice and equality: 
One holds that equality is just … in itself. The Law of Peoples, on the other hand, holds that 
inequalities are not always unjust, and that when they are it is because of their unjust effects 
on the basic structure of the Society of Peoples, and on relations among peoples and among 
their members.
237
 
  
One might argue that Rawls’s stance on inequality has not changed from the 
publication of ToJ to LoP, since here in LoP he is talking about peoples not persons. In this 
regard, one also might point out that in ToJ Rawls says, “the correct regulative principle for 
anything depends upon the nature of that thing”,238 and then argue that the different nature of 
persons and peoples justifies treating them differently when it comes to inequality. However, 
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T h e  G l o b a l  D i f f e r e n c e  P r i n c i p l e  a n d  t h e  D u t y  o f  
A s s i s t a n c e  
P a g e  | 91 
 
if we inspect the issue more closely we find that the later Rawls appears to have changed his 
view of inequality in the domestic realm. We can see this in LoP where Rawls claims that in 
a domestic society, “In itself, it doesn’t matter how great the gap between rich and poor may 
be. What matters are the consequences.”239 Someone trying to show that Rawls’s views on 
domestic inequality had not changed might suggest this was always Rawls’s view.240 
Furthermore, this person could argue, Rawls always maintained that if inequalities have the 
consequence of benefiting the least advantaged, then they are just. This person could then 
argue that Rawls always maintained that when it comes to inequality what matters are the 
consequences. However, these arguments are a misreading of the early Rawls. One should 
interpret the early Rawls’s statement that injustice is “inequalities that are not to the benefit 
all” as meaning inequalities need to be to the benefit of all in order to defeat their prima facie 
injustice and to override the initial presumption in favour of social and economic equality due 
to the equal moral worth of persons. 
 As if to emphasise how his view of inequality between persons has changed, in LoP 
Rawls goes on to give the example of a liberal domestic society where the least advantaged, 
“have sufficient all-purpose means to make intelligent and effective use of their freedoms and 
to lead reasonable and worthwhile lives.”241 He says that this society has no need to reduce 
the gap between the rich and the poor, and then says how this is similar to the international 
arena where there is no need to reduce the gap between rich and poor peoples once the duty 
of assistance has been satisfied. This comparison suggests Rawls, perhaps unconsciously
242
, 
partly based his rejection of the global difference principle on a rejection of a domestic 
difference principle.
243
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To justify further his inegalitarian conception of the international realm, Rawls comes 
up with scenarios, which he hopes show how the global difference principle has unacceptable 
consequences while the duty of assistance does not. As we will see, these scenarios fail 
because, ironically, they do not show an appreciation for the Rawlsian notion of deserved 
inequalities. 
Rawls’s Scenarios and Deserved Inequalities 
 
In the first scenario Rawls describes, there are two peoples, one decides to 
industrialize and save while the other one does not. The peoples make these decisions in line 
with their social values. These different decisions lead to economic inequality between the 
two peoples, with the people that industrialized and saved eventually being twice as wealthy 
as the people who did not. Rawls then asks, “Assuming, as we do, that both societies are 
liberal or decent, and their peoples free and responsible, and able to make their own decisions, 
should the industrializing country be taxed to give funds to the second [as would be required 
by the global difference principle]?”244 Rawls hopes we answer no, and will then favour the 
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The assertion that a man [or woman] deserves the superior character that enables him [or her] to make 
the effort to cultivate his  [or her] abilities is equally problematic; for his [or her] character depends in 
large part upon fortunate family and social circumstances for which he [or her] can claim no credit. The 
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Rawls, ToJ, § 17, p. 104/89 (wording slightly changed in revised edition).This quote appears to question all 
notions of desert. Indeed, Alan Zaitchik was not alone in thinking that Rawls had put forward, “a completely 
general argument which alleges that no desert theory could be true for the simple reason that no one ever 
deserves anything.” ‘On Deserving to Deserve’, in Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1977), p. 
371. 
A reason for thinking that no one deserves anything is thinking that no one is responsible for any of their actions. 
One might think that no one is responsible for their actions because actions flow from character, and no one is 
responsible for that character.  
In regards to the responsibility of peoples, one can question how Rawls could view them as responsible if he has 
this general sceptical view of individual responsibility. However, if we look back at Rawls’s quote we see that 
he leaves himself some wiggle room by saying, “such character depends in good part” on environmental factors. 
This leaves room for the notion of responsibility, a notion that he makes use of a number of times in ToJ. For 
example, when arguing that each individual has to decide whether civil disobedience is justified, and accept the 
consequences if she makes the wrong decision, he writes, “We cannot divest ourselves of our responsibility and 
transfer the burden of blame to others.” ToJ, § 59, p. 389/341. I thank my examiner David Reidy for making me 
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duty of assistance because it would not require a tax because both polities are already either 
decent or liberal peoples.  
In the second scenario once again there are two peoples, one people, in line with its 
social values, decides to reduce its population growth. The other people, “because of its 
religious and social values, freely held by its women, does not reduce the rate of population 
growth and it remains rather high.”245 Once again, this difference in policy eventually results 
in the first society becoming twice as wealthy as the second society. Once again, Rawls says 
that because both polities involved are already either liberal or decent peoples, the duty of 
assistance would require no tax, and that this seems right, while the global difference 
principle would require a tax, and that this seems wrong. In describing both scenarios, Rawls 
is correct when it comes to what the duty of assistance would require, but I will now argue 
that he is wrong in a number of ways when it comes to the global difference principle.  
One of the things Rawls gets wrong is that he does not simply say there would be a 
tax but says, “there would always be a flow of taxes as long as the wealth of one people was 
less than that of the other.”246 This is misleading because a global difference principle would 
only require there to be a flow of taxes from the wealthy people to the less wealthy people if 
the wealth of the wealthy people did not contribute to the wealth of the less wealthy people. 
Discussions of the difference principle in its domestic and global forms generally presuppose 
that there are economic links between either persons or peoples, and that via these links 
economic and social inequalities can be to the advantage of the less wealthy. Indeed, in his 
final statement of the difference principle in ToJ, Rawls states that the difference principle 
mandates we should arrange social and economic inequalities so they are to the benefit of the 
least advantaged. He does not state that we are to eliminate social and economic inequalities. 
One might try to defend Rawls’s claim about the extent of the taxation required by the 
global difference principle, by arguing that he presupposes there are no economic links 
between the two peoples. This means the economic inequalities between the two peoples 
cannot be to the benefit of the less wealthy people, and therefore an egalitarian principle like 
the difference principle would demand that we eliminate the inequalities. One can give this 
view some support by noting that Rawls precedes his discussion of the two scenarios by 
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discussing Beitz’s two redistribution principles, one of which applies to an autarkic situation, 
and one that applies to a situation of international economic cooperation.
247
 However, when 
discussing the two scenarios, Rawls has moved on from discussing the principle applying to 
the autarkic situation. Rawls also, in LoP, generally assumes economic links in the form of 
trade between peoples. We have already seen that Rawls thinks those in the international 
original positions would, “agree to standards of fairness for trade”.248 It would also not be 
realistic to imagine a scenario where there are no economic links between peoples given the 
increasing trade links between societies. So it would be strange and in need of justification 
for the scenarios to be presented with autarkic peoples.
249
   
However, some Rawlsians might think that if we remove Rawls’s claim about how far 
the taxation would go, the scenarios still show how the global difference principle is 
objectionable. Those making this claim might argue that we should not tax the wealthy 
peoples in the scenarios at all. This is because the less wealthy people freely chose policies 
that led to them being less wealthy; they could have chosen the same policy as the other 
people and been just as wealthy as the other people are, but they chose not to.  
The problem with this defence of Rawls is that a global difference principle would 
take the same view of inequalities that were the result of free decisions. It would view these 
inequalities as deserved inequalities, which means, even though the inequalities are not to the 
benefit of the least advantaged, they do not require redistribution. Making this claim might 
seem wrongheaded because the phrase “deserved inequalities” does not appear in either ToJ 
or LoP. However, in ToJ Rawls discusses the idea of undeserved inequality when he writes:   
[W]e may observe that the difference principle gives some weight to the considerations 
singled out by the principle of redress. This is the principle that undeserved inequalities call 
for redress; and since inequalities of birth and natural endowment are undeserved, these 
inequalities are to be somehow compensated for. Thus the principle holds that in order to treat 
all persons equally, to provide genuine equality of opportunity, society must give more 
attention to those with fewer native assets and to those born into the less favorable social 
positions. The idea is to redress the bias of contingencies in the direction of equality.
250
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Now on a Rawlsian basis we can draw a distinction between undeserved inequalities, 
which cover inequalities due to natural endowments and starting social position, and deserved 
inequalities, which are due to free actions made by persons. The latter type of inequalities 
seems to be what Rawls is discussing in ToJ when he notes that in a society where the 
difference principle is realized, “inequalities are allowed to arise from men’s [and women’s] 
voluntary actions”.251 Hinsch notes that Rawls finds the idea of redistribution in his scenarios 
unacceptable because the inequality was the result of, “conscientious and reasonable 
collective decisions and efforts in one country that could have been affected in the other 
country as well.”252 However, as Hinsch argues, a cosmopolitan, including those who take 
inspiration from Rawls, can avoid this unacceptability by recognising that the wealthier 
people in the scenarios deserve their wealth due to the choices that they made, even though 
these choices lead to inequality.
 253
 This means in both scenarios neither the duty of 
assistance or the global difference principle requires redistribution.  
Having seen how in these scenarios the duty of assistance and the global difference 
principle lead to the same consequences, one might think that the two principles are the same. 
This is not the case. We can see this by considering how the just savings principle works with 
the domestic difference principle, and how this is similar to how the duty of assistance works 
with the global difference principle. 
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A proponent of a global difference principle can reason as follows: we should design a global set of 
institutions and rules so that, given the predictable choices of individuals, firms and states that operate 
within this framework, this global set of institutions and rules will promote the condition of the global 
least advantaged. Within this fair framework, agents (including states) should take some responsibility 
for their decisions but the global framework is structured so as to maximize the position of the least 
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The Just Savings Principle 
 
Steven Wall notes, “The subject of just savings presents an important, and for the 
most part unappreciated, part of Rawls's theory of distributive justice.
”254
 The lack of 
appreciation is surprising given the amount of attention given to the difference principle, and 
that Rawls says, “the complete statement of the difference principle includes the savings 
principle as a constraint.”255  
Rawls also thinks that we are led to the just savings principle by thinking about the 
implications of the domestic difference principle. Rawls writes that we might think the 
domestic difference principle leads to the least advantaged being raised to a high point with, 
“the greater wealth of those better off … [being] scaled down until eventually everyone has 
nearly the same income.”256 However, Rawls maintains that this will generally not be the case. 
One reason for this that is obvious, but as we have already seen in this chapter is sometimes 
overlooked, is that the difference principle is based on the idea that inequalities can be 
arranged to the benefit of the least advantaged.
257
 Rawls argues that another reason for why 
there will not be extreme social levelling is because, “The appropriate expectation in applying 
the difference principle is that of the long-term prospects of the least favoured extending over 
future generations”, and that these prospects may diverge from the prospects of the current 
generation of the least advantage.
258
 Rawls does not fully explain why the intergenerational 
viewpoint is the appropriate one. However, his stance would appear to be that what 
generation one belongs to is a morally arbitrary factor; this means that Rawls keeps 
knowledge of this position behind the veil of ignorance, which means those in the original 
position take an intergenerational viewpoint of the least advantaged. 
The interest of the intergenerational least advantaged and the current least advantaged 
may diverge because raising the prospect of the current least advantaged to a high point 
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would endanger our ability to maintain just institutions which protect the liberties of future 
generations of the least advantaged. So instead, we must constrain the difference principle 
with the need to set aside some funds in order to maintain these institutions.  
 Now Rawls said it was by thinking about the long term implications of the difference 
principle that we are led to this establishing and maintaining just institutions principle (the 
just savings principle), but he goes on to argue that the difference principle is not an 
appropriate principle to cover savings. He comes to think this by first believing that the 
difference principle would mandate us to improve the expectations of the least fortunate 
generation, and that this generation would be the first generation of a society. He then notes, 
“There is no way for later generations to improve the situation of the least fortunate first 
generation.” Therefore, “The [difference] principle is inapplicable because it would seem to 
imply, if anything, that there be no saving at all.”259  
Perhaps because he thinks it is obvious, Rawls does not explain why he thinks the 
difference principle applied to justice between generations would mandate us to improve the 
expectations of the least fortunate generation, and why he assumes this generation will be the 
first generation of a society. Admittedly, the logic that leads Rawls to this conclusion could 
be simple. We are talking about generations, the difference principle is about helping the least 
advantaged, so if we apply the principle to the question of intergenerational saving it will, 
arguably, tell us to save for the least advantaged generation. Many, including social contract 
theorists, think that those living without society are worse off. Therefore, we can expect that 
the first generation of a society, which will be emerging from a non-societal state, will have 
the lowest expectations of any generation and therefore be the least advantaged generation. 
Rawls also appears to assume that generally expectations improve from one generation to the 
next. With these assumptions in place, the difference principle, as Rawls presents it, asks us 
to do something we cannot do, save in order to benefit the first generation of society. We can 
interpret this as asking us to save nothing.  
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However, if we interpret the difference principle as applying to an intergenerational 
least favoured group, that is always present in society, the principle could apply to the 
question of savings. A defender of Rawls may point out the some of this group will lie in the 
past
260
, so we will not be able to raise the expectations of all of the members of this group. 
However, Rawls’s main objection was that the difference principle would not mandate any 
savings, and this interpretation of the difference principle avoids this problem.  
Since we can apply a modified difference principle to savings, the just savings 
principle would appear to be superfluous since we brought it in because of the difference 
principle’s putative inability to deal with this problem. However, we should remember that 
while Rawls at this point misunderstands how the difference principle applies to savings, at 
another point he did say that the complete statement of the difference principle includes the 
just savings principle. On this interpretation, we can view the just savings principle as part of 
the difference principle. This part makes us view the least advantaged as an intergenerational 
group who are benefitted by saving to preserve just institutions which ensure that the basic 
liberties are realized, not just a group in the current generation who could benefit by 
economic redistribution and consequent consumption. 
We can transfer these comments about the just savings principle to the duty of 
assistance. We might think that a global difference principle would only require a 
redistribution of wealth, which the globally least advantaged would immediately spend. But 
once we think of the globally least advantaged as an intergenerational group that can benefit 
by the creation and maintenance of just institutions, we can see that transfers to the globally 
least advantaged should also be put towards creating and maintaining just institutions, which 
will require savings. When we have done this, we have realized the duty of assistance, which 
means, as is the case when we have realized the just savings principle, we have been able, “to 
secure a social world that makes possible a worthwhile life for all its [a polity’s] citizens.”261  
However, these comments do not show how the just savings principle would act as a 
constraint on the demandingness of transfers from wealthy states to poor states, with the 
demandingness not being altered by the transfers being used to save to establish and preserve 
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just institutions rather than being spent on consumption. What does constrain the 
demandingness is the requirement to balance the need to create and preserve the material base 
of institutions in poor states with the need to preserve the material base of these institutions in 
the wealthy states. As I argued in the previous chapter regarding the need to balance a 
domestic difference principle with a global difference principle, this balancing act would be 
accomplished by identifying which parts of the social product was produced by domestic 
cooperation and which part was produced by international cooperation. In this instance, we 
would use a part of the social product due to domestic cooperation in wealthy states to 
preserve institutions in these states, while we would use a part of the social product due to 
international cooperation to create and preserve institutions in poor states. 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter looked at Rawls’s argument that a duty of assistance is preferable to a 
global difference principle, but found that Rawls built this argument on a mischaracterisation 
of the global difference principle. We also found that we could have both the global 
difference principle and the duty of assistance, as in the domestic case where we have the 
difference principle and the just savings principle. We also saw how the duty of assistance 
and the just savings principle act as constraints on the global difference principle.   
Rawls, however, has not exhausted his arguments against the global difference 
principle. In the next chapter, we will look at an argument that was doing some work in the 
scenarios considered in this chapter. In these scenarios, Rawls was holding peoples, and the 
persons who make up these peoples, responsible for the economic performance of their nation. 
The next chapter will question this position and the related position that we can hold nations, 
and the persons that make up these nations, responsible for whether these nations are well-
ordered or not. 
The next chapter also sees a shift from the first part of the thesis that focused on 
Rawlsian theory and cosmopolitanism, to the second part of the thesis that looks at the more 
empirical questions that surround the issue of realizing principles of global justice, most 
notably the global difference principle.  
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 This second part of the thesis starts with Rawls’s idea, explanatory nationalism, which, 
if true, would undermine the idea that the duty of assistance and the global difference 
principle are realizable. 
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Part 2: Realizing Principles of Global 
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Chapter 6: Explanatory Nationalism 
 
Introduction 
 
In LoP Rawls claims:  
[T]he causes of the wealth of a people and the forms it takes lie in their political culture and in 
the religious, philosophical, and moral traditions that support the basic structure of their 
political and social institutions, as well as in the industriousness and cooperative talents of its 
members, all supported by their political virtues.
262
 
 
Pogge labels this belief about economics, “explanatory nationalism”, and notes that entailed 
in this belief is, “the idea that the causes of severe poverty and of other human deprivations 
are domestic to the societies in which they occur”.263 This economic version of explanatory 
nationalism undermines the idea that the global difference principle is a realizable principle 
of global justice because, if true, it means international factors could not have much of a role 
in reducing poverty. 
While Pogge focuses on Rawls’s economic thesis, at times Rawls has a broader notion 
of explanatory nationalism in mind that includes well-orderliness. For example, he follows up 
his statement about economics by saying, “I would further conjecture that there is no society 
anywhere in the world—except for marginal cases—with resources so scarce that it could 
not, were it reasonable and rationally organized and governed, become well-ordered.”264  
This clashes with what Rawls says at another point in LoP. As we have already seen 
in the third chapter, at this other point in LoP Rawls identified burdened societies as ones, 
which, “lack the political and cultural traditions, the human capital and know-how, and, 
often, the material and technological resources needed to be well-ordered”.265 At this point 
Rawls also believed international factors, most notably assistance from well-ordered 
societies, could help these societies become well-ordered. This chapter will argue that this 
latter position is correct, which means the duty of assistance is a realizable principle of 
justice.   
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Along with arguing this, the first section of this chapter will argue Rawls is incorrect 
when he argues international factors have little effect on economic performance, and 
therefore implies the global difference principle is not a realizable principle of justice. For 
example, this chapter will argue, in agreement with Pogge, that the way governments sell and 
buy natural resources on the international market can undermine the economic performance 
of nations with natural resources.  
One of the striking things about Rawls’s statements on economic performance is that 
they attribute causal power to things we often take to be to a certain extent under the control 
of societies. These things are “political culture”, “religious, philosophical, and moral 
traditions”, and “the industriousness and cooperative talents of its [a society’s] members”. 
This is important because, as David Miller points out, showing national factors can explain 
economic performance does not fully justify Rawls’s conservative view that includes a moral 
critique of societies that perform poorly in this area. In order to justify this critique, one 
would also have to show there was justification in holding societies and the persons who 
make up these societies responsible for the factors that led to their nation’s poor economic 
performance. In the second section of this chapter, I will argue that Miller is largely incorrect 
in thinking non-liberal societies and the persons who make up these societies have this 
responsibility. 
The Connected Questions of Economic Performance and 
Well-Orderliness 
 
What makes one country wealthy and another country poor? Many, unlike Rawls, 
have thought that a large part of the explanation is natural resources, with countries with 
natural resources likely to be wealthy, and those without likely to be poor. There appears to 
be empirical support for this view since there are wealthy countries like Australia, which 
people often label “The Lucky Country”,266  which have plentiful natural resources.267  
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Rawls notes Beitz has this view.
268
 Since, according to this view, the distribution of 
resources and therefore wealth between countries is arbitrary, Beitz argues for a significant 
global redistribution of wealth. In order to rebut this view, Rawls gives Japan as an example 
of a resource poor country
269
 that has been successful, and Argentina as an example of a 
resource rich country
270
  that has been unsuccessful.
271
 Since this comment follows a 
discussion of economic growth and well-orderliness, by “successful” Rawls appears to have 
both in mind. To explain the success of Japan and the failure of Argentina, Rawls suggests, 
“The crucial elements that make the difference are the political culture, the political virtues 
and civic society of the country, its members’ probity and industriousness, their capacity for 
innovation, and much else.”272 However, at this point, Rawls does not consider the possibility 
we could explain Japan’s success and Argentina’s failure by Japan having few natural 
resources and Argentina having abundant natural resources.  
This is counterintuitive, but, as is often the case, our intuition may not be a good 
guide to answers to empirical questions. Argentina is not alone in being a resource rich 
country with low economic growth. Resource rich countries tend to have lower economic 
growth. Economists refer to this phenomenon as the “resource curse”.273 Rawls was aware of 
                                                                                                                                                        
exporting of coal. 2014 Key World Energy Statistics, (Paris: International Energy Agency, 2014), p. 15, also 
available at URL: http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/KeyWorld2014.pdf, (accessed 9 
December 2014). 
268
 Rawls, LoP, § 16.2, p. 116. 
269
 Ibid, § 15.3, p. 108. The CIA lists Japan’s natural resources as, “negligible mineral resources, fish” and adds, 
“with virtually no energy natural resources, Japan is the world’s largest importer of coal and liquefied natural 
gas, as well as the second largest importer of oil.” ‘Field Listing, Natural Resources’. This comes close to 
according with figures from the IEA, which records Japan in 2013 as fourth in the net importation of coal, first 
in the net importation of natural gas, and fourth in the net importation of oil. However, in this last case, China in 
second place is safely ahead of Japan, while the first placed United States is well ahead of China. 2014 Key 
World Energy Statistics, pp. 15, 1, 11.  
270
 Rawls, LoP, § 15.3, p. 108. The CIA lists Argentina’s natural resources as, “fertile plains of the pampas, lead, 
zinc, tin, copper, iron ore, manganese, petroleum, [and] uranium”. The World Factbook, ‘Field Listing, Natural 
Resources’. 
271
 Argentina’s GDP growth rate has been variable over the years. Recently it has been positive, with OECD 
figures showing growth from 2003 to 2012. This contrasts with Japan’s recent lack of economic growth. Rawls 
might say this is likely to reflect a change in the countries’ political culture. However, we should note that 
Japan’s GDP per capita is still considerably larger than Argentina’s, which suggests we might be able to explain 
differences in growth rates by the countries being at different stages of economic development. OECD, Stat 
Extracts, ‘Quarterly Growth Rates of real GDP’, URL: https://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?queryid=350, (accessed 
9 December 2014). OECD, Stat Extracts, ‘Level of GDP per capita and productivity’, URL: 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx, (accessed 9 December 2014).   
272
 Rawls, LoP, § 15.3, p. 108.  
273
 There is disagreement among economists on the significance of the resource curse. Even supporters of the 
hypothesis see the curse as a tendency not an iron law; but certain critics of the thesis also admit resources can 
have a negative effect on economic growth. For the origin of and an argument for the thesis, see: Richard M. 
Auty, Sustainable Development in Mineral Economies: The resource curse thesis, (London: Routledge, 1993). 
For a measured critique of the thesis see, C. N. Brunnschweiler and E. H. Bulte, ‘Linking Natural Resources to 
E x p l a n a t o r y  N a t i o n a l i s m    P a g e  | 106 
 
similar ideas. In a footnote in LoP, he appears to endorse economic historian David Landes’s 
claim that the discovery of oil in the Middle East has turned out to be a, “monumental 
misfortune” for the Arab world.274 Nevertheless, Rawls’s position, along with Landes’s 
position, would appear to be that natural resources are only a curse when there is something 
wrong with one or more of the culture, institutions, individuals, and virtues of a country. In 
supporting this position, Rawls might point out resource rich countries like Australia and the 
United States, which have been successful.
275
 These examples show there is no such thing as 
resource determinism, but they do not disprove the resource curse hypothesis, a hypothesis 
that merely claims that having natural resources has a tendency to lead to bad economic 
outcomes. This highlights the fact that the resource curse thesis and explanatory nationalism 
are to a certain extent compatible.  
Indeed, a high profile advocate of the resource curse thesis, economist Richard Auty, 
(he coined the term) takes a position similar to Rawls. Auty argues that bad policy along with 
natural resources leads to bad outcomes. In support of his argument, Auty notes a number of 
countries, among them Peru, where natural resources paired with bad policy led to bad 
outcomes, but he also commends the resource rich Chile for taking an orthodox and 
pragmatic policy approach which led to good outcomes.
276
 Auty’s criticism is limited to 
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mineral rich countries but the tenor of his message, at least when it comes to moral criticism, 
is similar to Rawls, in that he thinks we can look to the persons in minerally rich countries in 
order to explain their economic performance. If national governments of resource rich 
countries adopt the right policies, they can expect good outcomes. This means, presuming, 
among other things, that resource rich countries are free in regards to policy choice and that 
virtually all the persons in a country have an influence over this choice, virtually all the 
persons in resource rich countries are culpable if the country adopts the wrong policy. 
Countries are not doomed to bad outcomes if they are rich in minerals, even if the term 
“resource curse” might suggest otherwise.  
Pogge would likely agree on the latter point, but likely argue both Auty and Rawls fail 
to see how international factors combine to make it more likely that countries with natural 
resources will perform poorly economically. The international factor Pogge has in mind is 
what he calls the “international resource privilege”.277 This privilege is the internationally 
recognised right of whoever rules a country to dispose of that country’s resources as they see 
fit. Pogge believes that this privilege can help to explain the resource curse because the 
privilege encourages such economically detrimental things as coups and civil wars in 
developing countries that have natural resources. Pogge argues this resource privilege is part 
of, “the current global order we [the developed world] uphold [that] shapes the national 
culture and policies of the poorer and weaker countries.”278 While I will argue in this chapter 
that the international resource privilege does have the effects identified by Pogge, I am less 
convinced that the developed world can take all the blame for upholding the privilege. One 
reason why I think this is that UN resolution 1803 (XVII) on “Permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources”, which was passed on 14 December 1962, had the support of 87 nations, 
many of them from the developing world. Only two nations, France and South Africa, voted 
against, while twelve nations, mainly communist ones, abstained.
279
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Pogge argues that the privilege means coup plotters and those launching civil wars 
will know that if they are successful, they will be able to sell their country’s resources, and 
use these resources as collateral when taking out loans.
280
 The lack of other sources of 
revenue in developing countries heightens these incentives. The incentives also discourage 
policies that lead to economic growth. Pogge’s analysis is similar to that offered by World-
System theorist Christopher Chase-Dunn. Chase-Dunn and other World-System theorists 
argue that, inter alia, the world economy is set up to facilitate the extraction of natural 
resources from peripheral countries (developing countries) to core countries (developed 
countries). This extraction will include core countries investing money in peripheral 
countries, but these theorists argue that this investment does not lead to countrywide 
economic development in the peripheral countries. This is in keeping with Chase-Dunn’s 
finding that while investment by core countries in mining in peripheral countries, “increases 
production in mining” it leads to, “negative effects on aggregate economic development”.281 
However, as I noted in the previous paragraph, this analysis has to explain the support this 
system has among a variety of countries. 
Pogge’s analysis of how the incentives created by the privilege lead to low economic 
growth starts by noting that the first concern of leaders who capture power by force will be 
maintaining the loyalty of those who helped them forcefully remove the previous leaders, and 
who might be able to remove them. In the case of a military coup, this group may be military 
officers. If the government can maintain this group’s loyalty by substantially increasing their 
pay via the sale of natural resources, then the government will do this even though such a 
policy is bad for economic growth.  
A military coup will also result in a reduced level of democracy, which means a 
reduced level in one of the forms of well-orderliness identified by Rawls. This means, in this 
scenario, the presence of natural resources also helps to explain low levels of well-orderliness 
and economic performance. 
Pogge could point to the work of Auty and others as evidence to back up his plausible 
account when it comes to the negative relationship between natural resources and economic 
                                                 
280
 Pogge, ‘”Assisting” the global poor’, p. 270.  
281
 Christopher Chase-Dunn, ‘The Effects of International Economic Dependence on Development and 
Inequality: A Cross National Study’ in American Sociological Review, Vol. 40, No. 6, (December 1975), p. 735, 
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2094176. My examiner Greta Snyder alerted me to the significance of 
the work of World-System theorists. 
 
E x p l a n a t o r y  N a t i o n a l i s m    P a g e  | 109 
 
performance. Can we do the same when it comes to natural resources and well-orderliness? 
Yes, and in doing so we can use some of Pogge’s sources. Pogge cites the work of economist 
Leonard Wantchekon whose analysis of the empirical data leads him to conclude there is a 
negative relationship between resource dependence and the level of democracy a country 
experiences.
282
 However, as Wantchekon notes, there are resource dependent countries with 
high levels of democracy, notably Norway. What explains this? Wantchekon believes one of 
the main explanations is the high level of transparency of the Norwegian government, with 
there being, “special courts and public access to documents” and an ombudsmen which 
makes, “arbitrary [and illegal] intervention by political leaders in public administration very 
difficult.”283 This leads him to recommend resource dependent countries to be more 
transparent, especially when it comes to allocating revenue. Pogge would not necessarily 
object to this recommendation, but he would probably argue Wantchekon is failing to 
consider that international factors, in particular the international resource privilege, play a 
role in explaining why resource dependent countries are unlikely to do this. Since those in 
power in these countries can sell their natural resources whether or not they are transparent 
about how they spend the money they receive, they have no international incentive to set up 
the costly institutions needed to ensure transparency. Norway avoided this problem because it 
had a number of these institutions already in place when it discovered oil resources.
284
 
However, other empirical researchers disagree with Wantchekon and Pogge’s idea 
that resource dependence can lead to low levels of democracy, arguing that this view presents 
the causal relationship backwards. For example, Stephen Haber argues that when there are 
low levels of democracy, or to put it in other words, “when dictators have unconstrained 
authority and discretion”, then, “investment tends to cluster in enterprises that are difficult to 
expropriate because running them requires proprietary knowledge of markets and 
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technologies—such as petroleum and mineral extraction.” Furthermore, Haber claims that 
this occurs, “independent of the extent of the country’s natural resource endowment.”285  
What would Pogge make of these claims? If they are true (Wantchekon’s work shows 
the empirical debate is far from settled) it would mean Pogge’s explanation of how the 
international resource privilege leads to low levels of democracy was mistaken, but Pogge 
would be able to maintain his criticism of the international resource privilege, albeit in an 
altered form. He could argue that while governments with low levels of democracy cannot 
afford to expropriate totally enterprises from investors because investors bring expertise 
needed to run these enterprises, they can still afford to tax revenue from these enterprises. 
Pogge could then argue that if we somehow replace the international resource privilege with a 
rule that only democratically elected governments could sell a country’s resources; then there 
would be little or no investment in countries where previously, due to their dictatorial nature, 
investment had focused on such things as petroleum and mineral extraction. This might 
encourage the rulers of these countries to move in a democratic direction.  
To the defenders of explanatory nationalism who do not think the facts support this 
argument, we can point out that in order to defend explanatory nationalism its defenders have 
to do more than show their account regarding empirical outcomes is correct. They also have 
to show we can justifiably hold nations responsible for the national factors that lead to these 
empirical outcomes. 
The Question of Responsibility 
 
The idea of national responsibility is one version of the complicated notion of 
collective responsibility, which Miller notes includes the claim, “that … cultural and political 
features … are … features for which peoples can properly be held responsible.”286 This 
would only be plausible if the peoples involved chose these features.   
In the previous chapter, we investigated Rawls’s scenarios, which he thought showed 
we could hold peoples responsible for pursuing certain policies. In the scenarios, the peoples 
could be a liberal people with its concomitant democracy, or a decent people with its 
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concomitant meaningful consultation between the social groups that make up their society. In 
both his scenarios, Rawls believes we can say the people as a whole made the decision to 
pursue certain policies, and therefore we can hold nearly all
287
 the persons who make up this 
people responsible and expect them to deal with the consequences of these decisions, which 
in these cases were different levels of wealth. While we found problems with Rawls’s 
argument, Miller develops it, so let us see if Miller avoids these problems. 
Miller points out that along with having a consultation hierarchy, decent peoples have 
members who converge on a common good idea of justice. Miller also points out that Rawls 
says there is a democratic element in decent consultation hierarchies with there being voting 
members of the various groups that make up society. In casting their vote, these members, 
“take into account the broader interests of political life.”288 Miller thinks this means that often 
policies adopted by governments in decent societies will be, “informed by principles on 
which there is agreement, and taken according to procedures that citizens accept”. When this 
is the case, Miller thinks the members of decent societies are, “reasonably implicated in 
collective responsibility.”289  
However, those members lower down in the social hierarchy of a decent people could 
legitimately claim reduced responsibility. They may have opposed the policy under 
consideration, and expressed this opposition. While those higher up in the social hierarchy 
would have listened to them and taken into consideration their views, they would deny their 
views equal status. This means a majority, even a large majority, could oppose a policy or set 
of policies, but those higher up in the social hierarchy could still choose to pursue the policy. 
Of course, we could say the same thing about a liberal people, but the presence of democratic 
elections increases the likelihood of the majority of members of a liberal people agreeing 
with the policy direction of the government, while in the case of a decent people this may 
often not be the case. Miller is aware of objections of this type. He notes the further objection 
that it, “is naïve to think that ‘consultation hierarchies’ which don’t treat citizens as equals 
can properly embody a shared view of the common good.” Miller’s response is to say: 
But Rawls says explicitly that he is trying to describe a ‘realistic utopia’ – a world different 
from ours but one that nevertheless stays within the realms of the possible. Given that aim, his 
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general assumption about the collective responsibility of liberal and decent peoples is 
reasonable.
290
 
 
In response, we can admit the possibility of a decent people where, despite no elections, the 
opinion of all significant social groups is taken into consideration, the opinion of these social 
groups reflect the opinions of its members, and therefore nearly all the persons who make up 
this people can be held responsible for the decision made by this people. But we can question 
what the significance of this possibility amounts to if actual non-liberal societies are quite 
different. To help answer this question we can look at Rawls’s discussion of the imagined 
Islamic people, Kazanistan.  
Rawls opens his exploration of Kazanistan by writing in a vein similar to the previous 
quote from Miller: 
The Law of Peoples does not presuppose the existence of actual decent hierarchical peoples 
any more than it presupposes the existence of actual reasonably just constitutional democratic 
peoples. If we set the standards very high, neither exists. In the case of democratic peoples, 
the most we can say is that some are closer than others to a reasonably just constitutional 
regime. The case of decent hierarchical peoples is even less clear. Can we coherently describe 
its basic social institutions and political virtues?
291
  
 
However, when discussing Kazanistan, along with showing the idea of a decent consultation 
hierarchy is coherent, Rawls wants to suggest that a Society of Peoples, where all polities are 
either liberal or decent peoples, is possible in our social world.
292
 Rawls is trying to describe 
a realistic utopia, not just a coherent utopia. In this regard, Rawls writes, “Kazanistan is the 
best we can realistically—and coherently—hope for.”293 In defence of the realism of 
Kazanistan, Rawls says he does, “not think it is unreasonable that a society like Kazanistan 
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might exist, especially as it is not without precedent in the real world”.294 In support of this 
claim, Rawls refers to an earlier footnote, but this note only claims, “The spiritual 
interpretation of jihad was once common in Islamic countries [italics original]”.295 In the 
footnote before this, however, Rawls does say, “The doctrine [of toleration] I have attributed 
to the rulers of Kazanistan was similar to one found in Islam some centuries ago [The 
Ottoman Empire tolerated Jews and Christians]”.296 Rawls, however, does not appear to be 
asserting that the Ottoman Empire was a decent people and therefore the persons who made 
up the Ottoman Empire could be held responsible for its economic performance and its well-
orderliness, and even if he is, it is not credible to do so due to the highly hierarchical nature 
of the Empire.  
With Rawls unable to cite a real world example of a nonliberal society the member of 
which we can hold collectively responsible for its economic performance and well-
orderliness, the realism of the idea of a decent people is undermined.  
What this brief discussion of responsibility has done is to show that the number of 
polities who we can hold responsible for their economic performance and well-orderliness is 
smaller than Miller’s analysis suggests. While we might be justified in holding the leaders of 
non-liberal states responsible, the majority of persons who make up these polities are not. It is 
only when there is democratic decision making that it is plausible to hold the persons who 
make up a society responsible for its economic performance and well-orderliness. 
Conclusion 
 
 We have seen that there are a number of problems with explanatory nationalism. 
Along with making false responsibility claims, explanatory nationalism also makes the 
questionable empirical claim that economic performance and well-orderliness are due mainly 
to national factors. In this chapter some evidence was gathered which ran counter to this 
claim. Although the next chapter discusses another topic, it also continues the questioning of 
the economic version of explanatory nationalism by arguing that an international factor, 
ODA, can have an effect on economic performance, and via this and other channels, can help 
to realize a global difference principle.
                                                 
294
 Ibid. 
295
 Ibid, p. 76, n. 18.  
296
 Rawls, LoP, § 9.3, p. 76, n. 17. 
P a g e  | 114 
 
P a g e  | 115 
 
Chapter 7: The Effectiveness of ODA 
 
Introduction 
 
 This chapter will investigate the effectiveness of ODA at being a step towards 
realizing a global difference principle. It is worth noting that fully realizing a global 
difference principle would require maximising the expectations of the globally least 
advantaged, and this is likely to require more than ODA programmes, which have the 
humanitarian goals of reducing poverty, and providing basic health and education services.
297
 
Indeed, in the next chapter I argue that trade can have a role in this process.  
When it comes to ODA, we can start by noting that its official purpose was and 
largely continues to be to assist with economic development in the developing world and 
thereby reduce poverty. This result relates to the goal of realizing a global difference 
principle because a reduction in poverty in the developing world would see the globally least 
advantaged making gains in income and wealth, one of the social primary goods. The chapter 
will also look at how ODA has led to improvements in health and education, and how these 
improvements can help to realize a global difference principle. 
While economist William Easterly admits ODA has led to improvements in health 
and education, he thinks ODA has generally been a failure due to certain obstacles. Among 
these obstacles are: governments in developed countries not knowing where to allocate 
resources so that they can help poor people in developing countries, and these governments 
also tending to allocate ODA to serve their own interests rather than the needs of recipients. 
The chapter will conclude that while these are real obstacles, they do not justify a general 
scepticism about ODA’s effectiveness. When it comes to the obstacle of donors allocating 
ODA to further their own interests, I will gather evidence that will show that although this 
sometimes occurs, at other times, governments allocate ODA to meet recipient need, and 
ODA is sometimes effective in meeting these needs. When it comes to knowledge obstacles, I 
will note we can sometimes overcome these by channelling ODA via developing country 
governments. 
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Finally, the chapter argues we can see ODA is effective by using randomized 
evaluations similar to randomized controlled trials used in medicine. There is the problem of 
scaling up from randomized evaluations that researchers carry out on a small scale to 
programmes that are much larger and therefore may have different effects and be harder to 
evaluate. Nevertheless, the chapter will argue that the results from randomized evaluations 
give us a reason to scale up programmes. 
Is ODA a Failure or Success? 
 
Economist William Easterly not only claims ODA is an abject failure when it comes 
to poverty reduction, he also claims it is a massive one. In support of this claim he notes,  
“Sixty years of countless reform schemes to aid agencies and dozens of different plans, and 
$2.3 trillion later, the aid industry is still failing to reach the beautiful goal [of making 
poverty history].”298 There is no denying that 2.3 trillion dollars is a great deal of money, and 
it may seem like enough to solve the problem of poverty if those in charge of the money had 
spent it effectively; however, as economist Jeffrey Sachs points out, we have to compare 2.3 
trillion dollars to the size of the problem of global poverty. In doing this perspective setting, 
Sachs mistakenly quotes Easterly as saying the developed world has given 2.3 trillion dollars 
over 50, instead of 60, years.
299
  This mistake is understandable since ODA in its modern 
form only started to emerge in 1960,
300
 and this mistake just makes the amount given sound 
even greater, and Sachs’s attempt to show we should not have expected it to solve the 
problem of poverty, more difficult. Nevertheless, Sachs succeeds. Sachs starts by estimating 
that there have been roughly 3 billion people in low-income countries over the 50-year period 
when developed countries gave ODA. This means, based on developed countries giving 2.3 
trillion dollars over 50 years, on average a person in a low-income country received 15 
dollars a year in ODA.
301
 This makes ODA’s failure to end poverty much less of a 
condemnation of ODA. This is even truer when we consider that Easterly concedes ODA is 
likely to have led to significant health and education improvements in low-income 
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countries.
302
 This fact is relevant to realizing a global difference principle because both health 
and education can raise the expectations of the least advantaged. When it came to education, 
Rawls appreciated its role in realizing a difference principle. While in ToJ Rawls discusses 
the importance of education for realizing another aspect of his second principle of domestic 
justice, the equal opportunity principle
303
, Rawls also notes, “the difference principle would 
allocate resources in education, say, so as to improve the long-term expectation of the least 
favored.”304  
Rawls largely avoided the issue of health and health care. In trying to justify this 
neglect of the sick Rawls wrote: 
The first problem of justice concerns the relations among those who in the everyday course of 
things are full and active participants in society and directly or indirectly associated together 
over the whole span of their life. Thus the difference principle is to apply to citizens engaged 
in social cooperation; if the principle fails for this case, it would seem to fail in general.
305
  
 
This passage comes from a discussion of the least advantaged; this is no coincidence. We can 
generally expect this group to have more health problems than other representatives groups. 
Part of the quoted passage suggests the main question for whether Rawlsian principles cover 
someone is whether this person is engaged in a scheme of social cooperation, but we have 
already concluded that the main question is whether one has the potential to develop the two 
moral powers. This opens up the possibility that our version of Rawlsian theory can cover 
those in poor health because these individuals still have the potential or actually have the two 
moral powers. However, even if one were to concede that only the presence of cooperation 
could justify Rawlsian principles, one could point out that there are those with health 
problems who are still fully cooperating members of society. The later Rawls, at times, 
appreciated this point, writing in PL, “The aim [of spending on health] is to restore people by 
health care so that once again they are fully cooperating members of society.”306 This also 
helps to realize a difference principle because being such a member of society is also likely to 
improve one’s expectations. 
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This brief discussion of health and education shows that Easterly’s admission that 
ODA has led to health and education improvements in low-income countries suggests ODA 
has been effective in helping to realize a global difference principle. However, Easterly 
emphasises that ODA has generally been a failure in poverty reduction. 
In making an argument to explain this putative failure, Easterly points out ODA can 
involve large plans devised in developed countries, or as he puts it “the West”. He then goes 
on to claim that when it comes to, “a big plan involving myriads of intended beneficiaries, 
planners in the West have no way to use the knowledge of the poor people themselves about 
their own needs and problems.”307 Easterly gives his argument the intellectual backing of F. 
A. Hayek who argued, ““The economic problem of society” is “a problem of how to secure 
the best use of resources known to any of the members of society, for ends whose relative 
importance only these individuals know.”308 The solution, for Hayek, to this problem is the 
price mechanism, which acts, “to coordinate the separate actions of different people”.309 
Since with ODA there is no price mechanism in place, Easterly argues that governments in 
the developed world cannot know what resources poor people in the developing world want. 
Easterly believes this is problematic because he thinks these people know what resources 
they need to escape poverty. However, it is not clear how the price mechanism can help poor 
people, and help to solve this knowledge problem, since poor people do not have much 
money. Aware of this problem, Easterly speaks favourably of cash payments made by the 
Bangladeshi government to Bangladeshi families that are conditional on the families making 
sure that their daughters attend school.
310
 However, this opens up the possibility of ODA 
being effective because developed country governments often channel ODA via governments 
in developing countries.  
However, one might think governments in developed countries will generally not fund 
these sorts of educational programmes. In making this argument, Pogge claims, “The 
disbursement of conventional development assistance (ODA) is governed by political 
considerations. It tends to be spent for the benefit of agents capable of reciprocation: 
exporters in the donor country or strategically important “elite” constituencies in the recipient 
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countries.”311 In support of his claim, Pogge notes that in 2005 only $7.63 billion out of the 
$106.78 billion given in ODA, which is roughly 7%, went towards basic education and health 
services.
312
  
One might think that further support for Pogge’s claim comes from a point made in 
the previous chapter of this thesis, namely that non-democratic governments lack 
responsiveness to the will of their people. Given this, one might ask, why should we expect 
these governments to use ODA to benefit their population? This question identifies a real 
problem. ODA has been misused and this is sometimes because of the non-democratic nature 
of the governments receiving the ODA. However, pressure from democratically elected 
governments providing the ODA can lead non-democratically elected governments receiving 
ODA to use the ODA effectively. If the latter government resists this pressure, the ODA 
donor governments can distribute via other channels like Non-Governmental 
Organizations/Civil Society Organizations. Indeed, in 2011, ODA donor governments 
distributed 14.4% of ODA in this manner.
313
  
However, some question whether donor governments would pressure receiving 
governments to spend ODA to benefit their population or channel ODA through NGOs that 
would do this. They base this questioning on an account of the motives of donor governments. 
Such accounts occur in development studies, much of which builds on the work of R. D. 
McKinlay and R. Little.
314
  
McKinlay and Little identify two models that could explain why donors allocate aid, 
the “humanitarian needs of the recipient” model, and the “foreign policy interests of the 
donor” model.315 McKinlay and Little believe in the validity of the latter model, which asserts, 
“the provision of aid enables the donor to form relations of commitment and dependency” 
and, “These in turn afford foreign policy utilities that can be used by the donor to promote 
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and protect certain of its interests.”316 Since these interests are unlikely to coincide with the 
interests of the recipient of aid, who may be a member of the globally least advantaged, it 
suggests aid is unlikely to help realize a global difference principle.
317
 In rebutting this view, 
I will now discuss studies that show things besides donor interest determine the allocation of 
aid.  
While in their seminal paper McKinlay and Little focused on the United States’ aid 
allocation, Eric Neumayer looked at a range of studies, which covered a number of countries’ 
aid allocation. In doing so, Neumayer measured three variables that might explain aid 
allocation: Donor Interest (DI), Recipient Need (RN) and Good Governance (GG).
318
  Along 
with discovering that recipient countries having GG did sometimes lead to them receiving 
ODA, Neumayer found, “Maybe not surprisingly, there is evidence that both DI and RN play 
some role in the aid allocation by most donors [italics original].”319  
Neumayer’s findings may appear to be at odds with the figures cited by Pogge, which 
showed the small amount of ODA going towards basic education and health services. The 
explanation for this apparent discrepancy is that Neumayer defines donor interest more 
broadly than simply basic education and health services. Pogge might argue this definition is 
too broad, and if we use this definition, we could deem ODA benefitting elite constituencies 
as meeting recipient interests. Pogge could further argue that this stands in contrast to what 
donor governments should do, which is direct ODA towards the urgent needs basic health 
and education services could satisfy. Pogge would also add that history shows donor 
governments will not do this. However, the recent shift in focus to the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), which includes goals like the realization of basic education and 
health services, should see improvement in this area.
320
 Indeed, figures from the same source 
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cited by Pogge show the percentage of ODA going towards basic social service had risen 
from roughly 7% in 2005 to roughly 11% in 2011.
321
 
This evidence regarding ODA and basic social services, and other evidence presented 
in this section of the chapter, suggests we can sometimes overcome the obstacles of donor 
interest and governments in developed countries not knowing where to allocate ODA. 
However, even if governments allocate ODA to the right places, and afterwards we see 
positive effects, can we be sure ODA was the cause? In some instances, it is safe to say yes. 
Given the previous testing of the performance of antiretroviral drugs in the treatment of 
HIV/AIDS, we can safely attribute reduced death rates from HIV/AIDS to the increased 
availability of retroviral drugs, which is often due to ODA funding
322
; but what of other ODA 
sponsored programmes? Some suggest that in order to be sure these programmes have 
positive effects we should attempt to replicate the testing which showed antiretroviral and 
other drugs have positive effects. Researchers, following this advice, have used what they call 
“randomized evaluations”, but these evaluations have some problems, which, along with 
other aspects of the evaluations, I will now briefly discuss.
323
 
Randomized Evaluations and the Problem of Scaling Up 
 
In doing a randomized evaluation of an aid programme, much like a medical 
researcher doing a randomized controlled trial of a medicine, an aid researcher randomly 
selects an experimental group and a control group from a population.
324
 The experimental 
group receives aid while the control group does not. Since researchers selected the groups 
randomly, generally the main difference between the two groups will be that one received aid 
while the other did not.
 
This means we can reasonably attribute any statistically significant 
differences between these two groups to the effects of aid.
325
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However, two of the leading advocates of randomized evaluations, the economists 
Esther Duflo and Michael Kremer, admit randomized evaluations have some possible 
problems. In the context of a discussion of small-scale aid programmes that have focused on 
education, Duflo and Kremer write, “It is possible that if some educational programs were 
implemented on a large scale, the programs could affect the functioning of the school system 
and thus have a different impact.”326 Economists Abhijit Banerjee and Ruimin He, who, like 
Duflo and Kremer, advocate the use of randomized evaluations, identify a related problem 
when they write, “The problem [with trying to assess policies] is that once something is big 
enough (“currency boards,” “democracy”), there is no way to know what would have 
happened in its absence.”327 Banerjee and He do not expand on what they mean, but had they, 
they would probably start by noting that small scale programmes can be tested with 
randomized trials because one can use small experimental and control groups which are 
basically the same except one receives the programme and the other does not. Then they 
would have pointed out that democracy and currency boards are nation-wide policies. The 
problem with nations is that one will not be able to identify, let alone select and then run an 
experiment on, an experimental nation and a control nation, that are sufficiently similar for us 
to have certainty that differences between the two groups are due to the presence of 
democracy and currency boards.  
However, Banerjee and He’s sceptical concern is overstated. If, for example, we 
repeatedly observe more economic growth variability in dictatorships than democracies, this 
gives us a reason, even if it does not give certainty, to think dictatorships are associated with 
variable economic growth. Returning to Duflo and Kremer’s specific concern, while we 
cannot be sure programs which randomized evaluations have shown work on a small scale  
will work on a large scale, nevertheless, this tested small scale success does give us reason to 
think there will be success on a larger scale. After all, drugs that randomized controlled trials 
have shown work on a small scale do seem to have also worked on a large scale.  
Banerjee and He note the use of randomized evaluations is rare in the study of the 
effectiveness of aid programmes.
328
 However, they describe a number of education and health 
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programmes (some of them ODA sponsored), which have been subject to randomized 
evaluations, and have been successful in the various goals set for them.
329
 This is another 
piece of evidence in favour of the effectiveness of ODA in realizing a global difference 
principle.  
Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter of the thesis, we found that ODA could be effective in a number of 
ways in helping to realize a global difference principle. We noted how even one of the 
harshest critics of ODA, Easterly, admitted that ODA has helped with health and education 
services in low income countries, and we also noted how these services could help to realize 
a global difference principle. The chapter did admit that there are obstacles to ODA being 
effective, but cited evidence that showed we could sometimes overcome these obstacles.  
We also learnt that by using randomized evaluation we could be relatively certain 
ODA was causing effects that lead to the realization of a global difference principle.  
However, despite an economist who is one of ODA’s harshest critics admitting ODA 
can be effective, there is not universal support for ODA among economists and others in 
development circles. Indeed, a long and common cry among these circles is trade, not aid.
330
 
This gives us a reason to investigate this policy in the next chapter, where we will consider 
both free trade and fair trade.
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Chapter 8: The Effectiveness of Trade 
 
Introduction 
 
The chapter will consider the argument that trade can best help to realize a global 
difference principle. While those arguing for trade rarely use Rawlsian terms, they do argue 
that trade can reduce poverty, which means it would be a step towards realizing a global 
difference principle.  
Those arguing that trade leads to poverty reduction, generally advocate for free trade, 
so the chapter will investigate this type of trade first. The chapter will focus on the arguments 
made by law professors Fernando R. Tesón and Jonathan Klick because of their focus on 
global justice and the work of Rawls. Along with arguing free trade leads to poverty 
reduction, they argue free trade is morally preferable to ODA due to its non-coercive nature. 
In deciphering this aspect of the argument, we will consider Rawls’s view of coercion and its 
similarities to Tesón and Klick’s. The chapter will conclude that while there are reasons to 
believe that free trade can bring benefits to the world’s poor, it cannot always do so in 
isolation, with ODA in some instances being able to assist free trade in this regard. The 
chapter will also note that coercion can be necessary to ensure free trade. These points 
suggest we should not view free trade as a panacea or as morally preferable because of its 
non-coercive nature. 
The chapter will close by briefly discussing what opponents of free trade often give as 
an alternative, namely, fair trade. This discussion will note that fair trade is a social 
movement that lacks a theoretical underpinning, and suggest that we can make trade fair by 
making sure that trade benefits the globally least advantaged. 
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Free Trade 
 
 Unlike economists, those who write on the topic of global justice rarely discuss free 
trade.
331
 This lack of discussion is surprising since, as Tesón and Klick note
332
, most 
economists (whose opinion, given they are experts on economic matters, must be given some 
weight) believe free trade will lead to poverty reduction.
333
 This is important from a Rawlsian 
perspective because the globally least advantaged are among the global poor, which means, if 
free trade is the best way to eliminate global poverty, then free trade may be part of the best 
way to realize a global difference principle.  
Tesón and Klick go on to note that those writing on global justice have tended to see 
the solution to the problem of global poverty as occurring through the redistribution of wealth. 
On the contrary, Tesón and Klick argue, “in order to even start considering whether we 
should coercively redistribute wealth from the world’s rich to the world’s poor, we should 
first have free trade”,334 but why do Tesón and Klick think we should wait until this point?  
To help answer this question we can look to their views on coercion. In order to keep this 
discussion Rawlsian in nature, we can start by stating Rawls’s view of coercion, and then 
compare it with the view of Tesón and Klick while also discussing the role of coercion in free 
trade and ODA.
335
 This will lead into a discussion of free trade’s possible benefits and the 
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suggestion that compensation could help to overcome the opposition of those who suffer 
losses from the introduction of free trade.    
Rawls views coercion as wrongful in itself because it is a denial of liberty. If this 
denial is a denial of a basic liberty, in order for it to be justified it must promote the system of 
basic liberties.
336
 One way coercion can promote this system is by stabilizing cooperation that 
helps to realize greater liberty.
337
 There would be instability without coercion because 
persons would be less willing to engage in social cooperation because they would not be 
reassured that others would not free ride on their efforts. This is true because, even though 
individuals have a sense of justice, and are aware others have a sense of justice, they are also 
self-interested, and are aware others are self-interested. Therefore, the state sometimes steps 
in coercively to prevent self-interested free riding, which reassures individuals and 
encourages them to engage in cooperative enterprises. 
Analogously, in an international setting some coercion may be necessary to ensure 
free trade. If a country makes a judgment that it benefits from other countries following free 
trade agreements while it breaks them, the country may break these agreements due to the 
country’s partly self-interested nature. This forms part of the justification for the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the successor to the GATT, which can coercively punish countries if 
they break free trade agreements. However, Tesón and Klick are critical of the WTO in part 
because they think its existence is based on what they think is the false idea that a country 
could benefit from having other countries follow free trade agreements while it breaks them. 
Furthermore, they note governments tend to treat, “access to their markets as a bargaining 
“chip””, but they argue, “Because imports benefit consumers, the notion that granting access 
to one’s markets is a concession to other countries is false: lowering one’s tariffs helps one’s 
citizens [italics original].”338 However, even if Tesón and Klick are correct about all countries 
benefiting from free trade, it does not change the fact coercion is sometimes required to 
ensure free trade.  
                                                                                                                                                        
In general, it is difficult to make judgments about Rawls’s view on free trade because he does not discuss free 
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Coercion is only required to ensure cooperation in the domestic realm due to the 
selfish nature of persons. If we could expect persons to do their fair share in cooperative 
schemes, then coercion to ensure cooperation would be unnecessary. Tesón and Klick would 
insist coercion would be unnecessary in the international realm of trade if trade negotiators 
could see free trade was in their citizen’s interests, and they acted in the interests of their 
citizens; but this may be as foolishly utopian as one expecting persons to be always ruled by 
fairness, and never selfishness.  
When writing on international aid, Tesón and Klick note, “Most people are not saints: 
they will have to be forced to contribute to the global redistributive agency.”339 As far as the 
saintliness of most persons is concerned, we could apply Tesón and Klick’s comments to 
domestic redistributive agencies. However, Tesón and Klick might argue that in the domestic 
sphere due to stronger communal bonds, persons would be more willing to contribute. 
Nevertheless, in the domestic case the coercive redistributive agencies exist, presumably 
because, despite an increased willingness to contribute, many would not contribute without 
the threat of coercion.  
Tesón and Klick object to those who draw such analogies between the global and 
domestic case for redistribution. They argue, “One cannot transpose the arguments in favor of 
redistribution within society to argue in favor of global redistribution, simply because a 
central assumption of the arguments for domestic welfare is that there are no internal 
barriers to trade [italics original].”340 This argument clarifies why Tesón and Klick think we 
should wait until there is global free trade before we consider giving aid. Many arguments in 
favour of giving aid do make an analogy between the domestic and global case, arguing that 
just as we redistribute wealth to the poor within our own country via social welfare, we 
should also redistribute wealth to the poor outside our own country via aid. Tesón and Klick 
say the former type of redistribution may be justified because we cannot blame domestic 
poverty on internal trade barriers. This means the non-coercive option of dropping trade 
barriers to eliminate poverty is not open to us. Therefore, we may choose to redistribute 
wealth coercively via taxes if we judge that the consequent gains in poverty reduction 
outweigh losses in freedom, and the costs involved. Coercively redistributing global wealth to 
reduce global poverty is not morally justified, Tesón and Klick argue, because we still have 
the non-coercive option of reducing global poverty by dropping trade barriers. 
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However, if Tesόn and Klick were consistent, they would have to admit that from 
their perspective domestic redistribution may not be justified either because domestic poverty 
may be due to external trade barriers. To show how the logic of their argument forces Tesόn 
and Klick to do this, we can note again that they claim that in virtually every case, global free 
trade will improve “welfare in each trade partner [italics original].”341 This means, according 
to Tesόn and Klick, we can expect global free trade to improve welfare in developed 
countries, which means we could expect to see a reduction in poverty in developed countries. 
Therefore, if we follow Tesόn and Klick’s argument, it would seem that before we even 
consider domestic redistribution, we should await global free trade because this is a non-
coercive way of eliminating domestic poverty.    
But while Tesón and Klick believe every trade partner will benefit from free trade, 
they note, “some [economic models] ... suggest that free trade might leave a subset of 
individuals worse off within nations, at least in the short run, absent some domestic 
redistribution of the gains from trade [italics original].”342 However, they argue, “Some 
people, including some poor individuals, would be left worse-off as a result of any economic 
policy” [italics original].343 This means, according to Tesón and Klick, we should not argue 
for free trade on the basis that no one will be made worse off by free trade, according to them 
no policy can claim this. Rather, we should argue in favour of free trade on the basis that free 
trade would reduce the number of poor persons.    
However, there is some evidence that simply allowing free trade between countries 
that have large numbers of poor persons and developed countries will not have much of an 
effect on reducing the number of poor persons. For example, despite growing global free 
trade, the amount of private resources flowing to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 
remains small.
344
 Indeed, if we compare private and ODA flows to the poorest countries from 
1960s onwards, ODA is always in the lead. For example, in 2009, 24331.7 million dollars in 
the form of ODA went to the LDCs, while only 5250.75 million dollars came via private 
flows.
345
 There is also some evidence that free trade with LDCs may be more beneficial to 
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the developed world than the LDCs, with some years the general flow of private resources 
being from the LDCs to Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s 
(OECD’s)346  Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members.347  Some years when this 
occurred were 1984-1987, 1989, 1991, 1994-1995, and 2002.
348
 Furthermore, when we look 
at specific trade initiatives, whose goals include poverty reduction, it is not clear if they are 
successful. 
For example, in an attempt to promote free trade, in 2000 the United States launched 
the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) initiative, which included allowing goods 
from certain African countries to enter the United States tariff free. The evidence for the 
effect of AGOA is mixed.  Some researchers argue the impact of AGOA has been limited
349
 
while others argue AGOA has had a significant positive impact.
350
 This and the previously 
mentioned small flows of private capital to LDCs, leads to scepticism about the idea that we 
should focus solely on trade liberalization as a way to reduce the number of the world’s poor. 
In response the advocates of trade liberalization may point out that trade liberalization 
does not just mean the elimination of tariffs. It also means the elimination of subsidies. If this 
happened, it would be a significant change, with agricultural subsidies in developed nations 
in 2012 being 259 billion US dollars
351
, while in the same year developed nations gave 126 
billion in ODA.
352
 However, some economists are not convinced the removal of agricultural 
subsidies would have a positive effect on poor countries. Sachs claims: 
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If Europe cuts back on its subsidies for staple crops (wheat, maize), the results for Africa 
[where most of the LDCs are located] could well be negative, not positive, since Africa is a 
net food-importing region: consumers of food would pay higher prices for food, whereas 
farmers would benefit.
353
 
 
However, economists Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Charlton note the possibility that in 
Africa, “rural producers may be far poorer than the average person in society” and the 
possibility, “that those who buy imported food (say wheat) are far richer than those who live 
off locally grown crops, like millet [italics original].”354 Therefore, while the net effect on 
Africa of removing agricultural subsidies in the developed world may be negative, it may be 
positive for those whom if we are Rawlsians we should focus on, the poorest of the poor, or 
in other words, the least advantaged, who in this case are farmers.
355
  
While developed countries could boost trade from developing countries by cutting 
subsidies, some suggest developed countries could also boost trade via aid. This idea has 
gained institutional support, with the WTO in 2005 at its Sixth Ministerial Conference 
launching an Aid for Trade initiative. In doing so, the WTO declared, “Aid for Trade should 
aim to help developing countries, particularly LDCs, to build the supply-side capacity and 
trade-related infrastructure that they need to implement and benefit from WTO Agreements 
and more broadly to expand their trade.”356    
 Another reason for thinking aid might sometimes be necessary for free trade is that 
the initial costs of freer trade can be much higher for developing countries’ governments. 
This is in part because currently developing countries have higher tariff barriers, which for 
some of the countries are one of their government’s few sources of tax revenue. This means 
aid to compensate for the removal of this tax revenue may be helpful. 
Still, Aid for Trade has critics. In commenting on these critics, and their critiques of 
aid as compensation for those who lose out from free trade, economist Simon J. Evenett notes, 
“that, as an ethical matter, I suspect that many are … [un]willing to support compensation for 
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rent loss”;357 Evenett does not explain where this unwillingness might come from. We might 
understand if we consider the condition of the rentiers. These persons are in protected 
industries; the protection comes in the form of tariffs. Tariffs increase the price of imported 
goods and services, and thereby enable producers and providers to collect rent by charging 
higher prices for their goods and services. From the point of view of a self-interested 
producer and/or provider, it makes sense to collect rent, but economists, like Gordon Tullock, 
have been almost unanimous in their verdict that, in terms of the collective welfare of society, 
the collection of rent is negative.
358
 Consequently, it is natural for economists to believe that, 
as far as possible, we should eliminate rent and invest the former rent money in further 
production. One response to make to these economists is to point out that rentiers can be a 
powerful lobby group who could block reform, and, if we want trade liberalization, the 
pragmatic thing to do may be to pay off rentiers.
359
  
This treatment of rent and other phenomena associated with free trade has shown free 
trade is not a straightforward solution to world poverty, and that free trade sometimes 
requires coercion, and may often require compensation. However, while Tesón and Klick are 
mistaken about some aspects of free trade, they are correct in noting commentators on global 
justice have generally not considered the potential benefits of free trade to the world’s poor 
persons.  
Fair Trade 
 
Commentators on global justice have also had little to say on the topic of fair trade, 
with philosophy-influenced papers on the topic mainly coming from commentators on 
business ethics.
360
  However, in LoP, Rawls only mentions fair trade. Unfortunately, he does 
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not go into detail about what fair trade would require. He does give the GATT as an 
organization analogous to one that could ensure fair trade. The GATT promoted free trade, so, 
could Rawls be implying that fair trade is free trade applied to all peoples?
361
 Rawls at least 
suggests compatibility between fair trade and free trade when he writes we need, “fair 
standards of trade to keep the market free and competitive”.362  
If we look for guidance on the nature of fair trade from commentators on global 
justice, we find Miller. Miller writes: 
[T]he main idea behind the growing Fair Trade movement is to guarantee the primary 
producers of products like coffee, cocoa and cotton a small, but still significant, proportion of 
the final selling price of these commodities – the movement is fuelled by the gross 
disproportion between the share they currently receive and the share taken by the companies 
that import and process the products, as well as by the absolute (low) level of their earnings. I 
shall not try to tackle here the difficulties involved in trying to formulate the relevant 
principle of justice more precisely and to make it operational – in particular problems in 
estimating the size of the benefit each party receives from co-operation. The principle has 
purchase where current practices distribute the material gains in such a grossly unequal way 
that according to any reasonable metric the outcome is unfair. And today’s world offers 
plenty of instances that fit that description.
363
 
 
This quote reminds us fair trade is not simply an idea but is also a social movement. 
Like a number of these movements, a feeling of injustice, unaccompanied by any theory, 
mainly underpins this movement. However, this movement, and Miller, focus on those 
directly involved in trade, or as Miller puts it “co-operation”, and the benefits they receive. 
We have already concluded, based on the relevant principle of justice (the difference 
principle), that when looking at the distribution of benefits we should focus on the least 
advantaged, even if they are not involved in economic co-operation. However, we saw in the 
last section that those that might fit the category of the least advantaged (rural producers in 
Africa) were involved in economic co-operation and trade. We also saw that the benefits to 
the least advantaged from trade agreements was not clear, and in some instances could be 
negative. 
We also concluded that some governments, product producers, and service providers 
might require compensation for lost tax revenues from the dropping of tariff barriers. 
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However, I presented this as a pragmatic way of introducing free trade, rather than a way of 
ensuring justice. While Rawls had given up on the difference principle in LoP, which might 
help to explain why he did not address exactly what the standards of fair trade were, we have 
not done so. This means we can conclude that trade is fair when, inter alia, it improves the 
position of the least advantaged. If trade on its own does not accomplish this, then we should 
look to redistribute its benefits. 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we considered how effective trade would be at helping to realize a 
global difference principle. We saw some evidence free trade could be effective, but there 
was evidence it could be more effective when pursued in tandem with ODA.  We also 
concluded we could make trade fairer if we made sure the benefits of trade improved the 
position of the least advantaged. 
When discussing the effectiveness of trade in realizing a global difference principle, 
we did not avoid other moral topics. Notably, we debated the topic of coercion. In the next 
chapter, we will debate the topic of promises, in order to see how it relates to commitments 
around ODA, and the issue of effectiveness.
  P a g e  | 135 
 
Chapter 9: A Consideration beyond Effectiveness?  
ODA and Promises 
 
Introduction 
  
   Previously I have argued that developed countries should give ODA because it 
would help to realize a global difference principle. In this chapter, I will argue that another 
reason why developed countries should give ODA is that they promised they would do so. 
While the early Rawls’s account of promising received attention in the philosophical 
literature from the likes of Thomas Scanlon
364
, there do not appear to be any papers that use 
this account to analyse commitments around ODA, but this chapter will add to the literature 
by showing we can do this. It will start doing this by looking at the long history of the 
majority of developed states committing to give a certain amount of ODA to developing 
states but failing to do so. Then there will be a Rawlsian analysis of promising which, along 
with showing the plausibility of Rawls’s account, will show that the long history of 
commitments around ODA is similar to familiar cases of promise making, which means we 
can reach similar conclusions about both processes. The chapter will also conclude that the 
promise breaking around ODA cannot be morally justified. 
A History of Broken Commitments around ODA 
 
Seven years after the launch of the MDGs, and after countless promises of increased 
financing from the donor countries, including a promise to double aid to Africa between 2005 
and 2010, the commitments remain unfulfilled. Quite incredibly, debate reverts to first 
principles (Is aid effective?) even after financial promises have been repeatedly made and 
endlessly reconfirmed.
365
 
 
       Jeffrey Sachs, Common Wealth 
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This quote from Sachs only hints at the long history of developed countries making 
commitments around ODA, which they have not met.  We can trace this history back to one 
of the dates that heralded the start of aid in its modern form, 15
 
December 1960 when the UN 
General Assembly adopted, without a vote, resolution 1522. The resolution claimed, 
“development would be greatly aided by improving the nature and increasing the volume of 
the present flow of capital and the scope of technical assistance from the economically 
advanced countries to the under-developed countries.”366 The resolution went on to express, 
“the hope that … [this] flow of international assistance and capital should be increased 
substantially so as to reach as soon as possible approximately 1 per cent of combined national 
incomes of the economically advanced countries [italics original] [.]”367 The resolution also 
said, “[T]he flow of capital and technical assistance to developing countries could be through 
public or private channels”.368 The resolution does not make it clear exactly which countries 
are “economically advanced” and which are “under-developed” or “developing countries”. 
Nevertheless, the members of the OECD’s DAC would adopt the target in 1964.369 There 
were, however, a number of problems with the target.   
 Among the problems that the WB’s Pearson Commission on International 
Development identified in its influential 1968 report was, “total resource flows [from DAC 
members to developing countries] actually did exceed 1 per cent of combined national 
income in the five years preceding the adoption of the target [in 1964] by the DAC.”370 This 
meant the 1% target did not represent, as the UN resolution suggests it does, a substantial 
increase in the transfer of resources. Despite this, and ironically, in the years from the setting 
of the target to the writing of the report, the DAC as a group did not meet the target.
371
 The 
report also noted, “The 1 per cent aid target is not, strictly speaking, an aid target at all. It 
does not differentiate between commercial transactions and concessional aid [italics 
original].”372 In response the writers of the report recommended, “that each aid-giver 
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increase commitments of official development assistance [concessional aid] to the level for 
net disbursements to reach 0.70 per cent of its gross national product by 1975 or shortly 
thereafter, but in no case later than 1980 [italics original].”373 
In 1970, the UN’s General Assembly responded to the call, passing a resolution, 
which declared: 
Each economically advanced country will progressively increase its official development 
assistance to the developing countries and exert its best efforts to reach a minimum net 
amount of 0.7 % of its gross national product at market prices by the middle of the Decade.
374
 
 
When the Assembly adopted the resolution, all the members of the DAC gave less 
than 0.7% of GNP in ODA, with the total average being 0.33%.
375
 However, in the 1970s, 
while the total average remained roughly the same, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and 
Sweden reached the 0.7% goal.
376
    
The failure of most developed states to reach the goal helps to explain why in 1980 
the General Assembly passed a resolution very similar to the 1970 resolution. The 1980 
resolution declared:  
A rapid and substantial increase will be made in official development assistance by all 
developed countries, with a view to reaching and, where possible, surpassing the agreed 
international target of 0.7 per cent of the gross national product of developed countries. To 
this end, developed countries which have not yet reached the target should exert their best 
efforts to reach it by 1985, and in any case not later than in the second half of the Decade.
377
  
 
However, during the 1980s the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Sweden remained 
the only countries that reached the 0.7% goal, while the DAC total average stayed in the 0.3% 
range.
378
  
Another development in the 1980s was the adoption of UN resolution 38/195 on 20 
December 1983, which included the goal of developed countries giving 0.15% of GNP in 
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ODA to the LDCs, “by 1985 or as soon as possible thereafter”.379 This did not represent 
developed countries pledging to give more than 0.7% of GNP to developing countries, but 
rather represented a pledge on the targeting of this 0.7%.
380
 By 1990, Denmark, Finland, 
France, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden were the only countries that reached this 
targeting goal.
381
  
Therefore, during 1990 at the Second UN Conference on the Least Developed 
Countries, developed countries pledged to “seek to implement”382 a number of goals around 
the percentage of GNP given to LDCs in the form of ODA. Countries that had reached the 
0.15% goal but were not giving 0.2% (which during 1990 only included France) pledged to, 
““undertake to reach”383 this latter goal, while those who were already giving 0.2% (which 
during 1990 was Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden) pledged to, 
“continue to do so and increase their efforts”.384 Those who had not reached the previously 
agreed to 0.15% goal, reaffirmed, “their commitment and undertake either to achieve the 
target within the next five years or to make their best efforts to accelerate their endeavours to 
reach the target”.385 The year 1990 also saw a continued focus on the 0.7% goal with UN 
General Assembly 45/199 declaring, “Donor countries should, in the 1990s, implement such 
undertakings as they have made to reach or surpass this [0.7%] target.”386 However, the 
1990s turned out to be similar to the 1970s and the 1980s with the Netherlands, Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden once again the only countries to reach the 0.7% goal, and the DAC total 
average dropping into the 0.2% range.
387
 The news was slightly better when it came to the 
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0.15% goal, with the number of countries reaching this goal rising from six in 1990 to seven 
in 1999.
388
 
This overall failure was one factor that led to the 2002 UN International Conference 
on Financing for Development, where the heads of government and state who attended stated: 
[W]e urge developed countries that have not done so to make concrete efforts towards the 
target of 0.7 per cent of gross national product (GNP) as ODA to developing countries [and to 
give] 0.15 to 0.20 per cent of GNP … to [the] least developed countries.389  
 
Perhaps understandably given past behaviour, the heads of government and state did not 
mention any dates. 
Over the next ten years, developed states would give about the same amount of ODA 
in percentage of GNP terms. The year 2013 was a typical year from this period with 
preliminary data showing the DAC total average was 0.3%. We can contrast this with the 
high point, which occurred in 1961, when DAC total average was 0.54%; and the low point 
of 0.21% in 2001.
390
 If we return to what individual countries gave, we find preliminary data 
show that in 2013 Luxembourg and the United Kingdom have joined the familiar four of the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden in meeting the 0.7% target.
391
 There was 
greater growth in the number of countries meeting the 0.15 percent goal, with this number 
rising from seven in 1999 to 10 in 2011, while the DAC total average in 2012 was 0.09.
392
 
Still, with the DAC currently having 28 country members, the current picture is of most DAC 
members not meeting either the 0.7% target or the 0.15% target individually or as a group.  
Having had a detailed look at this long history of broken commitments, we can move 
on to the philosophical question of whether this long history amounts to a history of broken 
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promises, and if it does, whether this promise breaking can be justified. In doing so, this 
section will also show promises can fit into a consequentialist framework. 
Is this a History of Broken Promises? 
 
Support for viewing the commitments around ODA as promises comes from Scanlon. 
He argues that for promising it is the setting up of expectations that is the important factor, 
rather than using the word “promise”. He notes that by making promises we generally set up 
expectations in others that we will do what we promised we would do. Scanlon then argues it 
is not meeting those expectations, which explains the wrongness of promise breaking.
393
 
Based on this, one might argue that via their commitments, aid donors created the expectation 
amongst recipients of ODA that donors would give 0.7% of GNP in ODA, and in not meeting 
these expectations, donors acted wrongly, just as wrongly as if they had said, “We promise to 
give 0.7% of GNP in ODA” and had not done so. 
However, an earlier account of promising by H. A. Prichard, which in ToJ Rawls says 
he largely follows
394
, suggests something other than setting up expectations is involved when 
we make promises.
395
 In making this argument, Prichard notes, “where I do what is called 
making a promise, I do not think that my obligation to do the action promised arises from my 
producing the expectation.”396 This is true. If I promise person A that I will do X, but 
unbeknownst to me person A is accustomed to people letting her down and so does not 
expect me to do X, it is not right to say this means I have no obligation to do X. The same 
would be true when it came to ODA commitments. Just because countries that receive ODA 
do not expect ODA donor countries to keep to their commitment of giving 0.7% of GNP as 
ODA, perhaps because in the past they have not done so, we would not say that ODA donors 
do not have any obligation to keep their commitments.
397
 However, if setting up expectations 
is not necessary in order to make promises, what is?    
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Prichard insists, “One thing is obvious. Promising requires the actual use of the word 
‘promise’”.398 This would count against the idea that the various UN resolutions cited amount 
to promises, since none of them include the word “promise”. However, Prichard goes on to 
say that if equivalent words such as, “‘undertake’, ‘agree’, ‘give you my word’, or ‘will’ in ‘I 
will [italics original]’”399 are used, then this amounts to promise making. In the previous 
quote from a 1970 UN resolution there was the statement, “Each economically advanced 
country will progressively increase its official development assistance countries to the 
developing countries and exert its best efforts to reach a minimum net amount of 0.7 % of its 
gross national product at market prices by the middle of the Decade” [italics added].400 Here 
the word “will” appears to be working in the same manner as it does in “I will”. Despite this, 
most of the economically advanced countries did not reach the 0.7% goal, so if we accept 
Prichard’s argument it would appear there is a basis for viewing this as promise breaking. 
A defender of developed countries could concede this point, but then argue that 
developed countries only promised they would progressively increase their ODA; and when it 
came to the 0.7% goal, rather than promising to meet the goal, they promised to exert their 
best efforts to meet the goal. The defender would then point out that in monetary terms ODA 
has progressively increased
401
, and then claim that developed countries had also made their 
best efforts to reach the 0.7% goal but, as often happens even when we make our best efforts, 
had failed.  
There are a number of problems with this defence. Since the comment about 
progressively increasing ODA came within the context of a discussion of the amount of ODA 
given in percentage of GNP terms, the most reasonable interpretation of this comment is to 
interpret it in these terms. It is also hard to argue that all developed countries have exerted 
their best efforts to reach the 0.7% goal. One reason for thinking this is that some developed 
countries have reached this goal.  It is true that most of these countries are among the 
wealthiest developed countries in GNP per capita terms, which might suggest it is unfair to 
compare them to other developed countries.
402
 However, there are developed countries like 
Australia, Canada, and the United States, who are as wealthy as some of these countries are 
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in GNP per capita terms, yet have not reached the goal.
403
 There has also been significant 
economic growth in developed countries over the decades, which means most developed 
countries are wealthier than Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden were in the 
1970s, when they had already met the 0.7% goal.
404
 This suggests that other developed 
countries could reach the goal if they made their best efforts, and this, along with the analysis 
of promising that we have considered, suggests that in not doing so they have broken 
promises. 
A defender of developed nations might concede this but argue that developed nations 
were right to break these promises because this was the only way to avoid some truly 
dreadful consequences. It is hard to argue with the common sense idea that we should break 
promises if this is the only way to avoid dreadful consequences, but in reply, we can question 
how often developed countries avoided dreadful consequences by breaking promises around 
ODA. The critic of ODA may agree, but change their approach and argue for breaking 
promises around ODA on the basis that each instance of promise breaking led to slightly or 
moderately better consequences.  
The defence is, of course, a utilitarian one, but, even if we concede that breaking 
promises around ODA might lead to slightly, or moderately better consequences in the short-
term, we can argue the defence still fails on utilitarian grounds. This is because breaking 
promises around ODA might mean others will not trust one when one on other occasions 
makes promises in other international agreements, like trade agreements, which would have 
led to better overall consequences in the long-term.
405
  
However, is that the right way to view promise making around ODA? It leads to the 
view that we could analyse developed countries saying, “We promise to give 0.7% of ODA 
in GNP”, as meaning, “We have assessed that giving a certain amount of ODA will bring 
about the best consequences, and therefore will give a certain amount of ODA.” Some might 
insist something else is going on when we make promises. If the utilitarian agrees, she still 
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can defend herself by coming up with a more sophisticated utilitarian analysis of promising. 
This is what a young Rawls did in his paper ‘Two Concepts of Rules”. In doing so, he 
describes a sophisticated form of rule utilitarianism.  
The two concepts of rules Rawls identifies equate to two different types of rule 
utilitarianism. The first concept, the summary concept type, leads to a form of rule 
utilitarianism where, in order to decide what to do in situations of type A, one looks back to 
past instances of situation A to see what type of action in this type of situation tended to bring 
about the best consequences. If action B tended to lead to the best consequences, then one 
adopts the rule “In situation A, do action B.” An example of a summary rule is “When asked 
by a beggar for money, always give them money.”406 There is the possibility that action B 
will not always lead to the best consequences in situation A, but the rule consequentialist 
argues it will be too difficult to ascertain when this is the case, so we should adopt the rule. 
This means these rules are not ethically fundamental but rather heuristic accommodations for 
our limited rationality.  
Could the summary view give a good account of promises? This view suggests we 
come up with the rule “Keep promises” because we have observed that in the past keeping 
promises has led to the best consequences. The critic of utilitarianism is unlikely to find this a 
good analysis because to the critic there seems to be something inherently wrong with 
promise breaking which this analysis does not capture. The early Rawls agrees in a certain 
sense. He argues the summary concept view of promises is fundamentally misguided and that 
we can see this when we appreciate promises are what he calls practice rules. 
While the actions endorsed by summary rules would occur in the absence of the rules, 
beggars would still ask for money and sometimes receive it even if no one adopted the rule of 
always giving them money; the same is not true of practice rules.  Rawls gives the example of 
the rules of games, and points out that many of the actions that take place in games would not 
occur in the absence of the rules that make up the game. Rawls argues something similar is 
true of promises. In this regard, he writes:  
It is absurd to say … that the rule that promises should be kept could have arisen from its 
being found in past cases to be best on the whole to keep one's promise; for unless there were 
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already the understanding that one keeps one's promises as part of the practice itself there 
couldn't have been any cases of promising.
407
  
 
Rawls argues the practice of promise making arose from the need to overcome 
assurance problems. He writes, “the point of the practice [of promising] is to abdicate one's 
title to act in accordance with utilitarian and prudential considerations in order that the future 
may be tied down and plans coordinated in advance.”408 Rawls’s point is that parties may not 
engage in coordinated activity if at any point in the activity one of the parties engaged may 
pull out because they judge pulling out is justified either on utilitarian or prudential grounds. 
Rawls then goes on to note that having the ability to engage in co-ordinated activity will lead 
to better consequences. This means there is a utilitarian justification for not allowing 
individuals engaged in a coordinated activity to appeal to utilitarian reasons for pulling out of 
the activity. Rawls emphasises: 
There is nothing contradictory, or surprising, in this: utilitarian (or aesthetic) reasons might 
properly be given in arguing that the game of chess, or baseball, is satisfactory just as it is, or 
in arguing that it should be changed in various respects, but a player in a game cannot 
properly appeal to such considerations as reasons for his [or her] making one move rather 
than another.
409
 
 
The player can also not break the practice rules of the game on the basis that doing so is 
justified on utilitarian grounds. 
In ToJ, Rawls makes no use of the distinction between summary and practice rules, 
makes no reference to ‘Two Concepts of Rules’, and places his account of promising in his 
wider theory of justice.
410
 However, there are a number of similarities between the two 
accounts. We can see some of these similarities in this quote from ToJ: 
[I believe] promising is an action defined by a public system of rules. These rules are, as in 
the case of institutions generally, a set of constitutive conventions. Just as the rules of games 
do, they specify certain activities and define certain actions. In the case of promising, the 
basic rule is that governing the use of the words “I promise to do X.” It reads roughly as 
follows: if one says the words “I promise to do X” in the appropriate circumstances, one is to 
do X, unless certain excusing conditions obtain. This rule we may think of as the rule of 
promising; it may be taken as representing the practice as a whole.
411
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We can see Rawls placing this account of promising in his wider theory of justice when he 
goes on to write:  
In general, the circumstances giving rise to a promise and the excusing conditions must be 
defined so as to preserve the equal liberty of the parties and to make the practice a rational 
means whereby men [and women] can enter into and stabilize cooperative agreements for 
mutual advantage.
412
  
 
When Rawls writes, “excusing conditions must be defined so as to preserve the equal liberty 
of the parties”, he has in mind the circumstances under which someone makes a promise. He 
argues that if one party infringes the liberty of another party in the process of promise 
making, e.g. forces another to make a promise; then there is no moral obligation to keep the 
promise.
413
 
If we take certain elements of the view of promising which Rawls explicates in ToJ 
and ‘Two Concepts of Rules’, and apply it to commitments around ODA, we can start by 
noting that no one forced developed countries to commit to giving 0.7% of GNP in ODA. We 
can also suggest that while one can question the practice of making commitments around 
ODA on utilitarian grounds, individual commitments around ODA should not be. Then we 
can argue that the practice of ODA can be justified on utilitarian grounds.  
However, a critic of ODA that accepts this Rawlsian analysis of promising, and 
accepts that the practice of ODA can be justified on utilitarian grounds, still has an option 
open to them. The critic can argue that the practice of making commitments around ODA is 
not, as Rawls in ToJ argues promises should be, “a means whereby men [and women] can 
enter into and stabilize cooperative agreements for mutual advantage.” This is because, the 
critic would argue, although the commitments may be beneficial to developing countries, and 
may therefore lead to the best overall consequences, they are simply a cost to developed 
countries, so cannot be considered as being advantageous to these countries. In response, we 
can say that by keeping their promises with regard to ODA, developed countries, by 
increasing trust in the international community, strengthen other commitments made in 
international relations, like trade agreements, that are to the benefit of developed countries. 
We can also suggest that if ODA assists developing countries with their economic 
development, it will likely mean increased trade links between countries, and this will benefit 
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developed countries. If none of these defences work, we can fall back on the priority Rawls 
gives to benefitting the least advantaged, and argue ODA does this. 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we looked at the history of broken commitments made by developed 
countries around ODA. Then by looking at accounts of promising, including an account by 
the early Rawls that had some similarities to the account he gave in ToJ, we found 
commitments around ODA could be analysed as broken promises. Furthermore, we found 
that promises could fit into a consequentialist framework. 
The next chapter sees a shift from this part of the thesis that looked at questions 
around the general issue of realizing principles of global justice, to the third part of the thesis 
that looks at a particular country’s record, New Zealand, when it comes to certain principles 
of global justice. This part of the thesis also considers how New Zealand could perform in 
this regard in the future. 
 This third part of the thesis starts with the tenth chapter that considers how New 
Zealand’s history of colonialism has and has not respected the freedom and independence of 
peoples’ principle. On its own, this topic deserves investigation in a thesis on Rawlsian global 
justice that uses New Zealand as a case study. However, it will also lead into the eleventh 
chapter, whose subject is New Zealand’s ODA programme, because New Zealand’s history 
of colonialism has had a profound effect on the programme, with the programme being a relic 
of this history. 
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Chapter 10: New Zealand’s History of Colonialism and 
the Freedom and Independence of Peoples’ Principle 
Introduction 
 
In this thesis, there has been a focus on the global difference principle, as well as 
other similar principles, like the duty of assistance, and how these principles apply to all 
countries. This chapter will see a shift to Rawls’s first principle of international justice, which 
states, “Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be 
respected by other peoples”, and how it applies to a particular developed country, New 
Zealand. I will call the principle “the freedom and independence of peoples’ principle”, and 
have a brief introduction to this principle in the first section of this chapter.  
Discussing this principle from a cosmopolitan perspective might seem wrongheaded 
because the principle refers to peoples rather than persons, but we shall see in this chapter 
that this is not the case. This is in part because Rawls justifies the principle by claiming the 
freedom and independence of peoples is good for persons. We shall also see this 
cosmopolitan justification in international law for the similar principle of self-determination. 
However, as Allan Buchanan emphasises, Rawls’s principle is narrow and therefore not able 
to deal with new types of political change,
414
 which, as we will see later in the chapter, 
include the emergence of small polities some of which achieve statehood. 
Another reason for discussing the freedom and independence of peoples’ principle in 
this thesis is that New Zealand dishonoured it by colonising the Pacific nations of the Cook 
Islands, Niue, Samoa, and Tokelau. The second section of this chapter will investigate the 
history of each case of colonisation in detail, in order to see exactly how this occurred.  
Making a judgment about the extent of New Zealand’s disrespect for the freedom and 
independence of peoples’ principle is difficult because we do not always best respect the 
principle, as Rawls suggests, by having polities reach full statehood. If Rawls were correct, 
currently the freedom and independence of the people of Samoa would be more respected 
than that of the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau, because Samoa has full statehood while the 
Cook Islands and Niue are self-governing territories in free association with New Zealand, 
and Tokelau is a Non-Self-Governing Territory (NSGT) of New Zealand. The chapter will 
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explain the meaning of the terms “free association” and “Non-Self-Governing Territory” and 
show that the freedom and independence of peoples is compatible with these statuses.  
The chapter will also look at what factors may have led some of these peoples to be 
open to entering into a constitutional relationship with New Zealand. Judging this openness 
will also require an investigation into the social structure of these nations, which will indicate 
how much the general population was involved in the colonisation process. This investigation 
will also provide evidence as to how we should classify these nations in a Rawlsian scheme, 
but I will directly address a classification issue raised by this review in the final section of 
this chapter. 
This issue is how small polities, like Niue and Tokelau, which Rawls did not consider 
in any detail in LoP, could fit into a Rawlsian framework which includes the freedom and 
independence of peoples’ principle. This investigation will require a deeper analysis of the 
Rawlsian concept of peoples, and will conclude that Niue and Tokelau are a type of people 
not envisioned by Rawls, namely semi-autonomous peoples with a right of access to liberal 
or decent institutions. 
This chapter will naturally lead into the next chapter (a discussion of New Zealand’s 
ODA programme) because New Zealand’s constitutional and historical relationship with its 
former colonies heralded the start of its ODA programme and led to New Zealand having 
bilateral ODA programmes with all of these countries.  
The Freedom and Independence of Peoples’ Principle 
 
We can start this brief introduction to the principle by noting that as is the case with 
all his international principles, Rawls would say one of the main justifications for this 
principle is that the representatives in the international original positions would select it. In 
this particular selection process, the representatives see that the principle is similar to one of 
the norms of international relations, the self-determination norm, and decide there is not 
sufficient reason to depart from this norm. 
One reason Rawls could give for his representatives taking this stance is the norm’s 
entrenchment in international relations and therefore would be difficult to remove. For 
example, UN General Assembly resolution 1514, the ‘Declaration on the granting of 
independence to former colonial countries and peoples’, which includes the declaration, “All 
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peoples have the right to self-determination”415, was voted on in 1960 and had 89 votes in 
favour, no votes against, and nine abstentions.
416
  
More utopian thinkers will find this reason for not departing from the norm 
unsatisfactory. They will want an explanation of why the freedom and independence 
principle is a good principle, which goes beyond noting how well established the principle is, 
and how difficult it would be to remove. The fourth chapter hinted at such an explanation 
when it noted this principle was partly about the need to tolerate different types of peoples. In 
what appears to be in part a response to the question of why we should respect different types 
of peoples with their variety of cultures, Rawls writes it is, “surely a good for individuals and 
associations to be attached to their particular culture and to take part in its common public 
and civic life.”417 Rawls goes on to claim, “This is no small thing. It argues for significant 
room for the idea of a people’s self-determination.”418  
However, Buchanan argues that Rawls leaves little room for self-determination, 
writing the freedom and independence of peoples principle, “appears to address only one 
particular instance of self-determination—cases where a Rawlsian ‘‘people’’ has been 
unjustly incorporated into another state and seeks to recover its independence.”419 While I 
agree with Buchanan that Rawls’s narrow scheme does not have room for groups, like small 
polities, that should have, “rights of limited self-government within the state”420, I do not see 
why he claims Rawls thinks the right to self-determination only covers the case of a people 
trying to recover their independence. When discussing these issues, Rawls writes: 
The right to independence, and equally the right to self-determination, hold only within 
certain limits, yet to be specified by the Law of Peoples for the general case. Thus, no people 
has the right to self-determination, or a right to secession, at the expense of subjugating 
another people.
421
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To illustrate his meaning Rawls gives the example of the antebellum South, and writes that in 
regards to its right of secession, “it had no such right, since it seceded to perpetuate its 
domestic institution of slavery. This was as severe a violation of human rights as any, and it 
extended to nearly half the population.”422 Presumably, if the individuals that made up the 
antebellum South looked to secede so they could attach themselves to their particular culture 
and take part in its common public and civic life in a way that the North denied them, and this 
culture did not violate principles of justice, then these individuals would have had a right to 
secession. This would be Rawls’s position even though the antebellum South was not a 
previously independent state that the North had unjustly incorporated.    
This discussion of self-determination highlights that when Rawls justifies the freedom 
and independence of peoples’ principle by saying it is good for individuals to attach 
themselves to a particular culture, he has in mind a particular type of culture. This culture 
comes with a particular set of institutions, namely a state, that help to define the culture’s 
common public and civic life, and rules out other cultures that would require a different set of 
institutions.  
Those opposed to Rawls’s freedom and independence of peoples’ principle could 
question whether it is good for individuals to attach themselves to their particular culture in 
such a way that requires a particular type of state, and will sometimes require secession from 
an already existing state. They, if they were a liberal, could argue that as long as a state is 
liberal, then it is good for individuals to have an attachment to this state, and that this makes 
secession unnecessary. A Rawlsian response is to say that we determine what is good for 
individuals by seeing what their rational desires are. This means that in this case we look to 
see if individuals desire to have an attachment to their culture in a fashion requiring a 
separate state, and if they do, if this desire fits into a rational long-term plan of life that does 
not violate principles of justice. If these conditions hold, then the satisfaction of this desire is 
good for those individuals.  
If we look at the process of decolonisation and independence movements around the 
world, we do find instances where these conditions held for a majority of individuals who 
made up these nations, which means from a Rawlsian viewpoint it is good for these 
individuals in these instances to have an attachment to their culture in this fashion. However, 
when we look at the polities colonised by New Zealand, we find that the desire for self-
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determination via full statehood was not always present among a majority of individuals who 
made up these nations. This does not mean, however, that in these instances the freedom and 
independence of peoples was not good for these individuals, rather in these instances the 
individuals involved chose a different type of freedom and independence for their people. 
To see how this occurred in detail, in the next section we will have an investigation of 
New Zealand’s history of colonialism. This investigation will also show how New Zealand 
did not respect the freedom and independence of peoples principle, and how New Zealand’s 
history of colonialism can be criticised on other fronts, some of them Rawlsian. 
 However, before this investigation, I will consider the objection that using the Law of 
Peoples to judge New Zealand’s history of colonialism is inappropriate because Rawls only 
meant the Law of Peoples to guide the current policies of liberal peoples.
423
 In supporting this 
thought, one could point out that Rawls writes that the second original position, “is a model 
of representation, since it models what we would regard—you and I, here and now—as fair 
conditions under which the parties, this time the rational representatives of liberal peoples, 
are to specify the Law of Peoples, guided by appropriate reasons.”424 One could also note that 
Rawls adds in a footnote, “In this case "you and I" are citizens of some liberal democratic 
society, but not of the same one.”425  
However, Rawls in LoP spends a good deal of time looking back at past wars and 
making judgements about them. In this context, he writes: 
No matter what the initial circumstances of war (for instance, the assassination of the heir to 
the Austro-Hungarian throne, Archduke Ferdinand, by a Serbian nationalist in Sarajevo in 
June 1914; or the ethnic hatreds in the Balkans and elsewhere today), it is the leaders, and not 
the common civilians, of nations who finally initiate the war. In view of these principles, both 
the fire-bombing of Tokyo and other Japanese cities in the spring of 1945 and the atomic 
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, all primarily attacks on civilian populations, were very 
grave wrongs as they are now widely, though not generally, seen to have been.
426
 
 
Admittedly, Rawls focuses on World War II, due to its impact and perhaps because he served 
in it, but as this quote hints at, his judgments go further back in time. Indeed, Rawls writes of 
the, “The outlaw states of modern Europe in the early modern period—Spain, France, and the 
Hapsburgs—or, more recently, Germany, all tried at one time to subject much of Europe to 
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their will.”427  Still, it might be objected that while it is appropriate to talk of outlaw states in 
the distant past, it is not appropriate to talk of liberal and decent peoples and their freedom 
and independence in such a way because such peoples are a recent development. However, in 
the case of New Zealand’s colonialism, I do not think this criticism works. By the time New 
Zealand started its colonial project, it was already approximating the liberal people ideal in 
having universal suffrage. In the case of the countries New Zealand was colonising, as I will 
argue later in this chapter, due to their moral nature and common sympathies, I think there is 
justification in describing them as peoples in a Rawlsian sense, with the right to freedom and 
independence, even if it is inappropriate to define them as liberal or decent peoples. 
Having dealt with the objection that it is inappropriate to use the freedom and 
independence of peoples’ principle to judge New Zealand’s history of colonialism, we can 
now turn to this history. 
New Zealand’s History of Colonialism 
 
From as early as the 1840s, leaders of New Zealand’s government had visions of it 
being a colonial power, even though they envisioned New Zealand only governing colonies 
in the Pacific on behalf of Great Britain.
428
 Indeed, New Zealand at this stage still referred to 
itself as a British colony.
429
  
The islands that topped New Zealand’s list of projected colonial projects were the 
large island groups of Fiji and Samoa.
430
 However, Great Britain’s officials in the Colonial 
Office repeatedly dismissed the idea, probably because they were interested in Great Britain 
having a more direct role in the governing of these islands. This appears to be confirmed by 
the fact that by 1889 Great Britain was ruling over Fiji; and as part of a tridominium, the 
other two parts being Germany and the United States, was administrating Samoa.  In 1899, 
Great Britain went further in alienating New Zealand and committed what New Zealand’s 
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Premier Richard Seddon described as a “great betrayal”,431 which was their decision to sign, 
along with Germany and the United States, the Tripartite Convention. The convention, which 
did not show much respect for the freedom and independence of the Samoan people, was an 
agreement to allow Germany to annex most of Samoa, with America annexing a smaller part, 
and Great Britain renouncing any rights to Samoa.
432
 The convention occurred because the 
tridominium had broken down with the outbreak of a civil war in Samoa, which saw 
Germany backing one side and the Americans and British backing another. With neither side 
quickly gaining an upper hand, the colonial powers decided to promote peace, hoping the 
convention would help to end hostilities and prevent their recurrence, which it did.
433
 The 
Germans, unsurprisingly, named the area they annexed German Samoa (or, to be more 
accurate, Deutsch-Samoa). The Americans gave the smaller part of Samoa they ruled over the 
equally unsurprising name it has to this day, American Samoa.  
While the convention enraged Seddon, it would open the path for New Zealand’s 
annexation of Niue by voiding another convention. In this previous convention, the Anglo-
German Convention signed in 1886, Great Britain and Germany, in disregard for the freedom 
and independence of any peoples in the area, had agreed on their spheres of influence in the 
Western Pacific. Included in this convention was the clause that Niue would remain neutral.  
In order to see how Niueans were involved in, and what they thought of, this change 
in their sovereignty, we can start by noting that despite generally having an egalitarian social 
structure
434
 Niue in the late 1800s had a single man recognised as their leader, Fata-a-iki. He 
held the recently recreated position of patu-iki. In 1889, perhaps unaware of the Anglo-
German Convention, and clearly under the influence of British missionaries, Fata-a-iki wrote 
to Queen Victoria in order to request, “Your Majesty and Your Majesty’s Kingdom if it be 
your pleasure to stretch out towards us your mighty hand that Niue may hide herself in it and 
be safe.” He did this because he was, “afraid lest some other powerful nation should come 
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and trouble us, and take possession of our island, in the way that some islands in this quarter 
of the world had been taken by great nations.”435 Whether Fata-a-iki’s opinion reflected the 
general opinion of Niueans is not clear, so let us take a closer look at the position of the patu-
iki to see if this was likely to occur.  
 Despite the British labelling the position a kingship, the patu-iki was not a hereditary 
monarch; instead, a chiefly council (fono) elected the patu-iki. Still, this does not amount to 
democratic decision making, and this thesis has already questioned whether we can describe 
decisions made in non-democratic societies as reflecting the will of the people. However, the 
request to place Niue under British sovereignty may have coincided with what most Niueans 
were in favour of because they had a fear of a practice known as blackbirding.
436
  
This practice involved foreigners visiting Pacific Islands by ship looking for 
labourers. Their tactics varied from lying about the nature, place and term of employment in 
order to get individuals “voluntarily” on board, to simply forcing people on to the ships. The 
Niuean’s fear of the practice was understandable. During the height of the blackbirding 
period, 1862 to 1863, four blackbirding ships from Peru visited Niue (during this time 
blackbirding was a largely Peruvian practice).
437
 In one instance, the Peruvians forcefully 
took Niueans on to their ship. Some of the Niueans succeeded in escaping, but only after the 
Peruvians fired upon them, with some escapees receiving gunshot wounds.
438
  Similar events 
occurred on other Pacific Islands, including the Cook Islands and Tokelau.
439
 Peruvian 
blackbirding did not last long, with the Peruvian government banning the practice due to in 
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part to French and British diplomatic complaints over Peruvians tricking or forcefully taking 
Polynesians from French and British protected islands. However, Queenslanders continued 
the practice, albeit in a less brutal form, into the early part of the 20
th
 century.
440
  
Given Britain’s role in ending Peruvian blackbirding, and the rosy picture of Britain 
painted by British missionaries, many Niueans may have thought being under British 
sovereignty would protect them from the practice. Given the impact the practice had on the 
Cook Islands and Tokelau, this may also explain these nations’ being to a certain extent open 
to the idea. 
Niueans, however, had to wait until 1900 after the Tripartite Convention had been 
signed, by which time Fata-a-iki had died and been succeeded by Togia
441
, to become a 
British protectorate.
442
 This was only to be a temporary measure with the British quickly 
passing sovereignty to New Zealand. While the Governor of New Zealand was asked by the 
Colonial Office to discover what the people of Niue thought of New Zealand having 
sovereignty over them
443
, researchers Ofa Tafatu and Ianeta Joylyn Tukuitoga claim that 
Niueans were not consulted about the shift in sovereignty and also not informed of it when it 
happened.
444
  
During the time Niue was in the process of becoming a New Zealand colony, the 
Cook Islands was also undergoing this process, but it took longer for this process to come to 
fruition. New Zealand had been prodding Britain to rule the Cook Islands, which the British 
were reluctant to do in part because they did not want to anger the French who ruled the 
Society Islands to the East. It was a petition from Makea Takau, a female ariki (high chief) of 
Rarotonga (the largest and most populous of the Cook Islands) to the British Foreign Office 
in 1888 that appears to have swayed British opinion. In the petition, she expressed concern 
over the possibility of a French invasion.
445
 Apparently taking these concerns seriously, and 
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having become less concerned about offending the French, the British decided to extend 
protectorate status to the Cook Islands. 
Despite do this, the British government did not view the Cook Islands as particularly 
important.
446
 This view opened the way for New Zealand annexing the islands. However, this 
shift in sovereignty had to await a 1900 visit by Seddon. On this visit, he rejected a petition 
requesting annexation signed by 39 residents who were mainly not indigenous Cook Islanders 
(27 were European and five were Chinese). Historian Dick Scott suggests that this may have 
been unfair considering those coming up with the petition were responding to a speech 
Seddon had given where he suggested, “New Zealand was prepared to extend its boundaries 
‘so as to include the Cook Islands.’” 447 After rejecting the petition, Seddon then proceeded 
on the path of annexation by making proposals designed to appeal to the indigenous arikis. 
According to Seddon, a relationship with New Zealand would bring better harbours, health 
and education services, as well as limiting the sale of liquor and the arrival of “Orientals”.448 
Seddon then left the islands, and left it to the British Resident, W. E. Gudgeon, a New 
Zealander who was aiding Seddon in his goal to annex the islands, to finalise the annexation 
process. In doing so, Gudgeon called a meeting of Rarotongan arikis and put forward a 
petition he designed to appeal to them.
449
 The petition included the clause that the Cook 
Islands group was to be “annexed to Great Britain and federated with New Zealand.”450 This 
hid the ultimate goal of New Zealand annexing the islands. 
Gudgeon claimed that the arikis of Rarotonga, Atiu, Mauke and Mitiaro (islands from 
the Southern group of the Cook Islands) signed the petition. He also claimed, “the Mataiapos 
[chiefs] and Rangatiras [low chiefs] have endorsed the action of the arikis, and, therefore, the 
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inhabitants of this island may be said to be absolutely unanimous in their desire for 
annexation.”451 Scott, however, says that there:  
[W]as no evidence to show that a single mataiapo or rangatira had endorsed the petition (or 
been consulted), Makea’s husband, Ngamaru, was the sole signatory for [the southern islands] 
Atiu, Mauke and Mitiaro, and Mangaia [another southern island] had not been asked to sign at 
all.
452
 
 
When it came to those below the rangatira in the Cook Islands’ power structure, 
Gudgeon made the condescending and contradictory claim:  
The inferior peoples have not, of course, been asked their opinion on this question; but I am in 
the position to say that they are more in favour of annexation than any other class, since they 
hope to benefit by the change.
453
 
 
Here Gudgeon is suggesting the unlikely scenario that “The inferior peoples”, despite not 
being consulted, were aware of changes he intended to make, that the ariki were unaware of, 
namely to reduce the power of the arikis. Even if these “inferior peoples”, who were the 
majority of the population, were in favour of the British passing sovereignty to New Zealand, 
as we will see shortly, Gudgeon would give them reason for regretting it. 
Initially, New Zealand treated the Cook Islands and Niue as one entity, with the 
proclamation declaring them part of the Colony of New Zealand not even mentioning Niue. 
When a number of Niueans made it clear they did not view themselves as a Cook Island 
people, New Zealand agreed to administer Niue separately.
454
  
New Zealand’s administrator in Niue, the Resident Commissioner, would work with 
the patu-iki and fono, but he increasingly became the person who had power in the Niuean 
government. Emblematic of this process was the failed push in 1904 by Togia and certain 
councillors for a pay increase. Researchers Leslie Rex and Young Vivian write, “After this 
defeat, the Council seemed to have resigned itself to being what Niueans would call “Tau 
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tagata gaki” (“yes” men).”455 Still, the relationship between the Resident Commissioner and 
the Niuean people was relatively cordial.
456
  
There was some justification in treating the isolated single atoll Niue as a political 
unit with one people. There was less justification for treating the Cook Islands in this fashion 
given they are 15 disparate land masses whose inhabitants did not traditionally view 
themselves as one political unit or single people.
457
  
New Zealand matched, at least initially, its attempts to make the Cooks function as 
one political unit, with an attempt to exert greater control. The now Resident Commissioner 
Gudgeon promoted this increased control as introducing a more egalitarian system. In 1908, 
he wrote of how he expected Cook Islanders to respond: 
The satisfaction felt by the people generally under European rule will not be shared by a few 
arikis and their friends, who for generations have lived on the labour of the people and have 
treated them most cruelly. Such men cannot be expected to appreciate a rule that sternly 
informs an ariki that when before the Court he is only the equal of the meanest of his 
followers.
458
 
 
Gudgeon’s assessment of the level of hierarchy in pre-European contact Cook 
Islands’ society may not be entirely accurate. Gudgeon implies there was a high level of 
hierarchy throughout the Cook Islands, but the Cook Islands are composed of islands and 
atolls. Anthropologist Marshall D. Sahlins argues that due to higher levels of productivity 
Pacific islands, like the Cook Islands’ Mangaia, are associated with high levels of social 
stratification, while due to lower levels of productivity Pacific atolls, like the Cook Islands’ 
Pukapuka, are associated with low levels of social stratification.
459
 
We can also question Gudgeon’s claim that he would introduce a more egalitarian 
system by pointing out his view of the general Cook Islands population as inferior persons 
who were not worthy of being consulted. Indeed, his earlier statement gives credence to 
historian Richard Gilson’s claim that Gudgeon, “wanted to take the place of the paramount 
chiefs (the only islanders whom he thought capable of maintaining local self-government) 
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rather than develop democratic leadership.”460 Gilson gives his claim more support by noting, 
“At the same time” Gudgeon was making claims about introducing a more egalitarian system 
“he said that the people would not respect a Resident Commissioner who did not have and 
use a high degree of power and authority.”461  
Gudgeon received the power he wanted, but in his case, unfortunately, it was a case of 
power corrupting. For example, Scott notes, “Gudgeon’s fondness for dispatching prisoners 
to plantation labour on the island prison of Manuae was not unrelated to his investment in the 
company leasing the plantation.”462 New Zealand would remove Gudgeon as Resident 
Commissioner in 1909. The official reason was Gudgeon’s age; he was 68. Others might 
have thought the real reason was his conflict of interests.
463
 
New Zealand’s colonial possessions would soon extend beyond the small Cook 
Islands and Niue, to include the relatively large Samoa. This was due to the outbreak of 
World War I in 1914, which placed Great Britain and Germany on opposite sides. This led to 
Great Britain requesting New Zealand to perform the, “great and urgent Imperial service” of 
capturing German Samoa.
464
 The New Zealand government’s enthusiasm for taking control 
of Samoa had waned with Seddon’s death in office in 1906.465 Nevertheless, New Zealand 
was not going to refuse a request from its former colonial master during a time of war; so, 
early in the month of August 1914, New Zealand navy troops set sail for German Samoa, and 
three weeks later on 29 August 1914, they landed. Though it might just have been luck that 
prevented German vessels in the South Pacific from intercepting the ships and sinking them, 
when the New Zealand navy arrived in German Samoa they faced no resistance from the 
small number of German sailors on the islands.
466
 The local population also did not actively 
resist.  
Subsequently, the leader of the New Zealand troops Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Logan 
informed an assembly of Samoans at Mulinu’u that government would continue along the 
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same lines established by the Germans.
467
 The influential Samoans at the meeting were 
matai, the heads of households, generally male, who traditionally dominated decision-making 
in Samoa. This was reflective of a wider hierarchical chiefly system, which is the type of 
system Sahlins would say we should expect given Samoa is mainly composed of two 
relatively large islands.
468
  
The occupying New Zealanders raised the British flag outside the Government 
building in the capital, Apia.
469
 This was in keeping with New Zealand’s status of 
administering Samoa on behalf of Great Britain.
470
 While New Zealand did administer the 
islands in a manner similar to the Germans, this wartime administration did have its positive 
aspects, with New Zealand granting Samoans more freedom to perform certain traditional 
cultural practices.
471
  
The end of the war saw Samoa officially renamed Western Samoa.
472
 This period also 
saw New Zealand start to have a more independent foreign policy, with the Department of 
External Affairs created in 1919. The initial role of this department was largely to aid in the 
administration of Samoa.
473
 Prior to this development, New Zealand’s foreign policy was 
largely a joint exercise between New Zealand and Great Britain.  
The creation of the department suggested New Zealand saw its administration of 
Samoa lasting for a long period. Another indication of this came in 1920 when the League of 
Nations, without consulting the indigenous population, granted New Zealand civilian 
administration over Western Samoa.
474
 This made Western Samoa the third of New 
Zealand’s colonial possessions. 
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The fourth and last of these possessions was Tokelau.
475
 Tokelau is small even in 
comparison to the relatively small Cook Islands and Niue,
476
 and like Niue has the low 
productivity and egalitarian social structure often found in atolls.
477
 Tokelau’s small size and 
lack of productivity may help to explain New Zealand’s reluctance to take over 
administration of the atolls. 
Tokelau had become a British protectorate in 1889
478
, but by 1919, the British were 
eager for New Zealand to take over.
479
 New Zealand resisted taking this responsibility until, 
in 1924, when Great Britain agreed to make Apia a port of entry to Tokelau. After this, Great 
Britain and New Zealand sought the consent of the faipule (elected administrator) of each 
atoll to New Zealand administrating Tokelau. All three faipule agreed.
480
 Once it was 
administrating Tokelau, New Zealand requested further control over the atolls, the British 
agreed to the request, and Tokelau became part of the Dominion of New Zealand in 1926.  
Neither New Zealand nor Great Britain appears to have sought the consent of the 
faipule or other Tokelauans on Tokelau becoming part of New Zealand. However, the Apia 
based New Zealand administrator of Tokelau, George S. Richardson, claimed: 
The Natives in each atoll express great pleasure at being brought under New Zealand, because 
that country governs the Maoris [sic], the Rarotongans, and the Samoans, all of whom 
belonged to the same race as themselves, and because they (the Tokelau-Islanders) originally 
came from Samoa, and they had long desired to be united with the Samoan people.
481
 
                                                 
475
 New Zealand did officially administer Nauru along with Great Britain and Australia, but in practice, 
Australia was the administrator. However, New Zealand and Australia both benefitted from the extraction of 
phosphate from Nauru, which appears to be the main reason for their interest in the island nation. Barrie 
Macdonald, In Pursuit of the Sacred Trust: Trusteeship and Independence in Nauru, (Wellington: Victoria 
University, 1988).   
476
 CIA, The World Factbook, ‘Country Comparison: Area’. Tokelau is composed of three atolls, Atafu, 
Nukunonu, and Fakaofo. Prior to colonisation Tokelau included a fourth atoll, Olohega (aka Swains Island), 
which is now administered by American Samoa, but privately owned by an American family, the Jennings. 
Pacific Islands Benthic Habitat Mapping Center, ‘American Samoa: Swains Island’, (last updated 11 July 2011), 
URL: http://www.soest.hawaii.edu/pibhmc/pibhmc_amsamoa_swains.htm, (accessed 9 December 2014). 
477
 Sahlins, Social Stratification in Polynesia, pp. 100-104. 
478
 According to researcher Peter McQuarrie, the motivation of the British in making Tokelau a protectorate was 
the possibility this would be helpful in the laying of a trans-Pacific telegraph cable. The British did not realize 
this possibility. Tokelau, pp. 97-102.  
479
 Ibid, pp. 99, 113. 
480
 Ibid, p. 115. 
481
 Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives, ‘Report of the Administrator of Samoa to the 
Government of New Zealand on the Tokelau (Union) Islands (by Mr Richardson)’, (Wellington: House of 
Representatives, 1926), I-A-04D, p. 12, also available at URL: http://atojs.natlib.govt.nz/cgi-
bin/atojs?a=d&cl=search&d=AJHR1926-I.2.1.2.8&srpos=8&e=-------10--1---bySH---0-
AJHR%5f1926%5fI%5fAZz-C-, (accessed 9 December 2014). The exact origins of the Tokelauan people is not 
clear but genetic analysis does show close linkages between Samoans, Cook Islanders and Tokelauans. S.  S. W. 
Serjeantson, D. P. Ryan, and A. R. Thompson,  ‘The Colonization of the Pacific: The Story According to 
Human Leukocyte Antigens’ in American Journal of Human Genetics, Vol. 34, No. 6, (1982), pp. 904-918, also 
N e w  Z e a l a n d ’ s  H i s t o r y  o f  C o l o n i a l i s m  a n d  T h e  F r e e d o m  
a n d  I n d e p e n d e n c e  o f  P e o p l e s ’  P r i n c i p l e  
  P a g e  | 164 
 
While we cannot be certain if Richardson’s report is accurate, this may not matter 
much because life did not change significantly for Tokelauans with the shift in sovereignty. 
New Zealand in keeping with British practice did not send any administrators to the atolls.
482
  
In 1926 there appeared to be little opposition to New Zealand’s light-handed rule in 
Tokelau, but there was growing discontent in Western Samoa. Many Western Samoans were 
not pleased with how the New Zealand administrator, the former Lieutenant-Colonel, Robert 
Logan, had allowed the entry and spread of the deadly 1918 influenza strain.
483
 There was 
also disquiet over moves by the New Zealand administration to change the system of land 
tenure.
484
 These forces led to the formation of the Mau movement. The movement initially 
included indigenous Samoans and Europeans living in Western Samoa both pushing for more 
freedom and independence for Western Samoa. New Zealand government administrators 
tended to view the Europeans involved in the movement as creating baseless discontent 
amongst indigenous Western Samoans. This view led to the threat, sometimes fulfilled, of 
deportation for European Mau members. This resulted in increasing the indigeneity of the 
movement.  
However, in the late 1920s there were still European members. A march on Saturday 
28 December 1929 to welcome back one of these members, A. G. Smyth, who New Zealand 
authorities had exiled for two years, turned violent when authorities attempted to arrest Mau 
secretary, Mata’utia Karauna, for the non-payment of taxes.485 The result of the violence was 
one police officer beaten to death and 11 Mau marchers shot dead in a day that Western 
Samoans refer to as “Black Saturday”. The authority’s reaction to the incident was to declare 
the Mau organization illegal. This resulted in a band of Mau members taking to the bush. The 
authorities responded by launching a military campaign against them. Commander Blake, 
head of the marines in this campaign, summed up the view of the New Zealand military: 
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It has been said—and it is true within certain limits—that the Samoan is very childlike and 
can be easily led. On the other hand, at the present moment he [or she] is in the position of a 
sulky and insubordinate child who has deliberately disobeyed his [or her] father, as the 
administrator is generally termed, and no peaceful persuasion will induce him [or her] to 
submit. There is no alternative, therefore, but to treat him [or her] roughly.
486
 
 
The military campaign ended when the group of Mau members agreed to disperse. 
 The policy of arrest and deportation of Mau members continued until the election of 
the first Labour government in New Zealand in 1935. This government declared the Mau 
movement a legal organization. Subsequent elections in Western Samoa resulted in sweeping 
victories for the Mau, but true independence was still a distant goal. 
Movement toward this goal came with the end of World War II and the formation of 
the UN. The UN Charter, signed on 26
 
June 1945, declares in its first article the UN’s 
intention, “To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples”.487 Of particular relevance to the 
decolonisation process in Western Samoa, was the chapter on the International Trusteeship 
System. 
The objectives of the trusteeship system were to be, “in accordance with the Purposes 
of the United Nations laid down in Article 1”. Amongst these objectives were: 
[T]heir [non self-governing territories’] progressive development towards self-government or 
independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its 
peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be provided by 
the terms of each trusteeship agreement[.]
488
 
 
In this instance, the United Nations portrays self-government as something short of full 
independence. 
The New Zealand government at the time, still the first Labour government, did not 
waste much time after the introduction of the trusteeship system, submitting a trusteeship 
agreement for Western Samoa on 12 December 1946.
489
 The agreement only took up a few 
pages, and repeated much already contained in the relevant sections of the UN Charter, 
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including a reference to self-government and independence
490
, but, as in the Charter, the 
agreement included the proviso that the movement towards self-government would, “be 
appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples”.491  
According to researcher Malama Meleisea, the submission of this agreement was 
done without consulting Western Samoans, so, “When Samoan leaders found out in 1946 that 
Samoa had been placed under United Nations Trusteeship … they were outraged … [and] 
made demands for self-government”.492 Here Meleisea portrays self-government as full 
independence without the mediation of the UN. While the New Zealand government was 
willing to make moves towards Western Samoa’s full independence, it insisted Western 
Samoa do this under the auspices of the trusteeship system. The New Zealand government’s 
opinion held sway. 
A major move in the direction of full independence was the creation of Western 
Samoa’s constitution, which Western Samoans drafted at two Constitutional Conventions 
held in 1954, and in 1960.
493
 The Constitution agreed to, declared that Western Samoa, 
“should be an Independent State based on Christian principles and Samoan custom and 
tradition”494, but also contained an article defending freedom of religion. The Constitution, 
however, did not make the extent of suffrage clear. The established practice of matai suffrage 
at the time represented voting rights for 5,030 individuals out of an adult population of 
roughly 94,000
495
, and this type of suffrage would be used in elections in the newly 
independent Western Samoa, with universal suffrage not being introduced until 1991.
496
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However, everyone could vote a plebiscite held on 6
 
May 1961 under the supervision 
of the UN Plebiscite Commissioner. The plebiscite asked two questions, “Do you agree with 
the Constitution adopted by the Constitutional Convention on 28 October 1960?” and, “Do 
you agree that on 1 January 1962 Western Samoa should become an independent state on the 
basis of that Constitution?” Most Samoans answered both questions in the affirmative, with 
about 80% of the 37, 897 who voted, voting for independence.
497
 This led to Western 
Samoa’s first Prime Minister, Mata’afa Mulinu’u II, whose father New Zealand police 
wounded on Black Saturday, joining the New Zealand delegation to the UN to request that 
the UN’s Fourth Committee (also known as the Special Political and Decolonization 
Committee) terminate the trusteeship agreement between New Zealand and Western Samoa. 
The committee agreed.
498
 Subsequently: 
At midnight on 31 December [1961] church bells throughout Samoa rang out to mark the 
birth of a nation [.] … Next morning, at Mulinu’u, in the presence of representatives of New 
Zealand (including the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition), of the member 
states of the South Pacific Commission, of Germany and of neighbouring Pacific countries, 
the New Zealand flag was lowered for the last time and the Samoan flag raised to fly, in 
future, alone. The first session of the Legislative Assembly of the Independent State of 
Western Samoa was opened by the Head of State. This was the beginning of a week of 
rejoicing and celebration.
499
 
 
 This, however, would not be the end of the close relationship between Western Samoa 
and New Zealand. In the year Western Samoa gained independence, the two countries signed 
a Friendship Treaty, which includes article IV that states:  
The two Governments shall continue to work together to promote the welfare of the people of 
Western Samoa. In particular the Government of New Zealand will consider sympathetically 
requests from the Government of Western Samoa for technical, administrative and other 
assistance.
500  
 
 Unlike Western Samoa, New Zealand’s other former colonies the Cook Islands, Niue 
and Tokelau have not gained independence via full statehood, but they have increased their 
autonomy.  
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All three became NSGTs in the mid to late 1940s.
501
 I will say more about the NSGT 
status when we discuss Tokelau, which is still an NSGT. In the Cook Islands’ case and 
Niue’s case, they have changed status, and become self-governing territories in free 
association with New Zealand. The UN introduced this status on 15
 
December 1960, when its 
General Assembly passed resolution 1541. This is a status for polities in between full 
independence and integration with an independent state, with the UN considering all three 
types of statuses a form of self-government.
502
 The decision to enter into free association with 
a state was to be the result of, “informed and democratic processes, impartially conducted and 
based on universal adult suffrage”.503 To ensure this would happen, “The United Nations 
could, when it deems it necessary, supervise these processes.”504 The decision of a people for 
their territory to enter into free association with a state would not be a final decision; instead, 
the people retained, “the freedom to modify the status of that territory through the expression 
of their will by democratic means and through constitutional processes.”505 The UN also said 
individuals living in these territories should have, “equal status and rights of citizenship and 
equal guarantees of fundamental rights and freedoms” and, “equal rights and opportunities 
for representation and effective participation at all levels in the executive, legislative and 
judicial organs of government.”506 Besides the Cook Islands and Niue, the only other 
territories in free association are the Marshall Islands, the Federate States of Micronesia, and 
Palau. All three are small Pacific Island territories that are in free association with the United 
States.
507
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 There was no referendum on the free association issue in the Cook Islands, but there 
was a UN supervised election in 1965, where one of the main election issues was the question 
of what the constitutional relationship between New Zealand and the Cook Islands should 
be.
508
 Most of the candidates in the election supported self-government in free association 
with New Zealand. When the elected members voted on a resolution that included the 
clauses, “that the Cook Islands shall be self-governing in free association with New Zealand” 
and, “that it requests New Zealand, in consultation with the Government of the Cook Islands, 
to discharge the responsibilities for external affairs and defence of the Cook Islands”; only 
two elected members voted no.
509
 
Cook Islanders accompanied this shift in constitutional status, eventually, with a shift 
in power from the chiefs and missionaries to elected politicians.
510
 Jon Tikivanotau M. 
Jonassen points out a number of other changes that have taken Cook Islands’ politics in a 
more liberal direction even though there are still strong traditional elements. Parliament still 
has an Are Ariki (House of Hereditary Chiefs), and a Koutu Nui (Group of Sub-chiefs), but 
these groups have little influence on government policy. Cook Islanders often elect 
politicians based on religious and tribal affiliations, but female candidates are meeting with 
more success.
511
 
Jonassen also notes, “The Cook Islands can make its own laws, while New Zealand 
cannot make laws for the country unless authorised by the Cook Islands government.”512 
Moreover, of the free association he writes: 
This unique free association political arrangement gives the Cook Islands full control over its 
own destiny, endowing it with a legal international personality that allows it the capacity for 
full membership in international organisations and for undertaking treaty commitments. 
Indeed, the Cook Islands has become a member of numerous regional and international 
organisations, signing significant multilateral and bilateral treaties.
513
 
 
It is questionable if one can say the Cook Islands, which still receives some financial support 
from New Zealand, is in “full control over its own destiny”; nevertheless, one cannot deny 
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Jonassen’s claim that the Cook Islands’ free association arrangement gives the Cook Islands’ 
people the freedom and independence to join a number of international organizations and 
treaties.  
In Niue’s case of decolonisation, in the 1960s before becoming a free association, 
there was a shift in power, supported by the New Zealand government, from a Resident 
Commissioner appointed by the New Zealand government to politicians elected by 
Niueans.
514
 
One of Niue’s final steps towards free association was the passing of the Niue 
Constitution Act 1974, which gave Niue freedom to make its own laws.
515
 The passing of the 
Act led to a UN supervised referendum on 2 September 1974, which asked, “Do you vote for 
self-government for Niue, in association with New Zealand, on the basis of the Constitution 
and the Niue Constitution Act, 1974?” Close to two thirds of the 1,384 who participated in 
the referendum voted yes.
516
  
The system of government that has developed in Niue, like the one in the Cook 
Islands, has liberal and traditional elements, but perhaps due to its small size and lack of 
resources, certain traditional elements have a larger role. For example, Parliament is partly 
composed of one representative from each village, even though the villages vary greatly in 
terms of population.
517
 However, we should note that Niue’s small size and lack of resources 
have also contributed to a continued strong traditional element of egalitarianism. In addition, 
the Niuean parliament has introduced a new element, having six members elected to 
Parliament, hoping this will ensure decisions made by Parliament have a greater tendency to 
reflect the will of the majority of the population.
518
  
Unlike Niue and the Cook Islands, Tokelau is not in free association with New 
Zealand. Instead, it continues to be a NSGT.
519
 UN members introduced this status in the UN 
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519
 Including Tokelau, there are currently 17 NSGTs. The other 16 NSGTs and their administrators are: 
 
NSGT Administrator 
American Samoa, Guam, and the United States Virgin 
Islands 
United States 
French Polynesia and New Caledonia France 
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Charter, where they defined NSGTs as, “territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full 
measure of self-government.”520 Furthermore, the charter declared: 
Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration 
of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize 
the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept 
as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international 
peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of 
these territories, and to this end: …  to develop self-government, to take due account of the 
political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their 
free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its 
peoples and their varying stages of advancement[.]
521
 
 
This suggests a partly cosmopolitan justification, based on the well-being of individuals, for 
the principle of self-government and the related principle of self-determination. 
The status of NSGT was not the status New Zealand envisioned Tokelau having as the 
process of decolonisation started to occur in the Pacific. After Western Samoa gained 
independence in 1962, the New Zealand government suggested that Tokelau could become 
part of Western Samoa while New Zealand would continue to pay for Tokelau’s 
administrative costs. New Zealand also suggested that a similar scheme might work for 
amalgamating Tokelau with the Cook Islands. According to researcher Peter McQuarrie, 
neither move was popular with Tokelauans who he claims did not feel a great deal of cultural 
affinity with either Cook Islanders or Western Samoans.
522
 McQuarrie’s claim appears to 
clash with Richardson’s claim that Tokelauans welcomed New Zealand administration in 
1926 because at the time New Zealand also administered Western Samoa and, “they [the 
Tokelauans] had long desired to be united with the Samoan people.”523  McQuarrie does draw 
a distinction between being administrated from Western Samoa and actually being part of 
                                                                                                                                                        
Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the 
Cayman Islands, the Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, 
Montserrat, Pitcairn Island, St. Helena, the Turks and 
Caicos Islands 
United Kingdom 
Western Sahara No administrator 
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Western Samoa. This might partly explain the difference between his report and Richardson’s 
report. McQuarrie also notes that an expectation by the Tokelauans that they would receive 
fewer resources might explain their reluctance to amalgamating with Western Samoa. Of 
course, Tokelauan opinion altering over time could explain the differences in the reports. 
Whatever was the explanation for Tokelau not wanting to become part of Western Samoa, it 
led to Tokelau becoming a NSGT of New Zealand in 1962.
524
 
Tokelau’s status as a NSGT should not make one think the New Zealand government 
controls life in Tokelau. While officially part of New Zealand, the laws of New Zealand only 
apply to Tokelau if the laws expressly state this. Law Professor Tony Angelo further notes, 
“A focus on the legal constitutional structure tends to emphasise the hierarchies and the apex 
of the colonial hierarchy in New Zealand.” However, “The reality of day-to-day 
constitutional life for Tokelau … is in the functioning of the villages … the General Fono … 
the Council for the Ongoing Government … and the Law Commissioners.”525  
Furthermore, “The heart of the system, both culturally and in practice, is the 
villages.”526 Due to the small size of the three atolls that make up Tokelau, there is only one 
village on each atoll. Senior male members of families exert the most control over the village 
system. However, this should not make one think Tokelauan society is highly hierarchical. 
There are elections in each village for the faipule and pulenuku (whose role is similar to that 
of a mayor).
527
 There is also a strong and traditional egalitarian element in the politics and 
lifestyle of Tokelauans.
528
 
 The control each village system exerts means life in Tokelau is quite different from 
life in New Zealand. Indeed, life can be quite different from atoll to atoll. In the Protestant 
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dominated Atafu and Fakaofo authorities strictly enforce a rule of no work on Sundays, while 
on the Catholic dominated Nukunonu, one is allowed to do what one wants on Sunday, after 
one has attended mass.
529
  
Even with this level of independence from New Zealand, by the 21
st
 century in 
Tokelau there was a desire for more, but not enough of a desire to change Tokelau’s status as 
a NSGT. Tokelauans displayed this in a 2006 UN supervised referendum where they voted 
on the proposal, “That Tokelau become a self-governing state in free association with New 
Zealand on the basis of the Constitution and the Treaty”.530 This referendum just failed to get 
the two-thirds supermajority required to pass. A similar referendum in 2007 had a similar 
result.
531
  
McQuarrie suggests that the New Zealand government was displeased with this 
outcome since, “as an independent state, it [Tokelau] would qualify for bilateral aid from 
other nations as well as the assistance of various United Nations agencies and aid donors such 
as the European Union.”532 This statement glosses over that becoming part of a free 
association is only one-step towards becoming an independent state, and nations can remain 
in free association for a long time. Notably, the Cook Islands and Niue have been a free 
association with New Zealand since 1965 and 1974, respectively. We shall also see in the 
next chapter that the amount of ODA received by the Cook Islands and Niue from New 
Zealand is similar to what New Zealand gives Tokelau. This suggests that a change in status 
from a NSGT of New Zealand to being in free association with New Zealand would probably 
not result in New Zealand giving less ODA to Tokelau. 
 In any case, Tokelau does not appear close to becoming a free association anytime 
soon, with, in 2012, the UN’s General Assembly agreeing with the Tokelauan assembly that 
when it came to Tokelau’s future:  
[A]ny future act of self-determination by Tokelau would be deferred and that New Zealand 
and Tokelau would devote renewed effort and attention to ensuring that essential services and 
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infrastructure on the atolls of Tokelau were enhanced, thereby ensuring an enhanced quality 
of life for the people of Tokelau.
533
 
 
In concluding this historical survey of New Zealand’s colonialism, we can note that 
while Tokelau maintains the closest relationship to New Zealand, out of New Zealand’s four 
former colonies, New Zealand’s treatment of Tokelau appears to come closest to honouring 
Rawls’s freedom and independence of peoples’ principle. As we have seen, in the 
colonisation process, New Zealand consulted with elected Tokelauan leaders, although not all 
of the time, and New Zealand’s rule over the atolls was light-handed. In contrast, New 
Zealand’s initial colonisation of Niue did not involve consultation. Then New Zealand 
compounded its mistake by treating Niue as though it was part of the Cook Islands, but this 
particular mistake was quickly rectified, and after this, New Zealand rule in Niue was 
relatively benign even though for a period the New Zealand appointed Resident 
Commissioner dominated decision-making. In the Cook Islands’ case, while some initial 
consultation took place, it was of a questionable character. Gudgeon’s abuse of power also 
marred New Zealand’s rule. However, New Zealand’s worse case of disrespecting the 
freedom and independence of peoples involved Samoa, the only one of its four former 
colonies that is now an independent state. New Zealand intervened militarily in Samoa at the 
request of the great colonial power Great Britain. While Samoans did not actively resist, 
given the strong military nature of New Zealand’s presence, it is difficult for us to say what 
attitude this reflected. Samoans were then told that rule under New Zealand was going to be 
much like rule under their former colonial masters the Germans. A number of poor policy 
choices marred New Zealand’s rule, and when in response Samoans pushed for more freedom 
and independence, New Zealand cracked down using military force. 
 Some Rawlsians may object that whatever New Zealand’s history of not respecting 
the freedom and independence of peoples of its former colonies may be, currently it respects 
the freedom and independence of Samoa more. This is because New Zealand aided Samoa in 
becoming an independent state while the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau still have 
constitutional ties to New Zealand. This misguided objection reflects that Rawlsian theory as 
it stands does not know how to treat small polities like the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau. 
This gives us reason to develop Rawlsian theory to accommodate this type of polity. 
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Small Polities and Rawlsian Theory 
 
Rawls did not have in mind polities like the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau when he 
was writing LoP. The closest he comes to mentioning polities that are similar in size and 
resources is in a footnote when he briefly discusses “marginal cases”, which are polities 
whose low level of resources means they cannot become well-ordered by themselves. In 
regards to these cases Rawls writes, “Arctic Eskimos534, for example, are rare enough, and 
need not affect our general approach. I assume their problems could be handled in an ad hoc 
way.”535 This comment has not received much attention in the literature, with what attention 
it has, not focusing on the issue of small polities like the Eskimos, but instead, like the work 
of John Tasioulas, focusing on the question of whether less marginal cases may also not be 
able to become well-ordered by themselves.
536
 
Rawls does not give a reason why he assumes we should handle these marginal cases 
in an ad hoc way, and we may find that similarities between these small polities mean a 
different approach is appropriate.  
To start to see what approach we should take to the small polities of the Cook Islands, 
Niue, and Tokelau we can investigate if they do not have enough productivity to become 
well-ordered and therefore are marginal cases. One way of doing this is by looking at their 
levels of productivity and comparing them with current states with the lowest levels of 
productivity. The assumptions behind this comparison being: that these latter polities are 
well-ordered,
537
 are close to having the least amount of productivity needed to have the 
necessary institutions to become well-ordered, and that if a polity had less productivity than 
this it might be incapable of becoming well-ordered because it could not sustain the necessary 
institutions.  
One gross indicator of productivity is, of course, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per 
annum. When we look at this indicator in relation to Niue and Tokelau, we find both have a 
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lower GDP per annum than any UN member state.
538
 However, when we look at this 
indicator in relation to the Cook Islands, we find that with a GDP per annum of 275 million 
(US dollars current prices) in 2011,
539
 the Cook Islands have a greater GDP per annum than 
UN members Kiribati, São Tomé Príncipe, and Tuvalu.  
In trying to make a determination about marginal cases, we could also make the same 
comparison using population, because there needs to be a certain number of persons to 
support the institutions needed for a polity to be well-ordered, and the least populous of 
current states may come close to this number.  If we compare the Cook Islands, Niue, and 
Tokelau to current states we find Niue and Tokelau have smaller populations than any current 
state,
540
 while the Cook Islands with a resident population of 14,974 in 2011
541
 has a 
population greater than at least one
542
 UN member state, Nauru.
543
 This population is also 
relatively steady so depopulation leading to an inability to become well-ordered does not 
appear to be a serious concern.
544
 
This data on GDP and population suggests that the Cook Islands might be able to 
become well-ordered, and so might not be difficult for Rawlsian theory as it stands to 
accommodate. However, this data also suggests it is unlikely Niue and Tokelau could support 
the complicated and costly structure including judges, corporations, estates, and various 
representatives groups needed to make up a decent people, or the institutions needed to 
support the constitutional democracy needed for a liberal people.   
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One might think that this does not make Niue and Tokelau difficult to accommodate 
for Rawlsian theory as it stands, because this theory has the burdened society category. 
However, Rawls defines burdened societies as being capable with assistance of becoming 
free and independent peoples, which for Rawls involved full statehood, while small polities 
like Niue and Tokelau even with assistance seem unlikely to be able to attain full statehood.  
Suggesting they could belong in some other category provided by Rawls in LoP is 
also incorrect. Niue and Tokelau are not benevolent absolutisms because their small 
populations do have a meaningful role in decision-making. They are also not aggressive and 
expansionist, and do not egregiously violate their members’ human rights, so cannot be 
categorised as outlaw states. 
Nevertheless, before concluding Niue and Tokelau cannot fit into a Rawlsian scheme, 
we should recognise that they have some of the features Rawls identifies peoples as having, 
namely a moral nature and common sympathies.  
Rawls says a people display their moral nature when they, “offer fair terms of co-
operation to other peoples” and, “honor these terms when assured that other peoples will do 
so as well.”545 Of course, for Rawls what amounts to “fair terms of co-operation to other 
peoples” is the Law of Peoples, but we have seen reasons to question the limited nature of 
this law. We, however, can take the still Rawlsian view that peoples display their moral 
nature by their fairness, and that this fairness is the willingness to offer terms to another party 
that one would find acceptable if one were that other party. In the process of Niue coming 
into free association with New Zealand, and Tokelau becoming a NSGT of New Zealand, all 
sides sometimes displayed this type of fairness, and this suggests Niue and Tokelau, as well 
as New Zealand, have a moral nature. The same also appears to be true of Niue and Tokelau 
when we look at the issue of common sympathies. 
Rawls says he takes the idea of common sympathies from John Stuart Mill. In a 
footnote, he gives this long quote from Mill on the topic:  
A portion of mankind [and womankind] may be said to constitute a nationality if they are 
united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any 
others—which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people, 
desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by 
themselves, or a portion of themselves, exclusively. This feeling of nationality may have been 
generated by various causes. Sometimes it is the effect of identity of race and descent. 
Community of language and community of religion greatly contribute to it. Geographical 
limits are one of its causes. But the strongest of all is identity of political antecedents; the 
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possession of a national history, and consequent community of recollections; collective pride 
and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past. None of 
these circumstances, however, are either indispensable or necessarily sufficient by 
themselves.
546
 
 
Niueans’ and Tokelauans’ “desire that it [their government] should be government by 
themselves, or a portion of themselves, exclusively” may not be as strong as Mill describes 
but in other respects they would appear to have common sympathies.  
Someone might still insist that it is incorrect to describe these Pacific Island nations as 
any type of Rawlsian peoples, because they lack the necessary institutions, and Rawlsians 
always focus on institutions. In response, we can note that due to closer connections of race, 
decent, and religion, Niueans and Tokelauans may actually be more willing to co-operate 
with each other, and have stronger common sympathies in this respect than those found 
among liberal peoples, and so in these respects be closer to the Rawlsian ideal.
547
 We can also 
note that the importance of institutions to the Rawlsian view can be overstated. The Rawlsian 
view when it comes to burdened societies would appear to be that, due to their common 
sympathies and moral nature, they should have the institutions necessary to become a decent 
or liberal people.
548
 To modify this view to accommodate small polities who, even with 
assistance, cannot develop the institutions necessary to become an independent and fully 
autonomous people with full statehood, we can say these small polities have the right of 
access to liberal or decent institutions as semi-autonomous peoples.
549
  In some instances 
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 If access to liberal or decent institutions includes access to a liberal or decent health system, then New 
Zealand appears to have failed Niueans in this regard. Waring notes:  
 
To be treated as a New Zealander in New Zealand … for the provision of health care, patients have to 
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Waring, ‘Ministerial Review of Progress in Implementing 2001 Cabinet Recommendations Establishing 
NZAID’, p. 80. 
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determining which particular set of liberal or decent institutions these semi-autonomous 
peoples have a right of access to might be difficult, but in Niue’s case and Tokelau’s case 
their historical relationship with New Zealand strongly suggests they have a right of access to 
New Zealand’s institutions. 
However, the critic of this view can point out that access to these institutions is a 
contributing factor to the depopulation of Niue, which brings into question the continued 
existence of Niueans as a people. 
We must admit that the trend of falling population is perhaps the most telling feature 
of life in Niue since it entered free association with New Zealand in 1974. However, the issue 
emerged before this, in 1971 with the opening of an airport. Prior to this, Niue’s population 
had been stable. When New Zealand gained sovereignty over Niue in 1901,
550
 Niue’s 
population was around 4,000.
551
 Starting in the 1930s the population grew slowly, reaching 
around 5,000 in 1966.
552
 There was then a slight dip in population before the opening of the 
airport. This opening appears to have led to a population drop of roughly 20% before Niue 
became a free association.
553
 Being in free association with New Zealand, meant Niueans 
could now enter and stay in mainland New Zealand with relative ease. This saw the 
population continue to drop, but not as quickly as after the opening of the airport.
554
 This 
long-term population decline led to 1,625 persons being in Niue on census night in 2006 with 
1,538 of those reporting Niue as their usual place of residence. The number of persons in 
Niue on census night in 2011 was only slightly lower, with there being 1,611; however, the 
number reporting Niue as their usual place of residence dropped further, and was 1,460.
555
  
The continual drop in Niue’s population has led political scientist Steven Levine to 
suggest that Niue might not be able to maintain its status of being a self-governing territory in 
free association with New Zealand, and perhaps should have the same status as the Chatham 
Islands,
556
 which New Zealand simply defines as a “territory”.557 New Zealand’s 2013 
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Census showed the Chatham Islands’ population to be 600, which suggests, at least 
population wise, Niue could easily be a territory.
558
 Another possibility is Niue reverting to 
NSGT status. Most of the NSGTs are small Pacific landmasses but have populations 
significantly larger than Niue.
559
 There are two exceptions, Tokelau and Pitcairn Island. We 
have seen that currently Tokelau’s population is slightly smaller than Niue’s, and has 
historically been considerably smaller. Pitcairn supports a population of just 50. These facts 
suggest that, at least population wise, Niue is currently more than capable of being a 
NSGT.
560
 However, if Niue’s population eventually reached zero it would be no type of 
polity whatsoever, so what is the likelihood of this occurring? 
 There are historical examples of once populated Pacific landmasses becoming empty 
of people,
561
 but in Niue’s case, remittances from Niueans living in mainland New Zealand, 
and ODA from the New Zealand government, provide an incentive to stay on the atoll. 
However, the atoll faces the threat of becoming unliveable due to global warming. This is 
because, even though Niue reaches a height of 68 metres above sea level, global warming is a 
threat because raised sea levels would affect subterranean freshwater lenses, which are the 
source of most of Niue’s drinkable water.562 However, should this happen, there could still be 
a Niuean people. 
This is because a large group of persons who live in New Zealand identify as Niuean. 
In 2006, these persons numbered 22,476; which is 15 times as many persons as who were 
recorded as living on Niue in 2011, which, as has been noted, was 1,460.
563
 As long as this 
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New Zealand based group retained a moral nature and common sympathies, there would still 
be justification in us describing them as a Rawlsian people.  
One might think that if depopulation is a problem for Niue, it would also be a problem 
for Tokelau given Niue and Tokelau’s similarity in circumstances, but this is not the case. In 
1926 when it became part of the Dominion of New Zealand, Tokelau’s population was 
1,033
564
; by 1960, it had reached 1,929.
565
 While the population would remain stable during 
the first half of the 1960s
566
, there was concern the atolls risked becoming overpopulated. 
This was one of the reasons given for the introduction in 1966 of a resettlement scheme 
placing Tokelauans in mainland New Zealand. There was some concern in Tokelau and 
mainland New Zealand that the ultimate goal of the New Zealand government in introducing 
this scheme was to relocate all Tokelauans. The New Zealand government reassured both 
groups that this was not the case.
567
 This appears to be borne out by the scheme not greatly 
reducing the population in Tokelau, with 1,558 persons living in Tokelau in 1976. Recent 
years have not seen much change, either, with the population in 2011 being 1,411.
568
  
However, Tokelau, like Niue, is vulnerable to the threat of global warming. In 
Tokelau’s case, rising sea levels might not “just” mean Tokelau becomes unliveable. 
Tokelau’s highpoint is 5 metres above sea level, which means rising sea levels due to a 
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combination of global warming and entirely natural causes could eventually see the atolls 
disappear underneath the waves.
569
  
However, as is the case with Niuean people, this would not necessarily mean the end 
of the Tokelauan people. In 2006, in New Zealand, 6,819 persons identified as Tokelauan, 
which is almost five times the population of Tokelau.
570
 This suggests a Tokelauan people 
will survive even if the future of the Tokelauan atolls is uncertain.  
Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has shown the freedom and independence of peoples’ principle requires 
interpretation and justification. We also saw that Rawls, despite using the concept of peoples 
in a somewhat distinctive way, interprets the principle in a way similar to how international 
law interprets the principle of self-determination, with both approaches seeing these similar 
principles realized via full statehood. When it comes to justifying the principle, we once 
again see similarities with Rawls sometimes giving a cosmopolitan justification by arguing 
that the freedom and independence of peoples is good for persons, and the relevant UN 
resolutions giving a similar justification to self-determination. These justifications being 
cosmopolitan means there is some congruence between them and the cosmopolitan Rawlsian 
viewpoint I have taken in this thesis. 
The question of how to judge New Zealand’s history of colonialism in relation to the 
freedom and independence of peoples’ principle is complicated in part because some of those 
persons colonised were open to their government to be in some sort of constitutional 
relationship with New Zealand’s government. While this counts in favour of New Zealand, 
these relationships, especially early on, had instances of New Zealand officials ignoring the 
opinions of persons from these colonies, and thereby disregarding the freedom and 
independence of these peoples. This led to occasionally very poor decision making. In the 
cases of Western Samoa and the Cook Islands there were major mistakes which were often 
the result of viewing Western Samoans and Cook Islanders as inferior. In the cases of Niue 
and Tokelau, New Zealand’s rule was more benign. 
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Another complicating factor in judging New Zealand’s respect for this principle is the 
small size of Niue and Tokelau, and that Rawls did not consider such small polities in any 
detail in LoP. However, we concluded that Rawlsian theory could accommodate small 
polities like Niue and Tokelau as semi-autonomous peoples with a right of access to liberal or 
decent institutions. This conclusion counted in favour of New Zealand’s respect for the 
freedom and independence of peoples’ principle, because it means New Zealand can respect 
the principle even while Niue and Tokelau continue to be in a constitutional relationship with 
New Zealand. 
The constitutional arrangements New Zealand has with Niue, Tokelau, and the Cook 
Islands, and its continuing close relationship with Samoa complicate the question of what sort 
of ODA programmes, if any, New Zealand should have with these four peoples. As we will 
see in the next chapter, these programmes are a relic of New Zealand’s colonial history. 
Indeed, one can trace the origins of all New Zealand’s ODA programmes, which now include 
a wide variety of countries, back to this history. 
In the next chapter, we will look at the history of these ODA programme as well as 
their current state, to determine what role they have played in the past, and what role they can 
play in future, in realizing certain global principles of justice discussed in this thesis. 
  
  P a g e  | 184 
 
  P a g e  | 185 
 
Chapter 11: New Zealand’s ODA Programme 
Introduction 
 
 This chapter will investigate New Zealand’s ODA programme (currently known as 
the New Zealand Aid Programme) in order to see what conclusions one can draw on the 
programme’s moral status including its role in realizing certain principles of global justice.  
The focus on one country means I leave to one side the issue of how different countries 
coordinate their ODA programmes in order to avoid inefficiencies and other problems. The 
ODA community is aware of the coordination problem. Members of this community, 
including New Zealand, have signed up to various documents including the 2005 Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action, which aim, among 
other things, to coordinate different ODA programmes.
571
 
 There is also some justification, from a Kantian influenced Rawlsian position, for 
imagining New Zealand and all other ODA countries focusing their policies on realizing a 
global difference principle. In doing so, we are testing, “our maxim by considering what 
would be the case were it a universal law of nature”.572 
While focusing on the global difference principle, the chapter will also briefly 
mention how the programme may affect the freedom and independence of peoples, and help 
to fulfil the duty of assistance. While researchers have carried out previous reviews of this 
programme, these reviews, like the ministerial review done by aid researchers Grossman and 
Lees, have been done without the sort of normative framework I have established in previous 
chapters, so have not had much to say on the programme’s moral status. 
In order to assess how the programme’s moral status has developed over time; to 
place the current programme in context; and to see how the programme might develop in the 
future, the chapter’s investigation will start with an examination of the programme’s history. 
This investigation will show the strong influence New Zealand’s colonial history has had; 
how New Zealand has focused the programme on the Pacific; and that New Zealand has 
generally given around 0.2% of GNP in ODA, never reaching the long agreed to target of 
0.7%. 
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After the historical investigation, there will be a closer analysis of what percentage of 
GNP in ODA New Zealand has recently given. This investigation will show that this 
percentage matches normal historical levels. This section of the chapter will also conclude 
that the New Zealand government’s attempts to justify these levels fail. 
Then the chapter will explore the programme’s current focus on the Pacific.573 One 
might believe most developed countries focus on giving ODA to developing countries in their 
geographical region, and therefore think this aspect of the programme is not worthwhile 
investigating. However, the chapter will gather evidence that will show New Zealand stands 
out in this regard. The chapter will argue this is regrettable because the focus of New 
Zealand’s ODA programme should be more on realizing a global difference principle.   
Another feature of the current programme the chapter will investigate is its “country 
programmes.” The New Zealand Aid Programme describes these programmes as bilateral 
aid.
574
 While these programmes have features that could help to realize a global difference 
principle, we will see that New Zealand reduces the chances of this happening by generally 
having country programmes with relatively wealthy developing countries. The chapter will 
note that New Zealand has a number of country programmes with LDCs, and then investigate 
the LDC concept, to show how LDCs could contain some of the globally least advantaged. 
However, the chapter will conclude that the relative wealth of the LDCs New Zealand has 
country programmes with reduces the chances of these programmes helping to realize a 
global difference principle. In this discussion, the chapter will also note that there is a 
justification in giving ODA to middle-income countries that contain some of the globally 
least advantaged and lack the capacity to mobilize domestic resources, but then note New 
Zealand only appears to have a country programme with one of these countries. 
Among the other countries which New Zealand has country programmes with are 
New Zealand’s former colonies the Cook Islands, Niue, Samoa, and Tokelau. The chapter 
will spend a good deal of time analysing these programmes because their distinctive nature, 
which includes the distinctive nature of the nations involved, raises questions which other 
country programmes do not. An example of this, which the chapter will investigate, is how to 
categorise the nations in order to determine whether they may contain some of the globally 
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least advantaged, and therefore whether having programmes with these nations might help to 
realize a global difference principle. This is difficult in the cases of the Cook Islands, Niue, 
and Tokelau, because they are not sovereign states, which means international institutions 
often do not treat them as separate entities that need to be categorised. Therefore, the chapter 
will attempt to categorise the nations in terms of income level, and to see whether the nations 
could fit into the LDC category.  
It might be thought that if one argues, as is done in this chapter, that less ODA should 
go to relatively wealthy Pacific nations, then one would have to argue New Zealand’s support 
of its four former colonies should drop dramatically. The chapter will argue that this is not 
the case because in the case of the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau, these nations deserve 
support as part of New Zealand; because additionally in Niue and Tokelau’s case it is 
questionable if they could survive without this support; and in Samoa’s case of previous 
commitments to give aid.
575
  
The chapter then looks at the New Zealand Aid Programme’s projects, which are not 
country-programmes, which we will call “non-country programmes.” In doing so, we will 
once again find that while they have features that could help to realize a global difference 
principle, by focusing them on relatively wealthy developing countries, New Zealand reduces 
the likelihood of this happening.  
The chapter will also discover that even though the New Zealand Aid Programme 
describes its country programmes as its bilateral aid, this does not mean that one can 
conclude that the non-country programs are multilateral. Indeed, a number of these 
programmes are bilateral which reflects the fact that most of New Zealand’s ODA is bilateral. 
The chapter will then argue that this fact is regrettable because New Zealand’s ODA 
programme would be more likely to realize a global difference principle if more of its ODA 
was multilateral. 
The chapter will close by showing there is public support for at least two of the policy 
recommendations made in this chapter: that New Zealand should increase its ODA in 
percentage of GNP terms, and that New Zealand should focus its ODA more on the globally 
least advantaged. This means that while the policy recommendations are moral and utopian, 
they also display realism and pragmatism. 
 
 
                                                 
575
 As was noted in the previous chapter, in the Niue Constitution Act 1974, New Zealand also committed itself 
to provide Niue with economic assistance. 
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History of New Zealand’s Aid Programme 
 
The origins of New Zealand’s aid programme date back to the start of the 20th century 
and the economic assistance New Zealand provided to its first colonies, the Cook Islands and 
Niue. As we saw in the previous chapter, by the 1920s this colonial project had expanded to 
include Samoa and Tokelau. The aid given to these colonies was not much in monetary 
terms, for example, in the late 1940s it was around NZ£1 million per annum.
576
 This amount 
was also not a large percentage of New Zealand’s GNP, which for the financial year 
1947/1948 was £475.6 million,
577
 which means (presuming this figure and the aid figure were 
relatively stable) New Zealand gave roughly 0.21% of GNP in aid during this period.  
 In the early 1950s, New Zealand started to broaden the countries it gave aid to by 
joining the Colombo Plan. The plan originally included seven Commonwealth nations: 
Australia, Great Britain, Canada, Ceylon (now known as Sri Lanka), India, New Zealand and 
Pakistan, with the United States joining shortly thereafter. Much of New Zealand’s aid under 
the plan went to Colombo Plan members India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.
578
 
Since a number of governments contributed funds towards the programme one might 
be lead to think that there was a pooling of funds, so individual governments would not have 
much control of their contributions, making these contributions multilateral in nature.
579
 
However, a New Zealand government report in 1966 noted aid under the plan was, “given 
and received bilaterally” with there being no, “centralised organisation for the administration 
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Zealand and the Pacific, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), p. 208. 
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multilateral contribution the OECD writes: 
  
Multilateral contributions are those made to a recipient institution which:  
 
i. conducts all or part of its activities in favour of development;  
ii. is an international agency, institution or organisation whose members are governments, or a fund 
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iii. pools contributions so that they lose their identity and become an integral part of its financial assets. 
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OECD, ‘DAC Statistical Reporting Directives’, p. 5. 
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of aid” and with all arrangements under the plan, “undertaken by direct consultation between 
the two countries concerned.”580  
The plan’s official purpose was to be, “a cooperative venture for the economic and 
social advancement of the peoples of South and Southeast Asia”,581 but the official New 
Zealand Government Encyclopaedia of 1966 summed up the goals of the Colombo Plan in 
this fashion: 
Like ANZUS [Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty] … the Colombo Plan 
is designed to achieve security, but its means are exclusively economic assistance to and 
friendship with underdeveloped countries whose enmity would be dangerous should low 
living standards foster the growth of communism within them.
582
  
 
The Encyclopaedia goes on to state, “In the first decade over £3,000 million of aid has 
been thus given, chiefly by the United States … In this period New Zealand has contributed a 
total of over £10 million”.583 This indicates that New Zealand continued to give a small 
percentage of GNP in aid.  OECD figures for the 1960s corroborate this, showing during 
these years New Zealand gave a range of 0.18 to 0.25% of GNP in aid,
584
 which was low in 
comparison to the DAC total average at the time, which ranged from 0.37% to 0.54%.
585
  The 
stability in the amount New Zealand gave may be partly explained by the same government, 
the second National Party government (1960-1972), being in power for almost the entirety of 
the 1960s.   
 New Zealand brought this long period of National Party rule to an end with the 
election of the short-lived third Labour government (1972-1975). Under this new 
government, strategic justifications of the aid programme gave way to humanitarian ones.
586
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New Zealand’s aid programme also started to resemble its modern form, with New Zealand 
joining the OECD’s DAC in 1973.587   
 The amount of ODA in percentage of GNP terms also increased during this period, 
reaching what is still its high point of 0.52% in 1975.
588
 According to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, these increased levels of aid were, “aimed at the achievement of the internationally 
accepted targets of 0.7 percent of GNP for Official Development Assistance (ODA)”.589 
However, the government did not combine this with a shift in focus away from the Pacific.
590
  
With the election of the third National government (1975-1984), the focus on the 
Pacific increased significantly.
591
 When it came to the amount of ODA given, officially the 
government remained, “committed to the eventual objective of reaching 0.7 percent of GNP 
for official aid expenditure”592, but the amount of ODA in GNP percentage terms began to 
drop, reaching what has proven to be the normal 0.2% range by 1981. There was also a return 
to a strategic focus in the disbursement of ODA. For example, when justifying the aid 
programme, the Prime Minister and Finance Minister of the period, Robert Muldoon, 
harkened back to the justification given by the New Zealand Government Encyclopaedia in 
1966 to the Colombo Plan. Presenting the 1976 budget, he said:   
While for obvious reasons we could not contemplate with equanimity any one of these states 
[Polynesian territories of the South Pacific] becoming a satellite of a Communist superpower 
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the corollary is that we must make it clear that we accept a continuing obligation in respect of 
the economic welfare of these countries and growth in their living standards.
593
 
 
The election of the fourth Labour government (1984-1990) did not result in a change 
in the type of justifications given for aid, as evidenced by a 1986 Ministerial review that 
stated:  
[I]n the case of the South Pacific, the Government has made it clear it hopes that the aid 
programme can partially substitute for a most costly defence programme by strengthening the 
fragile dependent economies and building up regional structures the better to withstand 
outside pressures.
594
 
 
The amount of ODA given in percentage of GNP terms also remained about the same, as did 
the strong Pacific focus.
595
 
The fourth National government (1990-1999) maintained this focus
596
, but there was 
an increase in aid to countries which were believed to have the potential to become larger 
trading partners in the future, namely Cambodia, China, Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
(PDR), and Viet Nam.
597
 This was part of an increase in emphasis on New Zealand aid being 
beneficial to New Zealand.  In this vein, the Minister of Foreign Affairs at this time, Donald 
McKinnon, pointed out that $77 out of $100 of New Zealand aid went to New Zealand 
businesses; McKinnon argued this showed, “New Zealand firms, suppliers, educational 
institutions and individual consultants are doing well out of our doing good”.598  
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With the election of the fifth Labour government (1999-2008), there was a significant 
change in the basic institutional structure of New Zealand’s ODA programme, with the 
government creating a semi-autonomous governmental agency to administer the programme. 
Up to this point, the ministry responsible for foreign affairs administered the programme. The 
change in administration was in response to Grossman and Lees’ 2001 ministerial review that 
recommended the creation of a semi-autonomous governmental aid agency, NZAID. Part of 
the rationale given for NZAID’s creation was the claim, “Foreign Affairs and ODA have 
distinctly different missions. ODA asks partner governments: what are your needs and how 
can we help them? Foreign Affairs asks: what are our needs and how can we advance 
them?”599 Recent statements from the Ministry and the aid programme give credence to this 
analysis. The most recent Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s (MFAT’s) Statement of 
Intent, includes the summation of MFAT’s purpose as, “promoting and protecting New 
Zealand’s interests abroad.”600 While, as we will see shortly, one of the focuses of the current 
aid programme is on similar strategic interests, the programme also declares its mission to be 
to, “support sustainable development in developing countries in order to reduce poverty and 
contribute to a more secure, equitable and prosperous world.”601 
  Along with arguing for the creation of NZAID, the ministerial review recommended:  
 NZAID should have one, unambiguous goal: the elimination of poverty. 
 NZAID should adopt the six International Development Targets [the precursors to the 
MDGs] as its own objectives. 
 NZAID should retain a core focus on the South Pacific. 
 NZAID should mainstream human rights issues, along with gender and environment, 
throughout its operations. 
 NZAID should establish monitoring and evaluation systems that measure impact of 
development assistance.
602
 
 
The government adopted a number of these recommendations including the creation of 
NZAID, and the elimination of poverty goal. The adoption of this goal arguably resulted in a 
shift in funds from New Zealand’s traditional sphere of influence Polynesia to the slightly 
poorer Melanesia.
603
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While the ministerial review advocated, “increases in the aid budget … to raise New 
Zealand’s contribution to ODA closer to the 0.7% GNP target”604, during the 1999 to 2008 
period, ODA remained in the 0.2% range except in 2008 when it reached 0.3%, the first time 
it had reached this level since 1986.
605
   
The institutional shift that resulted from the review did not last long, with the fifth and 
current National government, (2008- ), disestablishing NZAID and reintegrating New 
Zealand’s ODA programme into MFAT, and in late 2010 renaming it the New Zealand Aid 
Programme.
606
 This institutional change indicated a stronger focus on strategic interests. We 
can also see this more explicitly in a statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs, Murray 
McCully made in 2009. In this statement, he recommended that New Zealand’s, “ODA 
outcomes should be consistent with and support New Zealand’s foreign policy and external 
relations outcomes under the direction of the Minister of Foreign Affairs”, and that the 
government should give greater priority to ODA that has, “demonstrable value for both 
recipient and donor.”607  
The programme also returned to giving priority to Polynesia,
608
 and shifted its focus, 
“from the elimination of poverty to the support of sustainable economic development in 
developing countries”.609 
This means despite the number of changes New Zealand’s ODA programme has gone 
through over the years, its current form is reflective of a number of the most consistent 
themes in the programme’s history, namely, a small programme with a focus on Polynesia, 
New Zealand’s strategic interests, and the recipient’s economic development. 
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 Now let us look more closely at the recent and current form of the programme, and 
justifications given for this form. If this form can be morally justified, this will suggest its 
historical form, which shares a number of similarities with its recent and current form, can 
also be justified. We will start this exploration by briefly looking at how the New Zealand 
government recently gave much less ODA than it has pledged to give and how the 
government indirectly attempted to justify this. 
Recent Levels of ODA Given 
 
 In 2010, a year in which New Zealand gave 0.26% of GNP in ODA
610
, the NZAID 
website
611
 posed the question:  “Why doesn’t New Zealand give 0.7 per cent of our Gross 
National Income (GNI) like some organisations suggest we should?”612  
The website did not directly address the question, but did note that in the Millennium 
Declaration wealthy countries committed themselves, “to grant more generous development 
assistance”. The website then went on to claim, “New Zealand is delivering on its 
commitment to grant more generous development assistance”.613 In support of this statement, 
the website noted New Zealand’s aid budget had increased from 242 million New Zealand 
dollars in the financial year 2000/2001 to 500 million in 2009/2010, and the government 
expected it to rise to 600 million in 2012/2013.
614
  
The NZAID website did not mention New Zealand’s numerous promises to give 0.7% 
of GNP in ODA, and did not mention what New Zealand gave in GNP percentage terms 
during the 2000s. When we inspect OECD figures, we find in the 2000s New Zealand gave 
0.22% to 0.3%.
615
  
We can start to see why we need these percentages to decide whether New Zealand 
has given more generous development assistance, by noting that when we make judgments 
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about generosity we generally take into account how wealthy the entity we are judging is. For 
example, if a relatively poor person in a developed country gives 10% of her income to 
development charities, we do not judge her less generous than a wealthy person who does the 
same, even though the wealthy person gives more in monetary terms. Indeed, we would view 
the poorer person as more generous because they may be putting themselves through more 
privations in order to donate to charity. A corollary of this is that, if this poor person was to 
become wealthy but continued to give the same percentage of her income to development 
charities, we would not think she had become more generous. We also tend to make similar 
judgments about countries, not viewing the wealthiest country, the United States, as 
particularly generous even though it provides the most ODA in monetary terms.
616
 We also 
should not view New Zealand as more generous simply because it has given more in 
monetary terms in recent years, this is a reflection of New Zealand becoming wealthier
617
 
rather than becoming more generous. Instead, we should look to the amount of ODA in 
percentage of GNP terms given, and see continuing to give about the same in these terms 
since the year 2000 means New Zealand’s level of generosity has remained about the same. 
Therefore, even if we did not agree that New Zealand should fulfil its numerous 
commitments to give 0.7% of GNP in ODA, and thought New Zealand only had to fulfil the 
Millennium Declaration to be more generous, we would still have to admit that New Zealand 
had failed to fulfil its moral obligations.  
Another historical feature of the programme that, like the amount of ODA given in 
percentage of GNP terms, continues in the present form of the programme, and is morally 
questionable, is the focus on the Pacific. 
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An Ongoing Focus on the Pacific 
 
Figures from the OECD show that in 2012 out of the 449.14 million dollars (US 
current prices) New Zealand gave in ODA around 51% went to the Pacific.
618
 This made 
2012 a typical year.
619
 When one learns of this one might respond by asking: If governments 
use ODA as a tool of foreign policy, and if foreign policy looks to maintain a country’s 
sphere of influence, should not we expect governments to focus their ODA on their 
geographical neighbours, and therefore find these figures not noteworthy? However, aid 
researcher Eric Neumayer’s statistical analysis shows that at the stage when a country decides 
whether to give ODA, “Only Australia, New Zealand, and Portugal have a regional bias.”620 
When Neumayer analyses the data on a country’s decision on how much ODA to give to 
different countries he finds New Zealand and Australia, unlike Portugal, continue to show a 
regional bias. He also finds Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Japan, and the United States of 
America have this bias.
621
 Only Australia and New Zealand showing both types of bias leads 
Neumayer to write, “Australia and New Zealand notoriously concentrate their aid in the 
Pacific.”622 
Other countries may be able to come up with justifications for their regional biases, 
but is New Zealand able to? The NZAID’s website claims that it focuses its programmes on 
the Pacific because, “The Pacific is a part of the world where New Zealand has the scale, 
resources, people, and relationships that can influence positive and real change and make 
lasting differences in people’s lives.”623 This statement implies that if New Zealand were to 
spend most of its ODA elsewhere, New Zealand would misspend it because of a lack of 
“scale, resources, people, and relationships”. This is plausible when we think of New Zealand 
acting on its own, but New Zealand could avoid this problem but channelling ODA funds to 
other developed countries’ ODA programmes or multilateral ODA agencies, which do have 
the necessary “scale, resources, people and relationships”. Even the NZAID website appears 
to acknowledge this when it writes that New Zealand’s, “Global development efforts are 
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supported through funding from the NZAID programme to international agencies.”624 These 
facts suggests that New Zealand focusing its ODA on the Pacific has more to do with wanting 
ownership of the ODA programmes it contributes to, and a desire to maintain a sphere of 
influence in what it considers its backyard.  
However, while New Zealand concentrates ODA on the Pacific region, in part for 
strategic reasons, could the distribution of ODA in the Pacific, and to countries outside the 
Pacific, be partly explained by other reasons like the low-income levels of recipient countries?  
If we can answer affirmatively to this question, it would suggest that despite its Pacific focus, 
New Zealand’s ODA programme might, by distributing funds to poor countries likely to 
contain the globally least advantaged, still be playing a significant role in helping to realize a 
global difference principle. We would have even more reason to think the ODA programme 
was having this role if the types of sub-programmes that made up the programme were likely 
to produce social primary goods. In order to start answering these questions, we now turn to 
an exploration of what the New Zealand Aid Programme calls its “country programmes.” 
New Zealand’s Country Programmes 
 
The New Zealand Aid Programme says its “Country programmes”, “are New 
Zealand’s bilateral aid to a country.”625 In examining the goals of the various country 
programmes, we find that some, if achieved, may be steps towards realizing a global 
difference principle. This is because a number of these programs look to promote economic 
development, and improve health and education services, which means they look to produce 
social primary goods.
626
 The New Zealand Aid Programme also funds independent 
evaluations, although not randomized evaluations, of its programmes. The findings of these 
evaluations suggest the programmes are often successful in this regard, which is in keeping 
with our previous findings in this thesis about ODA’s effectiveness.627 This also suggests that 
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625
 New Zealand Aid Programme, ‘Programme Framework’, URL: http://www.aid.govt.nz/about-aid-
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626
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if New Zealand spent more on these and similar programmes, New Zealand would help in the 
production of more social primary goods. This gives New Zealand reason to spend more on 
these programmes. However, in order to realize a global difference principle it is the globally 
least advantaged whose expectations and conditions have to be improved via the receiving of 
more social primary goods. Therefore, in order for enlarged versions of these programmes to 
be more likely to help realize the principle, they will have to make significant changes in 
countries where some of the globally least advantaged are most likely to live. In order to 
work out if New Zealand currently targets these countries with its country programmes, let us 
look at a table, which shows the countries New Zealand had country programmes with, and 
how much these programmes received in monetary terms, in the financial year 2011/2012: 
 
Country programmes $NZ m 
Afghanistan 14 
Cook Islands 19 
Fiji 5 
Indonesia 24 
Kiribati 12 
Niue 14 
Papua New Guinea 27 
Samoa 17 
Solomon Islands 40 
Timor-Leste 12.5 
Tokelau 17 
Tonga 20 
Tuvalu 5 
Vanuatu 20 
Viet Nam 10 
Total    256.5
628
 
                                                 
628
 New Zealand Aid Programme, ‘Aid allocations 2011/12’, (June 2011), URL: http://www.aid.govt.nz/about-
aid-programme/aid-statistics/aid-allocations-20112012, (accessed 9 December 2014). New Zealand has had 
country programmes with these countries for a number of years, which means if we investigate the amount 
given to these countries from 1972-2010 we find: 
 
Recipient US million dollars current prices 
Afghanistan 46.35 
Cook Islands 255.14 
Fiji 150.23 
Indonesia 170.25 
Kiribati 55.6 
Niue 216.57 
Papua New Guinea 209.56 
Samoa 196.97 
Solomon Islands 199.74 
Timor-Leste post 2002 independence from Indonesia 39.7 
Tokelau 169.03 
Tonga 147.11 
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Unsurprisingly, we see a Pacific focus with 11 out of 15 of the countries who have a Country 
Programme falling under the OECD’s Oceania grouping, and the 196 million dollars these 
countries received being roughly 77% of the money allocated to country programmes. The 
four non-Oceanic nations that New Zealand has country programmes with (Afghanistan, 
Indonesia, Timor-Leste, and Viet Nam) are in the relatively near geographical area of Asia, 
an area where New Zealand has increased its strategic focus due in part to an enlarged trade 
relationship with the region.
629
 
In order to discover if New Zealand’s selection of countries is influenced by low-
income levels, and to get some sense of the relative wealth of nations, we can start by noting 
that the WB classifies countries as low-income 0-$1,035 (GNI per capita current US prices), 
lower-middle-income $1,036-$4,085, upper-middle-income $4,086-$12,615 and high-income 
$12,616+.
630
 If we look at countries for which the WB provides data
631
, we see most of New 
Zealand’s country programmes are with lower-middle income countries, for example 
Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, and Viet Nam. New Zealand also has country programmes 
with upper-middle-income countries like Fiji and Tonga. New Zealand appears to have only 
one country programme with a low-income country, Afghanistan. As we have already seen, 
Rawls gave reasons for identifying the least advantaged simply by looking at income
632
, so 
this data suggests New Zealand is not giving much ODA to the globally least advantaged. 
However, if we investigate via the broader notion of poverty the UN uses in their 
categorisation of the LDCs, we get a different picture and find just under half of the countries 
New Zealand has country programme with are LDCs. Two of these LDCs come from Asia 
(Afghanistan and Timor-Leste) and four come from the Pacific (Kiribati, the Solomon 
                                                                                                                                                        
Tuvalu 43.74 
Vanuatu 121.54 
Viet Nam 59.89 
 
QWIDS. While historically New Zealand had bilateral aid relationships with numerous other countries, these 
were generally small. The only ones of any financial significance were with Cambodia, Lao PDR, Philippines, 
South Africa, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. QWIDS. Debreceny, ‘New Zealand Development Assistance and 
the Pacific’, p. 208. 
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Islands, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu),
633
 which means New Zealand has country programmes with 
all the Pacific LDCs.  
To get a better idea of the broader notion of poverty found in the LDC concept, and to 
get a better idea of whether New Zealand’s country programmes with certain LDCs mean it is 
helping to realize a global difference principle, we can start by quoting the three criteria that 
determine LDC status: 
1)      Low-income criterion, based on a three-year average estimate of GNI per capita, based 
on the World Bank Atlas method
634
 (under $905 for inclusion, above $ 1,086 for graduation 
as applied in the 2009 triennial review). 
2)      Human Assets Index (HAI) based on indicators of: (a) nutrition: percentage of 
population undernourished; (b) health: mortality rate for children aged five years or under; (c) 
education: the gross secondary school enrolment ratio; and (d) adult literacy rate.  
3)      Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI) based on indicators of: (a) population size; (b) 
remoteness; (c) merchandise export concentration; (d) share of agriculture, forestry and 
fisheries in gross domestic product; (e) share of population living in low elevated coastal 
zones; (f) instability of exports of goods and services; (g) victims of natural disasters; and (h) 
instability of agricultural production.
635
     
 
The HAI and EVI indexes, like the low-income criterion, are numerical, with a 
country’s numerical score on these indexes being a factor in whether it is included among the 
LDCs or graduates from LDC status. To be more exact, to graduate a country has to reach the 
graduation level on two out of the three criteria, or its income level has to be twice the 
income threshold level, and in both cases, the UN’s Committee for Development Policy 
(CDP) has to judge these levels sustainable.
636
 If the CDP comes to this judgment about a 
particular country, it then recommends to the UN’s General Assembly that the country 
graduate, the General Assembly then either does or does not confirm this graduation. To be 
included on the LDC list a country has to qualify on all three criteria, and has to agree to 
being categorised as an LDC.
637
 The country then goes through a similar process to the 
graduation process, with the CDP recommending, and then the General Assembly either 
approving or not approving the inclusion of the country as an LDC.
638
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As one would expect, given our previous discussion of income levels, most of the 
LDCs New Zealand has country programmes with are relatively high in terms of income. All 
of them except Afghanistan
639
 have an income above the graduation level of $1,086 GNI per 
capita per annum for three years. Most easily exceed this level. For example, Tuvalu with a 
2010 to 2012 GNI per capita per annum average of $5,150
640
 makes it into the WB’s upper-
middle-income group.
641
 However, the Solomon Islands only just exceeds the graduation 
level with a 2010 to 2012 per capita per annum average of $1,100.
642
    
The Solomon Islands and the other LDC countries New Zealand has country 
programmes with that exceed the graduation level on income, do not exceed the graduation 
level score on some or all the other LDC indicators, the HAI and the EVI.
643
 To be more 
specific, Tuvalu, Kiribati, and Vanuatu score below the graduation level score on the EVI, 
while Timor-Leste (which does better in GNI per capita terms reaching 2,233 dollars in 
2012)
644
 and the Solomon Islands score below the graduation level on both the HAI and EVI. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, Afghanistan also scores below the graduation level on both these 
counts. 
A low score on the HAI can indicate that a number of individuals are undernourished 
and illiterate. These individuals are likely to be ones, “whose natural endowments (as 
realized) permit them to fare less well”.645 A country with a low EVI is likely to have 
inhabitants whose expectations of social primary goods are low due to uncertainty over the 
stability of their economy. This suggests that countries with a low HAI and EVI score may 
contain some of the globally least advantaged. This along with the efficacy of ODA suggests 
that targeting ODA programmes at these LDCs may be one way to realise a global difference 
principle. However, as we saw in the previous paragraph, among the countries New Zealand 
has country programmes with, only Afghanistan, the Solomon Islands, and Timor-Leste have 
low scores on both the HAI and EVI. This suggests that New Zealand is not targeting its 
ODA at the right LDCs. However, one could argue that governments can help to realize a 
global difference principle by targeting other countries besides the LDCs. 
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In doing so, one could point towards the research of Andy Sumner, which suggests 
that most of the world’s poorest now live in middle-income countries, and then argue that this 
means one way to use ODA to help realize a global difference principle would be to have 
ODA programmes with these countries.
646
 However, someone else might respond by arguing 
that reducing poverty in these countries is a problem these countries should solve since in 
these cases there would appear to be domestic resources that could help reduce poverty. 
However, Sumner notes that for middle-income countries it is not simply a question of 
having the resources to reduce poverty, but also having the capacity to mobilize these 
resources. In cases where countries lack this capacity, then there is an argument for, “poverty 
reduction to be a shared endeavour” with both ODA and domestic resources being used.647 
Does this mean New Zealand’s country programmes, which as we have noted are mainly 
with middle-income countries, could be helping to improve the conditions of the poorest of 
the poor, and thereby helping to realize a global difference principle? Unfortunately, this 
generally does not appear to be the case. Sumner only identifies two of the countries New 
Zealand has a country programme with, Viet Nam
648
 and Indonesia, as being among the 
middle-income countries that have a high number of world’s poorest, and he identifies 
Indonesia as an “emerging” power with little need for ODA.649   
 Another factor to take in to consideration when considering if New Zealand’s ODA 
programme is helping to realize a global difference principle is how much of New Zealand’s 
country programme ODA went to LDCs. In the financial year 2011/2012, we find 120.5 
million dollars of the 256.5 million dollars that went to country programmes went to LDCs. 
However, this may underestimate how much of New Zealand’s country programmes 
contribute to very poor nations, and therefore lead to an underestimation of the role New 
Zealand’s ODA programme has in helping to realize a global difference principle. This can 
happen because New Zealand gives ODA to some nations that the UN does not consider 
countries, and therefore does not consider for inclusion among the LDCs. The three nations I 
am referring to are New Zealand’s former colonies of the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau. 
Determining whether these nations could qualify as LDCs if the UN treated them as 
separate countries is not straightforward in part because a number of reliable sources of data 
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do not provide separate data on these nations, e.g. the WB.
650
 However, other reliable sources 
do provide data on some of these nations. The UN’s Statistics Division records the Cook 
Islands’ GDP per capita for 2010 as being $12,212 (US current prices).651 Given GDP is 
greater than GNI
652
, this places the Cook Islands easily into the WB’s upper-middle-income 
group, if not higher, and certainly above the income levels of most LDCs. Indeed, if the Cook 
Islands were an LDC it would be eligible for graduation purely based on its income level. 
The same is true of Niue. We can start to discover this by viewing figures from Niue’s 
statistics office that show that, in 2009, in NZ dollars current prices, the GDP per capita of 
Niue was 16,575.
653
 To work out which WB income group Niue fits into one would have to 
convert this into US dollars, which would lead to a reduction. However, this reduction would 
not be very large, and before doing this, we would have to convert GDP into GNI, which 
would lead to an increase. This means one can safely say that Niue is similar to the Cook 
Islands in being at least an upper-middle-income country, which means it is much wealthier 
in terms of income than most LDCs, and, if Niue were an LDC, it would be eligible to 
graduate solely based on its income. 
Working out Tokelau’s income, and whether this income would qualify it as an LDC, 
is more difficult due to limited data. The census of the atolls only collects data on household 
income, which is not easily convertible into GNI per capita.
654
 Nevertheless, this data 
suggests that Tokelau is significantly poorer than the Cook Islands and Niue. The 2011 
census records that more than two thirds of Niuean households earn less than 15,000 NZ 
dollars a year, with a large number of these households earning between 0-5,000 and 5001-
10,000 dollars. Given that there is on average roughly six persons in each household
655
, this 
suggests a very low GNI per capita. Another source that suggests this is America’s Central 
Intelligence Agency, which records Tokelau as having a GNI per capita of $1,000 (PPP) in 
1993.
656
 This suggests Tokelau may qualify as an LDC based on income. However, when 
                                                 
650
 WB, ‘Country and Lending Groups’.    
651
 UN Statistics Division, ‘Country Profile: Cook Islands’, URL: 
http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=Cook%20Islands, (accessed 9 December 2014). 
652
 OECD, ‘Glossary of Statistical Terms, Gross National Income (GNI)’. 
653
 PRISM, ‘Niue: Economic Statistics’, (2012), URL: http://www.spc.int/prism/niue/index.php/economic, 
(accessed 9 December 2014). 
654
 According to the census, “Cultural and real-world considerations meant that household, rather than personal, 
income was a more appropriate measure to reflect the communal lifestyle of Tokelau's people.” Statistics New 
Zealand, ‘Profile of Tokelau’, p. 58. 
655
 The census recorded Tokelau as having a population of 1,411 in 246 households. Statistics New Zealand, 
‘2011 Tokelau Census of Population and Dwellings – Tables’, (last updated 21 February 2012), URL: 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/people_and_communities/pacific_peoples/2011-tokelau-census-
landing-page/2011-tokelau-census-tables.aspx, (accessed 9 December 2014). 
656
 CIA, The World Factbook, ‘Country Comparison: GDP – Per Capita (PPP)’.  
N e w  Z e a l a n d ’ s  O D A  P r o g r a m m e  P a g e  | 204 
 
thinking about these GNI per capita figures for Tokelau, Niue, and to a lesser extent the Cook 
Islands, we have to keep in mind the amounts of ODA in per capita terms they receive.  
There is a paucity of direct data on this, so we have to do our own calculations based 
on other available data. In starting to do this we can look at the annual amounts of ODA 
received, and then divide this number by the nation’s population. According to OECD 
figures, in 2011, the Cook Islands received 25,350,000 in US dollar current prices in ODA, 
Niue received 20,850,000, and Tokelau received 20,040,000.
657
 In 2011 Niue’s population 
was 1,611
658, Tokelau’s was 1,411659 and the Cook Islands’ was 14, 974.660  This works out 
to Tokelau receiving 14,203 dollars per capita in ODA, Niue receiving 12,942 dollars per 
capita, and the Cook Islands received 1,693 dollars per capita.
661
 This data shows that while 
the ODA that New Zealand sends to Tokelau does not see Tokelauans recording high levels 
of income, it does make Tokelau wealthier than data on income levels suggests.
  
But what of other indicators of least advantage like those captured by the EVI and 
HAI? Once again, a paucity of direct data confronts us, but we can acquire an idea of these 
nations’ EVI scores by noting that the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau are small isolated 
island nations without much in the way of exports. This suggests they all might qualify as 
LDCs based on their scores on the EVI. However, there is a different picture when it comes 
to the result of estimating what their scores would be on the HAI. 
The UN’s World Health Organization (WHO) records the health of Tokelauans as, 
“reasonably good” with it recording no infant mortalities in 2010.662 The WHO records a 
similar picture for the Cook Islands, and Niue.
663
 The WHO also notes that Niue has good 
education levels, including a 100% literacy rate. The literacy rate in Tokelau is also high with 
less than 2% unable to read and write in Tokelauan.
664
 The Cook Islands has a similar literacy 
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rate.
665
 This data suggests that the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau would not qualify as 
LDCs based on their scores on the HAI. Considering this along with income levels and EVI 
levels, will lead us to conclude that the Cook Islands and Niue are like a number of Pacific 
Islands that receive ODA from New Zealand (Kiribati, Tuvalu and Vanuatu) in that they 
would only qualify as LDCs on their high scores on the EVI. Tokelau, however, might also 
qualify on income levels. 
Given this, and the other data we have analysed, we can suggest that the Cook Islands, 
Niue, and Tokelau would not qualify for inclusion as LDCs. If they previously qualified as 
LDCs, the current data suggests that the Cook Islands and Niue would now qualify to 
graduate, while Tokelau might not.  This might seem to suggest that New Zealand does not 
help to realize a global difference principle by giving ODA to the Cook Islands and Niue, and 
the same might be true of Tokelau, but before rushing to this conclusion, we should bear in 
mind how dependent these nations are on ODA from New Zealand.  
Data we have analysed regarding ODA and GNI suggests Niue and Tokelau are some 
of the most ODA dependent nations.
666
 Most of this ODA comes from New Zealand, with 
2012 seeing Niue and Tokelau, receiving 65% and 93% respectively from this source.
667
 
While the Cook Islands also receives most of its ODA from New Zealand, in 2012 around 
63%,
668
 this does not make up a very large percentage of its income. We can work out this by 
looking at the Cook Islands’ GNI per capita (12,212 in 2010) and its ODA received per capita 
from New Zealand (1,693 in 2011). This suggests were New Zealand were to stop sending 
ODA to the Cook Islands, the Cooks would not be eligible for inclusion as an LDC, and if it 
had previously qualified as an LDC, it would still be eligible for graduation.  This means 
New Zealand’s ODA to the Cook Islands is probably not preventing it from being an LDC, is 
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probably not preventing its inhabitants from being among the globally least advantaged, and 
unlikely to be helping to realize a global difference principle. The cases of Tokelau and Niue 
are not as clear because of their dependence on New Zealand ODA. 
In trying to clarify Niue’s case and Tokelau’s case, we can estimate how removing 
ODA would affect their economies. In doing so we can note that before large amounts of 
New Zealand ODA arrived, copra production formed a large part of Niue’s economy and 
Tokelau’s economy, but afterwards this production virtually ceased.669 One might criticise 
this on a Rawlsian front by saying Niue and Tokelau both were formerly a more free and 
independent people because they sustained themselves through their own economic 
production. However, this copra production did not earn the Niueans or Tokelauans much 
money, which means it would be unlikely to sustain the sort of freedom and independence 
Rawls had in mind.  
To be more specific, in Tokelau’s case, one of the high points for money earned from 
copra production was 87,154 New Zealand dollars in 1975.
670
 In trying to estimate how much 
Tokelau could now earn from copra production, we can note that when Tokelau was in the 
business of copra production it generally produced around 150 to 200 tonnes a year, and on 
recent prices this would earn it around 225,000 to 300,000 US dollars.
671
 This works out to 
about 142 to 213 US dollars per capita per annum. Niue, faced with the same problem of not 
being able to earn much from copra production has attempted to develop other export 
industries, but these attempts have met with little success.
672
  
However, both Niue and Tokelau do receive revenue from fisheries. In Tokelau’s 
case, the revenue from fishing licences had reached two million New Zealand dollars 
annually, which works out to be around 1417 New Zealand dollars per annum per capita, but 
this amount varies due to variation in fishing stocks.
673
 The single atoll, Niue, receives less, 
with fisheries licensing earning only 243,067 New Zealand dollars in the financial year 
2006/2007. That works out to only around 158 New Zealand dollars per annum per capita.
674
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 McQuarrie, Tokelau, pp. 177-179. John Connell, ‘Niue: Embracing a Culture of Migration’, in Journal of 
Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 34, No. 6, (August 2008), pp. 1028-1031, DOI: 
10.1080/13691830802211315. Niue also earned money from the export of bananas. Ibid, p. 1028. 
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 McQuarrie, Tokelau, p. 178. 
671
 UNCTAD, ‘Infocomm – Commodity Profile: Coconut’, (last updated 27 April 2012), URL: 
http://www.unctad.info/en/Infocomm/AACP-Products/COMMODITY-PROFILE---Coconut2/, (accessed 9 
December 2014). 
672
 Connell, ‘Niue: Embracing a Culture of Migration’, p. 1022. 
673
 Government of Tokelau, ‘Tokelau National Strategic Plan 1 July 2010 – 30 June 2015’.  
674
 Government of Niue, ‘Estimates of Expenditure and Revenue for year 2006/2007’, (Niue: Treasury 
Department, 2007), p. 14, also available at URL: http://www.paddle.usp.ac.fj/cgi-bin/paddle?e=d-0paddle--00-
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These figures suggest that if New Zealand did stop giving ODA to Niue and Tokelau, there 
would be a risk they would experience poverty levels similar to the LDCs and their 
inhabitants could become members of the globally least advantaged.
675
 This suggests some of 
the large amounts of ODA the two atoll nations receive from New Zealand may be helping to 
realize a global difference principle. 
One might think that this means New Zealand should maintain the ODA it gives to 
Niue and Tokelau, and that this contrasts with the Cook Islands’ case because removing ODA 
would probably not lead to Cook Islanders joining the ranks of the globally least advantaged. 
Before concluding whether these positions are correct, let us introduce ourselves to New 
Zealand’s ODA programme with its other former colony, Samoa, and some facts about 
Samoa that will lead to similar questions. 
Samoa used to be one of the LDCs New Zealand had a country programme with, but 
this recently changed, not because the country programme ended, but because Samoa 
graduated from LDC status on 1 January 2014. This does not appear to represent a change in 
its score on the EVI but rather the judgment of the UN’s CDP that Samoa’s high score on the 
HAI
676
 and its relatively high GNI per capita are sustainable.
677
  
Samoa’s ODA makes up a relatively high percentage of its GNI, to be more specific 
16.4%, but this does not make it as dependent on ODA as Niue and Tokelau. Samoa also 
receives a smaller percentage of its ODA from New Zealand when compared to New 
Zealand’s other former colonies. In 2010, it received 143 million US dollars in ODA from all 
donors, with New Zealand giving 11 million or roughly 7.7%.
678
 Given Samoa’s relatively 
large population, the total amount of ODA it receives from all countries is not a large amount 
                                                                                                                                                        
1-0---0-10-TX--4------0-11l--1-en-50---20-home---00031-000-1-0utfZz-8-00&a=file&d=niu002, (accessed 9 
December 2014). 
675
 Niueans and Tokelauans might avoid this if the possibility if Niueans and Tokelauans living in New Zealand 
sent back significant remittances. In Niue’s case, this possibility has some plausibility because, as Connell notes, 
Niueans sent larger remittances back to Niue in response to Cyclone Heta (2003-2004). Connell, ‘Niue: 
Embracing a Culture of Migration’, p. 1030. Anthony Cooper found that in the period of 1979-1981 remittances 
played a significant part in the economy of one of Tokelau’s atolls, Fakaofo, even though money from 
remittances was small in comparison to money from copra, salaries, and wages. Anthony Cooper, ‘The MIRAB 
transition in Fakaofo, Tokelau’, in Pacific Viewpoint, Vol. 34, No. 2, (1993), p. 255. MIRAB stands for 
Migration, Remittances, and Bureaucracy.  
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WB, ‘Data: Samoa’, http://data.worldbank.org/country/samoa, (accessed 9 December 2014).  
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 OECD, Aid Effectiveness 2011: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration – Volume II Country 
Chapters, ‘Samoa’, (2012), URL: http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/Samoa%205.pdf, (accessed 9 
December 2014). 
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in per capita terms, especially when compared to New Zealand’s other former colonies, with 
Samoa receiving 532 US dollars current prices per capita in 2011.
679
  
However, while the Cook Islands receives more in ODA in per capita terms than 
Samoa, a number of the figures we have analysed suggest Samoa’s ODA relationship with 
New Zealand is similar to the Cook Islands in certain ways. For example, while the Cook 
Islands GNI per capita of US $12,212 is significantly higher than Samoa’s $2,880680, the 
removal of New Zealand’s ODA in both cases would probably not have much of an effect. 
We have already seen that in the Cook Islands case this is because it receives a significant 
amount of income from sources besides ODA. In Samoa’s case, this is because New Zealand 
ODA is a smaller percentage of Samoa’s total ODA, and Samoa receives less ODA in per 
capita terms. Both Samoa and the Cook Islands also score highly on the HAI and EVI, and 
this, along with the other data, implies that the removal of New Zealand’s ODA would not 
see the inhabitants of these nations become part of the globally least advantaged.  
From a Rawlsian perspective, this might seem to mean that New Zealand should not 
have an ODA relationship with Samoa or the Cook Islands. However, as we will see in the 
next section of the chapter, there are other Rawlsian arguments for maintaining financial 
support for Samoa and the Cook Islands along with New Zealand’s other two former 
colonies, Niue and Tokelau.  
What Kind of ODA Relationship, if any, should New Zealand 
have with the Cook Islands, Niue, Samoa, and Tokelau? 
 
In Samoa’s case, one reason for New Zealand continuing to have an ODA relationship 
with the country is the Friendship Treaty, mentioned in the previous chapter, where New 
Zealand pledged to “consider sympathetically requests from the Government of Western 
Samoa for technical, administrative and other assistance.”681 In chapter nine, I argued that it 
was important to keep international agreements, in part because keeping these agreements 
will assist countries in making cooperative arrangements for mutual advantage in the future. 
                                                 
679
 This, however, did place Samoa 9
th 
amongst countries receiving ODA. WB, ‘Net ODA received per capita 
(current US$), URL: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.PC.ZS?order=wbapi_data_value_2011+wbapi_data_value
+wbapi_data_value-last&sort=asc, (accessed 9 December 2014).  With New Zealand giving 7.7% of Samoa’s 
ODA, this works out to around 41 US dollars per capita.   
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 UN, DESA, ‘LDC Data Retrieval’.  
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 United Nations — Treaty Series, No. 6515, ‘Treaty of Friendship between the Government of New Zealand 
and Government of Western Samoa’, Article IV.  
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This might lead us to the conclusion that New Zealand’s ODA programme with Samoa 
should continue.  
However, one fact that counts against this conclusion is Article VI of the Friendship 
Treaty, which states: 
Either Government may at any time give to the other Government written notice of its desire 
to terminate this Agreement. In such case, this Agreement shall terminate upon the expiration 
of three months from the date on which the notice is received.
682
 
 
This implies New Zealand could be morally justified in ending the agreement and ending its 
ODA relationship with Samoa as long as it gave three months’ notice of its intention to do so. 
However, New Zealand has yet to do so, and when discussing the treaty, assistance and trade 
are emphasised rather than the exit clause.
683
 New Zealand has also made newer 
commitments to Samoa including, in 2011, a Joint Commitment to Development, which as 
the name suggests, includes commitments from New Zealand and Samoa. Among New 
Zealand’s commitments is to, “Provide long-term and predictable assistance”.684 The 
agreement also does not contain an exit clause. This, along with the importance of keeping 
international agreements, and the benefits the programme will bring to the Samoan people, 
suggests New Zealand should continue to have an ODA relationship with Samoa.
685
   
As we have seen, while New Zealand gives similar amounts of ODA in monetary 
terms to Samoa, the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau, due to their smaller populations the 
Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau receive exponentially more in per capita terms. Some might 
think this means the amount the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau receives is too generous 
and that New Zealand should reduce its support to these three nations especially as it is 
questionable whether these nations contain many of the globally least advantaged. However, 
others argue New Zealand should provide more support, but that this support should not be in 
the form of ODA. The former National Minister of Parliament, Marilyn Waring, who 
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undertook a 2005 ministerial review of New Zealand’s ODA programme for the then Labour 
government
686
, appears to have this view.  
Waring viewed the ODA given to the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau as meagre, 
especially when compared to how other developed countries treat their overseas territories. 
She claimed, “Australia and France regard their territories as integral parts of the 
metropolitan country or community with citizen’s rights to the same level of provision of 
government services as mainland metropolitan levels.” This contrasts with New Zealand 
which, “promises special relationships and necessary assistance, not service equality.”687 
Waring suggested that New Zealand could view its territories as Great Britain does given 
Great Britain gives roughly the same amount of money in ODA in per capita terms.
688
 
However, data suggests that Waring’s claims about how Australia, Great Britain, and France 
treat their territories are not entirely accurate.  
If we look at OECD figures and compare Tokelau to the other 16 NSGTs, the 
majority of which are British, we find most of the 16 other NSGTs used to receive ODA. 
However, figures that are more recent suggest that, besides Tokelau, the only NSGTs to 
receive ODA in 2011 were the British territories of Anguilla, Montserrat, and St Helena. In 
investigating the question of how much each territory received in 2011 in per capita terms, 
we find New Zealand gave Tokelau roughly 12,594 US current prices dollars. If we compare 
this to the British NSGTs, we find Montserrat received around 9,037 dollars per capita;
689
 St. 
Helena received around 19,907;
690
 and Anguilla received only around 29.
691
 This, along with 
a number of Great Britain’s overseas NSGTs appearing to receiving no ODA692, suggests that 
Great Britain’s treatment of its overseas territories varies more than Waring indicated. 
However, as Waring claims, Great Britain, at least when it comes to amounts of ODA in per 
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capita terms, does seem to treat some of its territories in a manner similar to how New 
Zealand treats the Cook Island, Niue, and Tokelau.
693
  
But contrary to what Waring claims, France and Australia do not treat all of their 
overseas territories in all respects as if they were part of the mainland. For France notable in 
this regard is the territory known as Wallis and Futuna. This territory received around 8,604 
dollars in ODA in per capita terms,
694
 which means in this case France may not be any more 
generous than New Zealand is in regards to Niue and Tokelau, indeed, France may be less 
generous. France by giving Wallis and Futuna ODA may also be revealing it does not view 
Wallis Futuna in the same manner as mainland France. This is because the French 
government does not categorise financial support it gives to those living in mainland France 
as ODA. When it comes to Australia, we can note that its government does not provide the 
inhabitants of its territory Norfolk Island with the same level of health cover as mainland 
Australians.
695
 However, the Australian government does not classify the financial support it 
gives to Norfolk Island as ODA, which suggests it views the island as an integral part of 
Australia. This, along with Waring’s commentary, raises the question whether New Zealand 
should do the same when it comes to the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau. 
We can start to argue for a positive answer to this question by first noting that the 
New Zealand government does not classify the support it gives to mainland New Zealand 
citizens as ODA. Then we can note that the native inhabitants of Niue, Tokelau, and Cook 
Islands have New Zealand citizenship.
696
 If citizens deserve equal treatment from the state, a 
view with a history that predates Rawls but is nonetheless in keeping with Rawlsian thinking, 
then this suggests that the support New Zealand gives to Cook Islanders, Niueans, and 
Tokelauans should not be in the form of ODA. Similar thinking led Grossman and Lees to 
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recommend, “Constitutionally-derived payments to Niue, Cook Islands and Tokelau should 
not come from the ODA budget.”697 The review added: 
Niue, the Cook Islands and Tokelau are entitled to direct financial support from New Zealand 
through their constitutional arrangements. They are payments as of right that should not be 
met through ODA. The relationship with these countries comprising New Zealand citizens 
should be managed through Foreign Affairs or another appropriate body. ODA could still be 
provided for specific poverty elimination needs within those countries but would need to meet 
the same criteria for ODA as all other bilateral countries.
698
 
 
As was noted earlier, the fifth Labour government adopted many of the 
recommendations in the ministerial review; however, this government’s Cabinet decided, 
“Development Assistance to the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau should remain within the 
NZODA programme.”699 This was a mistake. Just as New Zealand has an obligation to meet 
its many promises to give 0.7% of GNP in ODA, it also has a separate obligation to meet its 
constitutional commitments to the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau in the same way it meets 
its constitutional commitments to other New Zealand citizens.  
The current inclusion of financial support to the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau as 
country programme ODA is just one problem this section on the New Zealand Aid 
Programme’s country programmes has revealed. Another notable problem is the focus on 
relatively wealthy Pacific nations unlikely to contain the globally least advantaged, which 
reduces the likelihood of New Zealand’s ODA helping to realize a global difference 
principle. However, is this true of New Zealand’s other forms of ODA, which for the lack of 
a better term we could call its “non-country programmes”?700 Does New Zealand target these 
programmes in such a way, and do these programmes have features, that could help to realize 
a global difference principle and certain other principles of justice discussed in this thesis?  
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698
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699
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New Zealand’s Non-Country Programmes 
 
We can start our exploration of the recent state of these programmes by viewing a 
table of New Zealand’s financial contribution to these programmes for the financial year 
2011/2012: 
Programme subtype $NZ m 
Regional programmes   
ASEAN
701
 30 
Africa 7 
Latin America and the Caribbean 6 
Multi-country thematic programmes  
Economic Development 18 
Human Development and Governance 20 
Agency Programmes  
Multilateral Agencies 94.5 
Pacific Regional Agencies 19.5 
Other programmes  
New Zealand Partnerships and Funds 40 
Humanitarian 17 
Other Crown Expenditure 7 
Discretionary/Revolving Fund 20 
Total 279 
            
702
 
As we can see from the table, one point of difference between these programmes and the 
country programmes is that many of these programmes do not have an explicit geographical 
focus. Instead, the New Zealand government names them after the goals it hopes they will 
accomplish. Among the goals we find a number that if realized may be steps towards 
realizing some of the global principles of justice discussed in this thesis.  
 It is likely that the governance part of the human development and governance 
programme will look to push nations towards becoming more liberal and therefore closer to 
being a liberal people, which means it could help to realize the duty of assistance.  We can 
see this push in a liberal direction when the New Zealand Aid Programme declares that it 
wishes that this, and other programmes, “reflect and encourage recognised values such as 
transparency, accountability, democratic governance, gender equity and the rule of law.”703   
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There is, of course, the possibility that a number of New Zealand’s other ODA 
programmes may indirectly assist countries in developing in a liberal direction. If, for 
example, as many political scientists claim, economic development pushes countries in a 
liberal direction
704
, then any programme that assists with economic development could 
indirectly help nations become a liberal people and thereby help to realize the duty of 
assistance. Of course, this economic development may also help to realize a global difference 
principle.  
For example, if the multi-country thematic programme that seeks to promote 
economic development succeeds in encouraging development in the developing world, then it 
may improve the expectations and conditions of the globally least advantaged. Similar 
comments apply to programmes that seek to promote human development, which the New 
Zealand Aid Programme believes is encouraged by improving education and health 
services.
705
 
However, when considering if these non-country programmes would help to realize a 
global difference principle, we have to discover the countries the programmes take place in to 
see if these countries are likely to include some of the globally least advantaged. While the 
figures in the previous table do not detail where all the non-country programme money is 
distributed, they still suggest that the non-country programmes have less of a Pacific focus 
than the country programmes. Other figures support this suggestion. We have already seen 
that in the 2011/2012 financial year, Pacific country programmes took up 77% of 
contributions to country programmes, while OECD figures for 2012 show that “only” 51% of 
New Zealand’s total ODA explicitly distributed to the Pacific. This suggests a low percentage 
of non-country programme money distributed to the Pacific, and leaves open the possibility 
that the rest of this money goes towards poorly performing LDCs that we generally do not 
find in the Pacific. However, when we inspect the figures more closely we find this does not 
appear to be the case.  
We already saw that New Zealand distributed 120.5 million New Zealand dollars of 
country programme money to the LDCs in the financial year 2011/2012, with most of these 
LDCs being the better performing ones. In 2012, according to OECD figures, the dollar 
amount from all New Zealand’s ODA programmes that went to LDCs was 118.35 million 
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(US current prices) out of a total 449.14 million given.
706
 Comparing these numbers suggests, 
even when adjusting for the exchange rate, that most of the ODA that New Zealand 
distributes to the LDCs comes from its country programmes. The small amount of non-
country programme money, 7 million New Zealand dollars, that Africa receives, also 
suggests this.
707
 
Along with reducing the possibility that New Zealand’s ODA will help to realize a 
global difference principle, the small amount of money that New Zealand distributes towards 
the LDCs also represents another broken promise. We saw in the ninth chapter that developed 
countries, including New Zealand, have pledged to give 0.15% to 0.2% of GNP in ODA to 
the LDCs. Figures from the UN show that in 2011 New Zealand only gave 0.08%.
708
 
New Zealand also gives a small amount of its resources to multilateral programmes. 
Before seeing why this reduces the ability of the programme to realize a global difference 
principle, let us discover exactly how much ODA New Zealand gives to multilateral 
programmes. 
One might think that all of the non-country programmes are multilateral because the 
New Zealand Aid Programme classifies its country programmes as its bilateral aid, but a 
number of New Zealand’s non-country programmes are clearly bilateral. For example, the 
New Zealand government controls the New Zealand Partnership for International 
Development fund, with the programme’s stated aim being, “to harness the expertise and 
innovation of New Zealand charitable, other not-for-profit, private sector and state sector 
organisations in the delivery of aid activities in developing countries.”709 
New Zealand’s contribution to the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
might appear to be multilateral because the members of ASEAN are governments.  However, 
when the New Zealand Aid Programme discusses its four ASEAN “flagship” programmes 
(Disaster Risk Management, New Zealand-ASEAN scholars, Agricultural Diplomacy, and 
the Young Business Leaders initiative) it says, “new bilateral and regional activities are under 
development for all four flagships.”710 This suggests that a good deal of funds provided for 
these programmes are bilateral in nature.  
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If we look at the previous table of non-country programme disbursements, the only 
money that goes to the non-country programmes that we can classify as multilateral may be 
the 94.5 million New Zealand dollars given to multilateral agencies, and the 19.5 million 
given to Pacific regional agencies. This represents around 21% of the 535.5 million New 
Zealand dollars given in the 2011/12 financial year. This is similar to OECD figures for 2011, 
which show that New Zealand gave 94.55 million dollars (US current prices) to multilateral 
agencies, which is around 22% of the ODA New Zealand gave that year.
711
 
Even without studying empirical research, one might be concerned with the large 
majority of New Zealand’s ODA being bilateral. This is because one might expect bilateral 
aid, whose disbursement is under the control of one government, would likely reflect the 
interests of the donor and be less likely to reflect the interests of the recipient. In comparison, 
an intergovernmental body determines multilateral aid’s disbursement. Common sense 
suggests that this may lead to a situation where the conflicting interests of donors cancel each 
other out, leaving room for the interests of the recipient to have more of a role.
712
  
If we look to empirical research, we find evidence backs up common sense with some 
exceptions. Starting with an exception, we can note Neumayer found, in contradiction to a 
number of other empirical studies, “there is only weak and somewhat ambiguous evidence 
that multilateral food aid allocation is actually more sensitive to recipient need [than bilateral 
food allocation].”713 However, he also found this, “stands in contrast to the allocation of 
general ODA”.714 This latter finding matches Craig Burnside and David Dollar’s empirical 
investigations, which found, “Not surprisingly, the donor interest variables are more 
important for bilateral than multilateral aid.”715  
While Rawls was open to the possibility that certain policies could be in everyone’s 
interests, he also acknowledged the obvious fact that some policies are in the interests of 
some groups and not in the interests of others. We can note it is likely that policies that reflect 
the interests of wealthy donors but do not reflect recipient need are in this latter category; 
serving the interests of wealthy donors but not improving the expectations of the globally 
least advantaged and thereby helping to realize a global difference principle. Policies that 
respond to recipient needs are more likely to improve the expectations of receiving social 
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 For an example see, ‘Roles of Bilateral and Multilateral Aid in Economic Growth of Developing Countries’ 
in Kyklos, Vol. 56, (February2003), p. 97, DOI: 10.1111/1467-6435.00211.  
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 Neumayer, ‘Is the Allocation of Food Aid Free from Donor Interest Bias?’, p. 398.  
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primary goods among the globally least advantaged, so can be a step to realizing a global 
difference principle. Given recipient need is more likely to influence the distribution of 
multilateral ODA, this gives us a Rawlsian reason to favour New Zealand directing more 
ODA through this channel.  
Exactly what the New Zealand public would make of this recommendation, and how 
this affects its realism, is not clear due to a lack of data on the topic. However, there is data 
that suggests there is public support for, and therefore some realism in, two of the other 
related policy recommendations made in this chapter, viz. that New Zealand should give 
more ODA in percentage of GNP terms, and that New Zealand should focus its ODA more 
on the globally least advantaged rather than the Pacific. 
New Zealand Public Opinion on ODA 
 
In 2007, UMR Research
716
, with funding from the New Zealand government and the 
Council for International Development
717
, surveyed the opinions of New Zealanders on 
overseas aid.
718
 Among the questions UMR research asked respondents was:  
If additional New Zealand Government funding was made available for overseas aid do you 
think it should go where people are in the greatest need of help no matter where that is or 
should it go to people in need in the Pacific region? 
719
  
 
Sixty-nine per cent responded that the additional funding should go to those in the greatest 
need, 25% responded that the funding should go to the Pacific region, 2% were unsure, 2% 
said neither, and 2% said both.
720
 Now, those in the greatest need in the world will likely be, 
                                                 
716
 UMR Research describes itself as, “a full-service market research and evaluation company specialising in 
corporate reputation, issue management, policy, evaluation, [and] social and rural research.” ‘What we do’, 
URL: http://umr.co.nz/what-we-do, (accessed 9 December 2014).  
717
  A statement from the CID website indicates the nature of the organization:  
 
The Council for International Development (CID) is the national umbrella agency of international 
development organisations based in Aotearoa New Zealand. CID was formed in 1985 by a small group 
of development NGOs and aid agencies to coordinate some activities and present a single voice on 
issues of common concern. Today CID represents over 50 members, from small community based 
organisations to large international NGOs. CID is governed by a board made up of member 
organisations. 
 
The Council for International Development, ‘About CID’, URL: http://www.cid.org.nz/about-2/about-cid/, 
(accessed 9 December 2014). 
718
 UMR Research, Overseas Aid: A Qualitative and Quantitative Study, (July 2007), 
http://www.cid.org.nz/assets/CID-Resources/Policy-position-and-discussion/UMRStudycorrected2007.pdf, 
(accessed 9 December 2014). 
719
 UMR Research, Overseas Aid: A Qualitative and Quantitative Study, [Supplementary Tables], (July 2007), p. 
9, URL: http://www.oecd.org/dev/communicationanddevelopment/39430074.pdf, (accessed 9 December 2014). 
720
 Ibid.  
N e w  Z e a l a n d ’ s  O D A  P r o g r a m m e  P a g e  | 218 
 
“persons whose family and class origins are more disadvantaged than others, whose natural 
endowments (as realized) permit them to fare less well, and whose fortune and luck in the 
course of life turn out to be less happy”.721 This suggests they are likely to be among the 
globally least advantaged. This gives indirect public support for the recommendation that 
New Zealand should focus ODA more on the globally least advantaged rather than the 
Pacific.  
 The New Zealand public is also open to the idea of giving more ODA in percentage 
of GNP terms. When respondents were given the statement, “The OECD recommends each 
Government provide 0.7% of their country's GNI for overseas aid. GNI is the value of all the 
goods and services in the economy” and then asked, “Do you think the New Zealand 
Government should meet this target?” Sixty three per cent said yes, 25% said no, 9% said 
unsure, and 3% said depends.
722
 Then the questioners gave the respondents more contextual 
information. Namely: 
The amount the New Zealand Government currently spends on overseas aid is 0.3% of our 
Gross National Income. That comes to around $429 million. The Government has made a 
commitment to reach the 0.7% Target by 2015. Some European countries have met or 
exceeded this target.
723
 
 
The questioners then asked the respondents, “If New Zealand were to meet this target by 
annual increases, would you support or oppose this?”724 Support stayed the same, 63%, but 
opposition grew to 29%, with other responses about the same.
725
 Then the questioners 
explained that increasing ODA to 0.7 % of GNI would mean giving around 1 billion dollars, 
while the government’s annual budget on health was 10 billion, on the unemployment benefit 
was 615 million, and on early education was 619 million. This induced a drop in support and 
a rise in opposition, but support was still in the majority at 54%, with opposition at 37%, and 
other responses remaining about the same.
726
  
Exactly how we should interpret these changing figures is a difficult question. An 
opponent of ODA might suggest that these figures show that the more information we give 
people, the more they oppose ODA. The critic might then suggest that if we gave the people 
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enough information, eventually a majority would oppose ODA. Then the critic could 
conclude that this makes increasing ODA an unrealistic policy. In response, we can note this 
is a speculative position. We can also respond, if for argument’s sake we too become 
speculative, by suggesting that if respondents learnt not only of New Zealand’s commitment 
to give 0.7% by 2015, but also of its numerous commitments over decades to reach the 0.7% 
goal, and its failure to do so, this would lead to more respondents supporting an increase in 
ODA.
727
  
The critic might give a different response and note that if the government were to 
increase ODA in percentage of GNP terms, there would probably have to be either a rise in 
taxes or a shift in tax revenues from expenditure in New Zealand to expenditure outside New 
Zealand. The critic could argue that once this happened, the popularity of ODA would drop 
dramatically and this would force the government to reduce ODA in percentage of GNP 
terms. In reply, we can note that in countries where governments have raised the amount of 
ODA they give in percentage of GNP terms, there has not been such a public backlash that 
governments have been forced to reverse this increase.  
The critic of ODA could respond by taking a different tack and point out that the 
survey occurred in 2007, when the global financial crisis and subsequent recession was only 
beginning to emerge. The critic could then suggest the New Zealand public would now be 
against raising ODA levels, as the effects of the recession are still ongoing. However, we 
could note that countries who give high levels of ODA have been able to maintain these 
levels during the global financial crisis and subsequent recession.
728
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Of course, we cannot be sure of how New Zealanders would react to the government 
increasing the amount of ODA it gives to 0.7% of GNP. The only way we will know for sure 
is if the New Zealand government finally fulfils its numerous pledges to do so. 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has investigated New Zealand’s distinctive ODA programme from a 
Rawlsian point of view, with a focus on what role the programme has had, what role it does 
have, and what role it could have in helping to realizing a global difference principle. A 
number of the conclusions drawn in this regard have been negative. Historically the 
programme seems unlikely to have had much role in realizing a global difference principle. 
The same is true of the current programme, which, like many previous incarnations of the 
programme, is a small programme that focuses on bilateral ODA to relatively wealthy 
developing states in the Pacific. 
However, the chapter also had some positive findings. It found there was justification 
in New Zealand giving financial support to its former colonies, the Cook Islands, Niue, 
Samoa, and Tokelau. It also found that the level of financial support New Zealand currently 
provides is comparable, and in some cases more generous than what other countries provide 
to their overseas territories. The chapter argued, however, that due to their constitutional 
relationship with New Zealand, the New Zealand government should not classify the 
financial support it gives to the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau as ODA. 
 The last conclusion drawn in the chapter was positive. This conclusion was that two 
of the policy recommendations argued for in this chapter, that New Zealand should give more 
ODA in percentage of GNP terms, and that New Zealand should focus this ODA more on 
improving the expectations and conditions of the globally least advantaged, has support 
among the New Zealand public. This means these utopian recommendations have realism. 
This comment on the realism of some of the recommendations the thesis makes, 
brings to an end the third part of the thesis, and the topic-based chapters. In the concluding 
chapter, I will restate my findings from this and previous chapters, and then end with a 
peroration.
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Chapter 12: Conclusion 
 
 In the previous chapters we have seen how there is justification for a Rawlsian 
inspired cosmopolitan view of the world, and how this view applies to New Zealand. 
 In order to set up our Rawlsian view of the world we had to interpret a great deal of 
Rawls’s theory, starting with his domestic theory of justice, and working our way up to a 
global theory of justice based on Rawls’s views, this process occupied the first part of the 
thesis. This process began in the second chapter where I introduced Rawls’s distinction 
between ideal and nonideal theory, and his domestic model and the principles of justice he 
derived from it. In this chapter, I argued that the main justification for the model and 
principles was that virtually all humans possess the potential to develop the two moral 
powers. I also briefly presented Rawls’s arguments that his principles were superior to 
perfectionist and intuitionist principles. My final argument in this chapter was that the version 
of egalitarianism argued for by Rawls was superior to stricter forms of egalitarianism 
proposed by Nielsen and Cohen. 
 In the third chapter, I introduced Rawls’s international model, starting with his 
taxonomy of polities. The chapter then moved on to the international principles of justice 
Rawls derived from this model, and added to the literature by building on Alyssa R. 
Bernstein’s argument that this was an interpretive process that did not consider other 
principles than the eight listed by Rawls. 
 An argument for a principle not found in this list, a global difference principle 
focused on persons, started in earnest in the fourth chapter. In making this argument, I argued 
that if we accept the domestic difference principle because of the equal moral worth of 
persons, which is due to them possessing the potential to develop the two moral powers, then 
we should also accept the global difference principle. After this, the chapter responded to a 
number of arguments made against the principle by Nagel, Freeman, Pettit, and, ironically, 
Rawls.   
  In the fifth chapter, we saw Rawls’s argument against the global difference principle 
was not entirely negative. He believed he had identified a principle that could act as a 
replacement, the duty of assistance. The chapter showed that this position is mistaken 
because, as is argued by Hinsch, we can and should have both principles. This is a reflection 
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of the domestic situation where we have the difference principle and the just savings 
principle. We could discover this reflection by noting a number of similarities between the 
just savings principle and the duty of assistance, both of which are about the creation and 
preservation of institutions which help to protect certain liberties. These similarities had been 
hitherto been largely neglected by other commentators. 
 While the fifth and the previous three chapters that made up the first part of the thesis 
mainly focused on a number of conceptual issues in ideal theory, the second part of the thesis 
investigated the more empirical, nonideal theory issues of realizing principles of global 
justice. This started in the sixth chapter that looked at Rawls’s empirical claim that the causes 
of wealth and well-orderliness are largely internal to nations, which if true would undermine 
the idea that the duty of assistance and the global difference principle were realizable 
principles of justice. It was concluded that Rawls’s empirical claim, labelled by Pogge as 
“explanatory nationalism”, was often false and that we can see this in how international 
factors, like how governments sell natural resources on the international market, can have an 
effect on economic performance and well-orderliness. I then argued that even when 
explanatory nationalism was true, this did not necessarily mean in these instances we could 
hold the persons who make up nations responsible for their countries’ economic performance. 
In disagreement with Miller, I argued this was especially true in the case of non-liberal 
societies. 
 In the seventh chapter, I argued that testing of ODA using randomized evaluations, 
along with other sources of evidence, provided reasons to believe that, via poverty reduction 
and other means, ODA can be effective in helping to realize a global difference principle. 
However, economists and others in development circles often suggest trade would be more 
effective in reducing poverty. If true, this could mean trade would be more effective at 
realizing a global difference principle. Therefore, the eighth chapter considered this policy in 
both its free and fair forms.  
Despite its prominence, theorists on global justice have largely neglected the issue of 
free trade. After reviewing free trade, and the arguments made in favour of it by Tesón and 
Klick, I concluded there were reasons to believe free trade could improve the condition of the 
globally least advantaged, but that we should not pursue the policy in isolation, and that ODA 
can assist free trade. I also concluded that Tesón and Klick’s argument in favour of free trade 
C o n c l u s i o n   P a g e  | 223 
 
on the basis that free trade is not coercive, had neglected to acknowledge that free trade 
sometimes requires coercion.  
I closed this chapter by considering fair trade. I noted that it was more of a social 
movement than a school of thought, and suggested trade is fair when it improves the situation 
of the globally least advantaged.  
 In the ninth chapter, I had a discussion of promises. While a discussion of promises 
may seem removed from questions about governmental policy, I argued that it is relevant in 
part because the various commitments developed countries have made in relation to ODA 
amount to promises. This discussion of promises ended the second part of the thesis. 
The third part of thesis was composed of chapters ten and eleven, and looked at the 
nonideal theory issue of how a particular developed country, New Zealand, could realize 
certain principles of global justice discussed in the previous two parts of the thesis. This 
started in the tenth chapter which looked at how New Zealand via its history of colonialism, 
had not respected one of Rawls’s international principles of justice, the freedom and 
independence of peoples principle. Along with detailed discussion of the principle, the 
chapter’s discussion of New Zealand’s colonialism led to an investigation of a neglected 
issue in Rawlsian theory, how to view small polities. The discussion of New Zealand’s 
history of colonialism also tied into how New Zealand might be able to help realize a global 
difference principle via its ODA programme, because this history clearly led to the 
programme. The final topic-based chapter of this thesis, the eleventh chapter, explored this 
and other aspects of the programme.  
Much of the eleventh chapter was dedicated to empirical investigation, but the 
normative framework established in previous chapters acted as a guide to this investigation 
and enabled us to come to a number of normative conclusions. Among these conclusions 
were that; the low levels of aid giving, the strong focus on the Pacific, and the mainly 
bilateral nature of the programme, could not be morally justified; and consequently New 
Zealand should change these aspects of the programme. These conclusions were the last ones 
made in the third part of thesis, and brought the topic-based chapters of the thesis to an end.  
Now that we have nearly reached the end of the thesis, what can I say as a final note? 
Rawls would often end his work, which contained its fair share of dry prose, with dramatic, 
almost poetic, language. At the end of the book version of LoP, he wrote: 
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If a reasonably just Society of Peoples whose members subordinate their power to reasonable 
aims is not possible, and humans are largely amoral, if not incurably cynical and self-centered, 
one might ask, with Kant, whether it is worthwhile for human beings to live on the earth.
729
 
 
The essay version of LoP ends in a similarly bleak fashion, with Rawls writing that 
when it comes to clashes between expansionist religious societies “there is no peaceful 
solution … except the domination of one side or the peace of exhaustion.”730 Both the 
original and revised versions of ToJ end on a more optimistic note, even if there is a touch of 
uncertainty:  
[T]o see our place in society from the perspective of this [original] position is to see it sub 
specie aeternitatis: it is to regard the human situation not only from all social but also from all 
temporal points of view. The perspective of eternity is not a perspective from a certain place 
beyond the world, nor the point of view of a transcendent being; rather it is a certain form of 
thought and feeling that rational persons can adopt within the world. And having done so, 
they can, whatever their generation, bring together into one scheme all individual perspectives 
and arrive together at regulative principles that can be affirmed by everyone as he [and she] 
lives by them, each from his [and her] own standpoint. Purity of heart, if one could attain it, 
would be to see clearly and to act with grace and self-command from this point of view.
731
 
 
The evidence gathered and the arguments made in this thesis show there are more grounds for 
optimism than pessimism when it comes to certain questions we ask from the point of view of 
global justice. That is not to say the pessimist is entirely misguided. Considering ongoing 
injustices, it is natural to have some of the dark thoughts you sometimes find in Rawls’s 
work.
732
 However, if one takes the philosophical and historical viewpoint I have taken in this 
thesis, one can see the reality of progress, and the possibility of a just world.
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Acronyms 
 
AGOA…………………………………..African Growth and Opportunity Act (United States) 
ANZUS……………………………….Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty  
ASEAN……………………………………………………..Association of East Asian Nations 
CIA……………………………………………….Central Intelligence Agency (United States) 
CID……………………………………Council for International Development (New Zealand) 
DAC…………………………………………….Development Assistance Committee (OECD) 
DAG…………………………………………………Development Assistance Group (OECD) 
DESA…………………………Department for Economic and Social Affairs (United Nations) 
DI………………………………………………………………………………..Donor Interest 
DOI………………………………………………………………….Digital Objector Identifier 
EU……………………………………………………………………………..European Union 
EVI……………………………………………………………...Economic Vulnerability Index  
GATS………………………………………………..General Agreement on Trade in Services 
GATT………………………………………………..General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
GDP…………………………………………………………………...Gross Domestic Product 
GG…………………………………………………………………………...Good Governance 
GNI……………………………………………………………………..Gross National Income 
GNP……………………………………………………………………Gross National Product 
HAI……………………………………………………………………….Human Assets Index 
IEA……………………………………………………..International Energy Agency (OECD) 
LDCs……………………………………………………………….Least Developed Countries 
MDGs………………………………………………………...Millennium Development Goals 
MFAT………………………………….Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (New Zealand) 
MIRAB………………………………………..Migration, Remittances, Aid, and Bureaucracy  
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NSGT…………………………………………………………...Non-Self-Governing Territory 
NZAID………………………………….New Zealand Agency for International Development 
NZMCH………………………… …………...New Zealand Ministry of Culture and Heritage 
ODA…………………………………………………………Official Development Assistance 
OECD……………………………Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OEEC…………………………………….Organisation for European Economic Co-operation 
OOF……………………………………………………………………….Other Official Flows 
LoP…………………………………………………………………………The Law of Peoples 
PL………………………………………………………………………….Political Liberalism 
PPP……………………………………………………………………Purchasing Power Parity 
PRISM……...Pacific Regional Information System (Secretariat of South Pacific Community) 
QWIDS……………………..Query Wizard for International Development Statistics (OECD) 
RN………………………………………………………………………………Recipient Need 
SIDS…………………………………………………………....Small Island Developing State 
ToJ…………………………………………………………………….……A Theory of Justice 
UN……………………………………………………………………………....United Nations 
UNCTAD…………………………….United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UN-OHRLLS…………….....United Nations’ Office of the High Representative for the Least    
Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States 
URL………………………………………………………………...Uniform Resource Locator 
WB ………………………………………………………………………………...World Bank 
WHO……………………………………………………………….World Health Organization 
WTO……………………………………………………………......World Trade Organization 
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Polynesian Words and Terms 
 
Are Ariki……………………………………………Cook Islands’ House of Hereditary Chiefs 
Ariki…………………………………………………….…………….Cook Islands High Chief 
Faipule………………………………………………………Tokelauan Elected Administrator 
Fautua……………...Office held by an Influential Samoan Appointed by German Authorities 
Fono……………………………………………………………………Chiefly Council (Niue) 
General Fono……………………………………………………National Assembly (Tokelau) 
Inati……………………………………………………….…Tokelauan Equal Sharing System 
Koutu Nui………………………………….Cook Islands’ Parliamentary Group of Sub-Chiefs 
Matai……………………………………………...Head of Samoan Household (usually male) 
Mataiapo…………………………………………………………………...Cook Islands Chief 
Mau…………………………………………………………….Samoan Autonomy Movement 
Patu-iki………………………….Niuean Leadership Position (sometimes referred to as King) 
Pulenuku……………………………………………………………………..Tokelauan Mayor 
Rangatira…………………………………………………………………..Chief or Low Chief 
Tama’āiga…………………………………………………………………Influential Samoans 
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